


Joint Publication 3-31



Joint Land Operations



03 October 2019
Incorporating Change 1,
16 November 2021



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and assess joint land operations.

2. Purpose

This publication is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) official advice on joint land operations and provides consideration for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It does not restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing forces and executing the mission in a manner deemed most appropriate to ensure unity of effort.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. J. O'Donohue', written in a cursive style.

DANIEL J. O'DONOHUE
Lieutenant General, USMC Director, Joint Force
Development

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**SUMMARY OF CHANGES
CHANGE 1 TO JOINT PUBLICATION 3-31
DATED 24 FEBRUARY 2014**

- Adds Appendix E, “Theater Detainee Operations.”
- Replaces “range of military operations” with “competition continuum.”
- Removes the term “geographic combatant commander” per Unified Command Plan.
- Modifies discussion on phasing of operations and related figure in accordance with JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* and JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.
- Changes the title to *Joint Land Operations*.
- Splits Chapter II into two chapters, Chapter II, “Forming the Joint Force Land Component Command,” and Chapter III, “Command and Control of the Joint Force Land Component Command.”
- Expands the discussion of a theater joint force land component commander and the differences with a joint operational area joint force land component commander.
- Clarifies a joint force land component commander’s authority and responsibilities in a theater or a joint operation area.
- Updates the discussion of large-scale combat operations as per Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, to include discussion of a field army as a basis for multi-corps capable headquarters.
- Expands the discussion on the range and types of military operations.
- Updates the joint function discussion to include information as a joint function.
- Expands the discussion on setting the theater from JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
- Updates definitions and terminology.
- Updates figures, quotes, and vignettes.
- Adds Appendix D, “Example Theater-Joint Force Land Component Commander Establishing Directive.”

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Discusses organizing the joint land force.
 - Outlines the joint force land component commander roles and responsibilities.
 - Discusses command and control of the joint force land component command.
 - Presents strategic and operational considerations to plan and assess joint land operations.
 - Describes the execution of joint land operations.
-

Introduction

Joint Land Operations

Joint land operations include any type of joint military operations, either singly or in combination, performed across the competition continuum with joint land forces (Army, Marine Corps, or special operations) made available by Service components in support of the joint force commander's (JFC's) operation or campaign objectives or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint land operations require synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic and operational objectives.

Organizing the Joint Land Force

Combatant commanders (CCDRs) **organize assigned and allocated forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and concept of operations (CONOPS), as well as considerations of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available.** Unity of action centralized planning and direction, and **decentralized execution** are also key considerations.

In addition to areas of responsibility (AORs), which are assigned in the *Unified Command Plan*, CCDRs and other JFCs designate smaller operational areas (e.g., joint operations area [JOA] and area of operations [AO]) on a temporary basis. Operational areas have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, maritime, and space domains. Theaters of war and theaters of operations are operational areas defined by

the CCDR for the conduct of large-scale combat and major operations and the conduct or support of other specific military operations, respectively. Multiple theaters of operations are normally geographically separate and focused on different missions.

CCDRs with assigned AORs can conduct operations through subordinate unified commands, subordinate joint task forces, single-Service task forces, Service component commands, functional component commands, or a combination of Service and functional component commands.

Forming Considerations

Forming a joint force land component command is a key organizational decision, which will significantly influence the conduct of joint land operations. The following are some of the factors to be considered by the JFC in making such a decision:

- **Mission.** The mission requires that the capabilities and functions of more than one Service be directed toward closely related land objectives where unity of effort is a primary concern.
- **Scope of Operations.** When the projected scope of joint land operations approaches large-scale combat operations in terms of force size, duration, and/or operational area, the JFC needs to synchronize and apportion responsibility among major operations and/or phases of operations.
- **Planning.** The formation of a joint force land component command with a joint force land component commander (JFLCC) integrates planning beneath the level of the JFC for land operations.
- **Duration.** Duration of operations must be long enough to warrant establishing a joint force land component command.
- **Experience.** Designating a JFLCC, with an experienced land-oriented staff, enhances the

detailed planning, coordination, and execution of joint land operations.

- **Multinational Operations.** Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

Forming the Joint Force Land Component Command

Designated Authorities

Each JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the **CONOPS**. The JFC establishes **subordinate commands**, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders.

Roles and Responsibilities

The JFLCC's overall responsibilities and roles, whether subordinate to a CCDR at theater level or serving a subordinate JFC in a JOA, are to plan, coordinate, and employ land forces made available for tasking in support of the JFC's CONOPS, in accordance with the authorities granted as the JFLCC.

Designating a Land Area of Operations

AOs are normally defined by the JFC for surface (land and maritime) forces. A land AO does not typically encompass the entire land operational area of the JFC, but the size, shape, and positioning should be large enough for the JFLCC to accomplish the mission and protect the force or capabilities provided. Within the assigned land AO, the JFLCC establishes an operational framework for the AO that assigns responsibilities to subordinate land commanders and maximizes the operational capabilities of all subordinate elements.

Organizing

The JFC establishing a functional component command has the authority to designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to command and control (C2) those forces will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander.

Within the joint force land component command headquarters (HQ), the commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, and key members of the staff (manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff through the communications system directorate of a joint staff [J-6]) should be fully integrated with representation from the forces and capabilities made available to the JFLCC. The commander designated as the JFLCC will normally provide the core elements of the staff.

Forming the Staff and Command Element

The HQ is organized according to the JFC's implementing directive that establishes the roles and responsibilities of the JFLCC and designates the mission and forces assigned. **Normally, the staff is built around the JFLCC's Service component staff and augmented with members of the other Service components or forces.** The joint force land component command's staff should have key staff billets allocated, such that all Services are appropriately represented and share equitably in staffing tasks.

Liaison Requirements

The joint force land component command's liaison requirements include, as a minimum, liaison with other components of the joint force, either functional or Service. The commander may require additional liaison with other organizations such as joint force HQs, major subordinate commands, and multinational land forces not assigned to the command.

Command and Control of the Joint Force Land Component Command

Functional Component Command Authority

Functional components have specific delegated authority over forces or capabilities made available to them, but this does not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC. Normally, these specific authorities are described in an establishing directive or "terms of reference" document prepared by the JFC staff.

Joint Security Coordinator Responsibilities

The JFLCC may be designated as the joint security coordinator (JSC) by the JFC. The JSC coordinates the overall protection of the joint security area (JSA) among the component commanders in accordance with JFC directives and priorities. The JSC ensures the surface area requirements and priorities for the JSA are

integrated in the overall security requirements of the joint force and are coordinated with the area air defense commander who is responsible for defending the airspace over the operational area.

Command and Support Relationships

The JFLCC is responsible for joint land operations as assigned and establishes command relationships for subordinate forces to the limits established by the JFC. The JFLCC plans and executes the land operations portion of the JFC's operation or campaign plan. The JFLCC prepares a supporting plan or order to the JFC's operation plans that provides JFLCC's intentions, CONOPS, and details. The JFLCC directs current land operations while continuing to plan and prepare for future land operations.

Functional Command Relationships

The JFC establishes command relationships between Service and/or functional component commanders with clear areas of operations, delegated authorities, and assigned responsibilities to best integrate the capabilities of the joint force. Elements of the different Services may be placed under tactical control or operational control to functional component commands while retaining an administrative control relationship with their respective Service component commander. However, support relationships may also be used to provide the necessary authority and basis for mutual support in the operational environment (OE).

Notional Cross-Functional Staff Organizations

The JFLCC may be required to establish a variety of cross-functional staff organizations and send representatives to the JFC's and other component cross-functional staff organizations.

Interorganizational Cooperation

Joint force land component commands are likely to operate with other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, foreign governments, NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector in a variety of circumstances. The nature of interorganizational cooperation demands that the JFLCC and staff consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Other agencies may provide the lead effort during some operations, with Department of Defense (DOD) providing support; however, US military forces will remain under the DOD command structure while supporting other agencies. In some cases, a federal agency

with lead responsibility is prescribed by law, regulation, or agreement between the agencies involved.

Multinational Operations

To achieve the most effective C2 and best use of the capabilities of the multinational land forces, **the multinational force commander normally designates a single land component commander for land operations.** Multinational forces may be part of a coalition or an **alliance**. How that structure is organized will be based on the needs, political goals, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. The multinational commander has the option of creating a land component command within either an alliance or coalition.

Communications Support Systems

The CCDR, through the J-6 supervised joint network operations control center ensures effective, reliable, and secure communications system to enable the combatant command campaign plan. As driven by the mission, the foundation of the communications system is laid by the C2 organization of forces assigned to the JFC.

Planning and Assessment

Strategic Planning Considerations

Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to attain a specified end state. Joint land force planning links the tactical employment of land forces to operation or campaign objectives through the achievement of operational objectives.

Competition Continuum

The use of land force capabilities in **military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence** activities shapes the OE and helps to keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. Many of the missions associated with **crisis response and limited contingencies**, such as foreign humanitarian assistance, may not require land combat.

Major operations and campaigns requiring significant land forces often contribute to a larger, long-term effort. The nature of the OE is such that the US land forces will often be conducting several types of joint operations simultaneously.

Support to Joint Planning

The joint planning process (JPP) provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate

commanders, and other partners to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem. JPP may be used by a JFLCC's staff during contingency and crisis planning. The focus of JPP is the interaction for planning between commanders, staffs, and echelons. JPP is also linked with the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). JIPOE is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC's decision-making process.

Operational Planning Considerations

The primary difference between planning for single-Service employment and joint land operations is synchronizing the unique capabilities and limitations of each force to achieve unity of effort. This requires an understanding of these capabilities and limitations across all staff functions, but it is particularly important in the joint planning group.

Joint Land Operations Plan

JFLCC joint land operations plans, operation plans in concept format, and operation orders convey how the land force helps accomplish the JFC's mission. The plans developed by the JFLCC describe the intended conduct of joint land operations that support the achievement of JFC's objectives.

Operational Environment

The OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of commanders. It normally encompasses the physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains, as well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint land operation. Understanding the OE helps commanders understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how this impacts attaining the military end state.

Conventional and Special Operations Force Integration

The JFC's C2 organization should consider the unique special operations forces organizational structures, along with their capabilities and limitations, in the same manner as those of the different Service land forces. The unique attributes of all land forces and their integration are considerations throughout planning and execution. To maximize efficiency, Services and United States Special Operations Command rely on each other for various functions during operations.

Assessment

Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. **Commanders continuously assess** the OE and the progress of operations and compare them to their vision and intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure military objectives are met and the military end state is attained. **The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander's decisions** throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations.

Levels of Operations and Assessment Considerations

Assessment occurs at all levels of military operations. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses indicators (measures of performance and measures of effectiveness) that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment.

Execution

Types of Operations

All joint campaigns and major operations feature an appropriate combination and balance between offensive and defensive operations and stability activities in all phases.

Range and Types of Military Operations

The US military employs its capabilities in a variety of military operations at home and abroad in support of its national security goals across the competition continuum against a backdrop of the conflict continuum. Some operations conducted by a JFLCC may involve only military engagement, security cooperation, shaping, and deterrence activities. Operations such as foreign assistance, foreign internal defense, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, show-of-force operations, and arms control are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives. Other crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as counterinsurgency, support to insurgency, and combating terrorism, primarily involve irregular warfare. Major operations and campaigns may be characterized by large-scale

combat operations associated with traditional war. All of these circumstances—each potentially with different root causes and objectives—can exist concurrently within a single operational area and may require consideration by a JFLCC.

Offensive Operations

Offensive land control operations are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy land forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. For large scale combat operations conducted during a campaign, multiple corps-sized formations, potentially including United States Army (USA) corps, Marine expeditionary forces, or multinational forces, may be required, necessitating a joint or multinational force land component command based upon a USA field army HQ.

Defensive Operations

Defensive operations are combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability activities and tasks. Defense alone is normally not a decisive action. However, defensive land operations enable joint force land component commands to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive or stability activities and tasks.

Stability

US military forces contributions to stabilization efforts encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Joint land forces assume that role before, during, and after conducting land operations, across the range of operations. In doing so, the efforts of military forces appropriately focus in support of the other instruments of national power. Stability activities will not only include stability tasks but will often have elements of offense and defense.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Defense support of civil authorities defense support of civil authorities consists of Department of Defense (DOD) support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, both man-made and natural, and for designated law enforcement and other activities, such as national special security events. This includes DOD forces when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. USG

departments and agencies or state governors request DOD capabilities to support their emergency response efforts by using the federal request for assistance process.

Joint Functions

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of warfare fall into seven basic groups—information, C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as information, protection, C2, and intelligence, apply to all operations and form the basis for the conduct of other functions. Others, such as fires, apply as required by the mission.

Transitions

Transitions are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships.

Transitions involving JFLCC command relationships normally include a Service HQ being directed by a JFC to assume the responsibilities of a theater or JOA JFLCC. This transition can be based upon either a permanent establishing directive or an approved contingency plan. In either case, the Service HQ selected to be a joint land component command prepare to conduct joint land operations for their respective JFC using approved joint doctrine, as well as continue to perform their previous functions as a Service HQ using appropriate Service doctrine and regulations. Conversely, a transition from JFLCC to JFC staff may also be directed when the JFC determines that operational requirements warrant such a change for control of joint land operations.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and assess joint land operations by a joint force land component command, with a designated joint force land component commander, across the range of military operations.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

“Modern land warfare is the most conclusive, yet the least exclusive, of the geographically focused branches of conflict. Because the belligerents in modern strategic history, with only minor and partial exceptions, have been territorially defined, victory or defeat on land has been all but equivalent to victory or defeat in war.”

Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, 1999

1. Background

a. Command and control (C2) of joint land operations is fundamental to warfare. Having a land component commander (LCC) is not new to the Armed Forces of the United States. The Allies in World War II successfully employed separate joint or multinational land component command headquarters (HQ) in several theaters. These land component commands ensured proper coordination with other components and freed the multinational force commander to focus on overall strategy. After the Allied losses at the battle of the Kasserine Pass in February 1943 due to poor command relationships, General Dwight D. Eisenhower restructured his Allied Forces in North Africa. Not only were all air elements brought under centralized control but all land forces were also consolidated under General Sir Harold Alexander’s 18th Army Group. This structure was the first modern combined organization with coequal land, maritime, and air component commanders under separate commanders and contributed significantly to the defeat of the Axis in North Africa by May 1943. For the Normandy invasion in June 1944, Eisenhower again subordinated US Army forces (ARFOR) under a multinational LCC, British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery.

b. During World War II in the Pacific, United States Army (USA) and United States Marine Corps (USMC) land forces habitually operated together. Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC, commanded both USA and USMC forces in the Mariana Islands campaign. Perhaps the most notable instance of Army and Marine Corps integration occurred during the battle for Okinawa in 1945. Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, USA (Commanding General Tenth Army and Task Force 56), commanded the joint expeditionary force with the mission of seizing Okinawa, Japan, as a shaping operation for the eventual invasion of the Japanese home islands. Tenth Army consisted of XXIV Army Corps, III Amphibious Corps, and a tactical air force that consisted of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing and Army Air Force elements under Major General F.P. Mulcahy, USMC. The Island Command under Major General F.G. Wallace, USA, provided Army-level enabling troops that also had the primary mission of establishing the base complexes for subsequent operations.

c. After World War II, joint land operations became the exception as the lessons of World War II were lost. Frequently, officers serving as theater commanders attempted, with varying degrees of success, to also serve as multinational or joint LCCs. Campaigns



British General Sir Harold Alexander, Lieutenant General George S. Patton, and Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk inspect invasion task force for Operation HUSKY off the coast of Sicily. Alexander was to become the land component commander of the allied forces in March 1943. (Official US Navy photograph)

such as in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam during 1965-1972 were fought without unifying land operations under a single component commander or HQ for C2. In March 1999, neither a combined nor a joint forces land component command was established for either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation ALLIED FORCE or its associated US operation.

d. **Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) (Afghanistan and Iraq).** In June 1998, General Anthony Zinni, USMC, Commander of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), designated Lieutenant General Tommy Franks, USA, Commander of United States Army Central Command and United States Third Army, as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) for any operations that might occur in the Middle East. Subsequently, when Lieutenant General Franks became the commander of USCENTCOM, he similarly designated his replacement as the JFLCC in the war plans. Consequently, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Lieutenant General P.T. Mikolashek, USA, assumed control of the land operations in the Afghanistan joint operations area (JOA) in November 2001 for the conduct of OEF and was designated the coalition forces land component

WORLD WAR II JOINT COMMAND

“General [Sir Harold R.L.G.] Alexander was to become the deputy commander of the Allied force. Admiral [Sir Andrew Browne] Cunningham was to remain as my naval [chief]. And Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur W. Tedder was assigned as the [chief] of the air forces... This development was extraordinarily pleasing to me because it meant, first and foremost, complete unity of action in the central Mediterranean and it provided for needed machinery for effective tactical and strategic co-ordination...[after the Kasserine battle] the ground command on the Tunisian front was placed under General Alexander. The latter...was able to devote his entire attention to daily tactical co-ordination.”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

commander (CFLCC). As such, Lieutenant General Mikolashek controlled a unique combination of Army, Marine Corps, special operations, and Northern Alliance forces during the initial defeat of the Taliban and their Al-Qaeda allies at the beginning of operations in Afghanistan.

2. Joint Land Operations

a. Joint land operations include any type of joint military operations, either singly or in combination, performed across the competition continuum with joint land forces (Army, Marine Corps, or special operations) made available by Service components in support of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) operation or campaign objectives or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint land operations require synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Joint land operations may also involve multinational land forces.

b. In the 20th century, joint and **multinational operations** encompassed the full diversity of air, land, maritime, and space forces operating throughout the operational area. Advances in capabilities among air, land, maritime, special operations, space, and cyberspace forces and the ability to communicate over great distances have made the application of military power in the 21st century more dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate **joint land operations** with other components’ operations as part of full-spectrum superiority and across operational boundaries. Many of these advances have been realized through the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which has enabled the US military and allies to communicate and reach across geographic and geopolitical boundaries. However, these advances have also led to increased vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace and the EMS for the US and its allies.

c. Joint land operations include **land control operations**. These are described as the employment of land forces, supported by maritime, air, and cyberspace forces (as appropriate), to control vital land areas. Such operations are conducted to establish local military superiority in land **operational areas**. Land control operations may also support

countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) to isolate, seize, or secure weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For more information on CWMD, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-40, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*.

d. The operational environment (OE) and the threats in it are increasingly transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional in nature. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, establishes the JFC's OE as composed of the air, land, maritime, and space domains, as well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace), the EMS, and other factors. Domains are useful constructs to aid in visualizing and characterizing the OE in which operations are conducted. The land domain is the land area of the Earth's surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals. The land domain shares the Earth's surface with the maritime domain. Nothing in the definitions of, or the use of the term, domain implies or mandates exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of that domain. The JFC establishes C2 based upon the most effective use of available resources to accomplish assigned missions.

e. **Land operations** are conducted within a complex OE. Number of civilians, amount of valuable infrastructure, avenues of approach, freedom of vehicular movement, and communications functionality vary considerably among land environments, creating challenges for the JFLCC (see Figure I-1). Additionally, urban, mega-city, or emerging subterranean environments require special consideration for the conduct of joint land operations. As a result, **joint land operations require an effective and efficient C2 structure to be successful.**

See JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, for capabilities and tasks that are unique to, or significantly challenged by, joint urban operations at the operational level. For a more detailed discussion of urban terrain, urban patterns, and urban functional zones, see Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-06, Urban Operations.

f. In today's complex OE, actions can originate from, within, and outside of the operational area, all with potentially global impacts and influence. To negate these threats, commanders at all levels should consider how space, cyberspace, and EMS capabilities enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land operations. Furthermore, joint staffs should seek out functional area experts and capabilities that can enhance the effectiveness of land operations.

3. Organizing the Joint Land Force

a. The manner in which combatant commanders (CCDRs) with assigned areas of responsibility (AORs) organize operational areas and forces within their AORs directly affects the C2, responsiveness, and versatility of joint force operations. (CCDRs **organize assigned and allocated forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and concept of operations (CONOPS), as well as considerations of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available.** Unity of action, centralized planning and direction, and **decentralized execution** are also key considerations.

Selected Aspects of Land Environments

Aspect	Urban	Desert	Jungle	Mountain
Number of Civilians	High	Low	Low	Low
Amount of Valuable Infrastructure	High	Low	Low	Low
Multi-dimensional Operational Environment	Yes	No	Some	Yes
Restrictive Rules of Engagement	Yes	Some	Some	Some
Direction, Observation, Engagement Fires	Short	Long	Short	Medium
Avenues of Approach	Many	Many	Few	Few
Ease of Vehicular Movement and Maneuver	Low	High	Low	Medium
Communications Functionality	Degraded	Fully Capable	Degraded	Degraded
Logistics Requirements	High	High	High	Medium

Figure I-1. Selected Aspects of Land Environments

b. In addition to AORs, which are assigned in the *Unified Command Plan*, CCDRs and other JFCs designate smaller operational areas (e.g., JOA and area of operations [AO]) on a temporary basis. Operational areas have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, maritime, and space domains (see Figure I-2). Theaters of war and theaters of operations are operational areas defined by the CDR for the conduct of large-scale combat and major operations and the conduct or support of other specific military operations, respectively. Multiple theaters of operations are normally geographically separate and focused on different missions. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. For operations somewhat limited in scope or duration, a JFC can establish a JOA in which a joint task force (JTF) normally conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint special operations areas are similar and are assigned to special operations forces (SOF) to conduct special operations activities.

For more information on organizing operational areas, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

c. CCDRs with assigned AORs can conduct operations through **subordinate unified commands**, subordinate JTFs, single-Service task forces (TFs), Service component




Figure I-2. Operational Areas within a Theater

commands, functional component commands, or a combination of Service and functional component commands. Although not recommended due to the combatant command HQ need to maintain the AOR/theater-wide focus, the CDR may elect to retain control of joint land operations within the joint force HQ. In making this decision, the CDR should consider the impact dual-hatting has on the staff as it is forced to simultaneously operate both as the JFC with oversight over all the components and as one of the components. In those instances, the CDR would retain command authority and responsibility for all land forces and use the combatant command staff, with augmentation, as appropriate, to assist in planning and coordinating joint land operations. **If the CDR does not choose to retain joint land operations responsibilities, there are four primary options available for employing land forces from two or more Service components:**

- (1) Subordinate **unified command** for land operations (available only to a CDR).
- (2) JTF(s).

- (3) Service component commands.
- (4) Joint force land component command with a designated JFLCC.

d. Each option has advantages and disadvantages that the CCDR and staff should consider prior to a decision to organize under a particular option. The following advantages and disadvantages are not all-inclusive but highlight some important issues that should be considered.

(1) Subordinate Unified Command

(a) Advantages:

- 1. Enduring unity of command and effort.
- 2. Joint staff.
- 3. Provides the authority of a JFC, including the authority to organize subordinate JTF and/or functional components.

(b) Disadvantages:

- 1. Separate subordinate unified command commander/staff required.
- 2. Lead time required to establish HQ before execution.

(2) Subordinate JTF

(a) Advantages:

- 1. Unity of command and effort, the JTF is JOA focused, rather than AOR/theater focused.
- 2. A joint staff.
- 3. The authority of a JFC, including the authority to organize subordinate functional components.

(b) Disadvantages:

- 1. Size of staff requires building multiple new HQ staffs.
- 2. Lead time required to establish the HQ before execution.

For a more detailed discussion of JTFs, see JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.

(3) Service Components

(a) Advantages:

1. Simplified C2.
2. Requires no change in structure.
3. Services provide HQ when forces are presented to the CCDR.
4. Easier to establish prior to execution.

(b) Disadvantages:

1. Staffs not an integrated force, liaison only.
2. Potential for ineffective use of assigned forces due to tasking and mission redundancies between Services.
3. CCDR retains focus on joint land operations as well as other joint operations.
4. Potential for CCDR to lose focus on the AOR.
5. No single focus for land forces, joint land operations, or coordination with other components.

(4) **Functional Land Component.** When designated, the JFLCC is the commander within a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or JTF responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. In essence, the JFLCC advises the JFC on the optimum use of joint land power within the AOR or a JOA. This is the option most utilized in recent conflict and is the focus of this publication.

(a) Advantages:

1. Unity of effort.
2. Integrated joint staff.
3. Single voice for land forces and land operations (consolidated picture of land force capabilities/requirements to the JFC, staff, boards, and other functional components).

PERSIAN GULF WAR EXAMPLE OF JOINT FORCE COMMANDER RETAINING CONTROL OF LAND FORCES

The Saudis had insisted on commanding all Arab forces. Yet the need to maintain unity of command called for establishing a land component commander in charge of all ground forces... Political sensitivities argued against placing Arab forces under an American land commander. Technically, USCENTCOM [United States Central Command] did not control Arab-Islamic forces, and [General] Khalid was [General Norman A.] Schwarzkopf's political equal...

Schwarzkopf made the tough decision to retain the land component commander responsibility for himself, with [Lieutenant General Calvin A. H.] Waller [the USCENTCOM deputy commander] serving as his primary assistant for ground combat issues. The decision created numerous challenges and difficulties. Though [Lieutenant General John J.] Yeosock [the Third Army commander] was clearly charged with commanding the two US corps, Schwarzkopf was within his rights as the LCC [land component commander] in going directly to the corps commanders with instructions. From the other direction, the two US corps commanders dealt directly with Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock. Lieutenant General Charles Horner, as the joint force air component commander, could go directly to [Schwarzkopf], whereas Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock competed with the Arab command and the Marines [I MEF] [Marine Expeditionary Force] for Schwarzkopf's attention. This rather convoluted arrangement certainly went against the principles of simplicity and unity of command. That it was made to work as smoothly as it did was attributable to the powerful personalities and professionalism of the senior commanders.

Source: Brigadier General Robert H. Scales Jr., *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War*

4. Single concept and focus of effort for land operations (an aspect of the plan rather than a function of coordination either horizontally or vertically).

5. Synchronized and integrated land force planning and execution (prioritization and therefore deconfliction of competing land force requirements).

(b) Disadvantages:

1. JFLCC normally retains Service component responsibilities to the JFC (requires split focus of the staff).

2. Challenge of integrating staffs.

3. More lead time required to establish HQ before execution, and sourcing the staffs.

(c) No matter the option selected, the JFC must designate or retain responsibility for the conduct of joint land operations. Hereafter, the term JFLCC will be used in this publication to discuss the responsibilities and functions of the commander designated to conduct joint land operations.

4. Forming Considerations

Not only can the CCDR designate a JFLCC but each subordinate JFC may also designate their own JFLCC (see Figure I-3). Consequently, there may be multiple LCCs, each with an organization, duties, and responsibilities tailored to the requirements of their specific JFC, within a single AOR. Prior to the establishment of the JOA(s) in which joint land operations will be conducted, the CCDR-designated JFLCC, sometimes known as the theater JFLCC, may be responsible for shaping missions. The primary responsibilities of the theater JFLCC may be to provide pre-hostilities coordination with other theater-level functional components; to provide general support to any subordinate commanders and JTFs within the AOR; to conduct theater-level planning; or to conduct joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) for the entire joint land force. The most likely candidate for a theater JFLCC is the commander of the CCDR's assigned theater army (see Appendix D, "Example Theater-Joint Force Land Component Commander Establishing Directive"). Forming a joint force land component command is a key organizational decision, which will significantly influence the conduct of joint land operations. Below are some of the factors to be considered by the JFC in making such a decision. The theater Army is also the Army Service component command for a combatant command and recommends the allocation and employment of ARFOR and on other matters for which the Army is responsible. When directed, the theater Army conducts operational missions as a JTF or JFLCC.

a. **Mission.** The mission requires that the capabilities and functions of more than one Service be directed toward closely related land objectives where unity of effort is a primary concern. Land forces are competing for limited joint force assets. The joint force land component command contributes to the combat efficiency, prioritization, and control of joint force assets, scheme of maneuver, and joint fires, as the situation requires. The JFLCC provides direction and control of land operations.

b. Scope of Operations

(1) When the projected scope of joint land operations approaches large-scale combat operations in terms of force size, duration, and/or operational area, the JFC needs to synchronize and apportion responsibility among major operations and/or phases of operations. A joint force land component command may be designated any time the forces of two or more Military Departments operate in the same operational area.

(2) The unity of command a JFLCC provides may be especially beneficial in geographically concentrated, large-scale land operations, as it provides singular focus, expedited decision making, and centralized coordination.




Figure I-3. Area of Responsibility with Multiple Joint Force Land Component Commanders

(a) **Level of Operations.** Regardless of size, when the scope of the operation requires an operational-level commander to directly link **land operations** to **campaign** or strategic objectives, a JFLCC can provide the linkage.

(b) **Span of Control.** The multiple, complex tasks confronting the JFC may challenge the JFC's span of control and ability to oversee and influence each task. In addition, the **commander of a unified command should not act concurrently as the commander of a subordinate command**, such as a functional component command, without the prior approval of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Having a separate JFLCC allows resolution of joint issues at the functional component command level and enhances component interaction at that level. The JFC has other responsibilities in the operational area that may require greater focus. If the operation can be controlled by one corps-sized

unit, either an **Army corps** commander or a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) commander could be designated as a JFLCC. If the joint land mission is of large scale and requires more than one corps-sized unit, the preferred option is to designate the commander of an assigned or allocated field army or a suitably augmented theater army as the JFLCC. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of land forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will be designated as the JFLCC.

c. **Planning.** The formation of a joint force land component command with a JFLCC integrates planning beneath the level of the JFC for land operations. In addition, the designation of a JFLCC enhances the integration and synchronization of operational maneuver with fires by making the JFLCC the supported commander within the designated AO.

d. **Duration.** Duration of operations must be long enough to warrant establishing a joint force land component command. The duration of operations must be worth the costs in terms of time, personnel and staff training, C2, communications systems, intelligence architectures, and impact on flexibility. The decision to constitute a joint force land component command and appoint a JFLCC should be made early enough in the JFC's planning cycle to facilitate establishment and preparation of the HQ for land operations and allow time for development of a joint land operations plan (JLOP) in support of the JFC. In the case of the US homeland, and the joint operations of homeland defense (HD) and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), the formation of a theater joint force land component command that can coordinate unity of effort between multiple state-formed JTFs has become a durable requirement, as enduring threats to the homeland are both natural and man-made.

e. **Experience.** Designating a JFLCC, with an experienced, land-oriented staff, enhances the detailed planning, coordination, and execution of joint land operations.

f. **Multinational Operations.** Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Designating a multinational LCC provides for unity of effort for land operations. See Chapter III, "Command and Control of the Joint Force Land Component Command," for more on multinational operations.

For a more detailed discussion of multinational operations, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.

CHAPTER II

FORMING THE JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND

"We can never forget that organization, no less than a bayonet or an aircraft carrier, is a weapon of war. We owe it to our Soldiers, our Sailors, our Airmen, and our Marines to ensure that this weapon is lean enough, flexible enough, and tough enough to help them win, if God forbid, that ever becomes necessary."

Congressman Bill Nichols, Hearings for the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986

1. Designated Authorities

a. Each JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the **CONOPS**. The JFC establishes **subordinate commands**, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization provides for unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Unity of command is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning and direction are essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces, simplicity and clarity are critical; **by making the JFLCC the commander for joint land operations, the JFC has the ability to enhance synchronization of operations not only between US joint land forces and other component forces but also with multinational land forces.**

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for additional doctrinal guidance on establishing the land component command and designating the JFLCC.

b. The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the functional component commanders based upon the CONOPS and may alter this authority during the course of an operation.

c. The designation of a JFLCC normally occurs when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation and the JFC determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces.

2. Roles and Responsibilities

a. The JFLCC's overall responsibilities and roles, whether subordinate to a CDR at theater level or serving a subordinate JFC in a JOA, are to plan, coordinate, and employ land forces made available for tasking in support of the JFC's CONOPS, in accordance with (IAW) the authorities granted as the JFLCC.

b. The responsibilities of the theater JFLCC are to:

UNITED STATES ARMY PACIFIC AS A THEATER JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER

In September 2013, to achieve unity of effort among joint forces in the land domain, Admiral S.J. Locklear, III, as Commander, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), prepared an initiating directive for the designation of a theater joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and deputy. This resulted in the February 2014 formal designation of General Vincent Brooks, Commander, United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), as the theater JFLCC; the Commander of US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC), as his deputy; and with support from the Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) as the Chief of Staff. While having only coordinating authority over the Marines and special operations forces, the theater JFLCC provided the USPACOM Commander not only with a means to synchronize land-force activities during persistent military engagement and contingency operations, but also initially developed an accurate, timely, and persistent common operational picture (COP) of all land force activities occurring through the theater. In order to enhance effectiveness and create efficiencies in the land domain across the Services, the theater JFLCC advised USPACOM Commander on the prioritization and allocation of land force capabilities; maintains a land domain COP; coordinates land component planning; and tracked key leader engagements and land-based operations, actions, activities. The theater JFLCC also had an established battle rhythm to enable coordination among the USARPAC, MARFORPAC, and SOCPAC. To operationalize the theater JFLCC, USARPAC also established the Theater Joint Land Force Component Command Coordination Center. With the change of USPACOM and Service component leadership over time, the theater JFLCC role has evolved to Commander, USARPAC remaining as the theater JFLCC but with reduced involvement of the other Service components with land activities as only supporting commands. Commander, USARPAC, as the theater JFLCC does focus on coordination for defense support of civil authorities as evidenced in support to Typhoon Yutu in Guam in November 2018, land based homeland defense planning and exercises, and continued synchronization of land component activities. The challenge of unity of effort remains with only coordination authority for day to day operations, but in crisis response and contingency planning, USPACOM and its Service components value the synchronization that the theater JFLCC provides to maximize use of joint land capabilities.

Source: United States Army Pacific Plans Directorate

(1) Advise the CCDR on the proper employment of joint land forces made available for tasking.

(2) Develop, integrate, maintain, and share with the CCDR an accurate representation of the land common operational picture (COP) (objects and events) within the JFLCC's operational area, as an input to the CCDR's COP.

(3) Develop the JLOP or operation plans (OPLANs)/operation orders (OPORDs) in support of the CCCR's CONOPS and optimize the operations of task-organized land forces. (See Appendix C, "Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development Example.") The JFLCC issues planning guidance to all subordinate and supporting elements and analyzes proposed courses of action (COAs). The intent is to concentrate combat power at critical times and places to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

(4) Conducting personnel recovery (PR) in support of joint land operations and for isolating events occurring within assigned operational area or as tasked by the CCCR. Performing duties of the joint force supported commander for PR, if designated.

See JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, for additional guidance on PR.

(5) Provide mutual support to other components by conducting land-based operations such as suppression of enemy air defenses, suppression of threats to maritime operations, and suppressing the physical locations of cyberspace threats.

(6) Coordinate with other functional and Service components' sustainment support in achievement of JFC objectives.

(7) Provide an assistant or deputy to the area air defense commander (AADC) for land-based joint theater integrated air and missile defense (AMD) operations and coordination as determined by the CCCR.

(8) Support the CCCR's operations (lethal and nonlethal) in the information environment to synchronize the land force information activities and capabilities.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for additional guidance on the information joint function.

(9) Establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) and other directives based on CCCR guidance.

(10) Plan and determine requirements for, and coordinate implementation of, the joint force land component command's communications systems; integrate them into the theater's Department of Defense information network (DODIN) architecture.

(11) Integrate cyberspace operations (CO) into future operations and plans. Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) will be coordinated with the CCCR's CO planning staff. The joint force land component command plans CO within the operational area and relies on the CCCR's CO planning staff and United States Cyber Command's (USCYBERCOM's) CO integrated planning element to coordinate and synchronize CO across the CCCR's AOR throughout all operations and campaigns.

For more information on joint C2 planning and utilization of networked capabilities, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3155.01, Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) Operational Framework Policy, and CJCSI 3151.01, Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting

Requirements. *See JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, for additional guidance on integrating CO into plans.*

- (12) Integrate special operations, as required, into overall land operations.

For additional information on SOF, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.

- (13) Perform joint security functions, such as serving as the **joint security coordinator (JSC)**, as designated by the CCDR.

See JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, for additional guidance on joint security functions.

- (14) Supervise detainee operations as designated by the CCDR.

See Appendix E, "Theater Detainee Operations," for additional guidance on detainee operations.

- (15) Facilitate interorganizational coordination, as required.

See JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for additional guidance on interorganizational coordination.

- (16) **Performing the duties of the space coordinating authority (SCA)**, if designated. The individual designated to be the JFLCC may also be designated to be the SCA within a joint force to coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. The SCA has primary responsibility for joint space operations planning, to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force. The SCA gathers operational requirements that may be satisfied by space capabilities and facilitates the use of established processes by joint force staffs to plan and conduct space operations.

For further detailed discussion of the SCA, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.

- (17) Conduct civil-military operations (CMO) when directed.

For further discussion of CMO, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

- (18) Conduct continuous setting the theater activities that includes communication synchronization, military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities that establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations, as well as during crisis response and limited contingency operations. Setting the theater can encompass a wide range of the joint functions (e.g., sustainment, protection, intelligence, information, C2, fires, and movement and maneuver), all in support of joint land forces, other components, or other agencies and multinational partners. While the theater army generally has this responsibility to set the theater for the CCDR, it may provide this support while designated as the theater JFLCC.

SETTING THE THEATER

Each CCDR's [combatant commander's] area of responsibility (AOR) has unique challenges, often framed by its sheer size, diversity of cultures and languages, numbers of countries, and often with immature facilities for US operations. These factors have caused the joint force to describe setting the theater as a broad range of actions conducted to establish conditions in the operational area to prevent crises, prepare for the execution of combatant command plans, or mitigate the impact of a crisis. United States Army Africa (USARAF), as a theater army, sees this as a continuous process, with three distinct elements to setting the theater: supporting plans or emerging contingency operations that require dynamic planning, shaping the theater through activities driven by the command campaign plan, and understanding the theater. The following are examples of USARAF activities to set the theater within each of these elements.

Open/Close a Joint Operations Area (JOA):

USARAF provided the initial command and control (C2) core of Joint Forces Commander United Assistance to support the United States Government response for Ebola relief efforts in Liberia. USARAF was challenged to set the theater for the mission due to an immature understanding of the environment and lack of available infrastructure. Ultimately, USARAF developed a land use agreement with Liberia that facilitated basing 300 support soldiers near the capital of Monrovia, as well as other agreements for establishing the Ebola treatment units and a supporting airfield.

Shape the Theater:

Exercise SHARED ACCORD is an annual joint exercise bringing together United States military and civilian personnel and African partners to promote interoperability between participants for peacekeeping operations in the Southern Africa region. Exercise SHARED ACCORD 17 involved approximately 2100 participants deploying from Africa, Europe, and the US into separate aerial ports of debarkation/seaports of debarkation. The planning and execution used to establish the exercise JOA benefited USARAF efforts to set the theater.

Understand the Theater:

Given the size and complexity of the United States Africa Command AOR, the limited resources available, and the number of tasks required to support operations in each country, USARAF developed a plan to scope their efforts.

The command conducted a proof of principle in one country with a cooperative security location, which would provide a critical C2 and logistics hub to support a contingency operation in the region. This proof of principle increased the command's situational awareness and understanding of the operational environment to enable USARAF to shape emerging crises and seize opportunities should the need arise.

Source: United States Army Africa

(19) Conduct DSCA as directed.

For further discussion of DSCA, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more on setting conditions for theater operations. See JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, for more on theater army responsibilities for setting the theater.

c. In addition to some of the responsibilities listed above, the responsibilities of a JOA JFLCC may include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Advise the JFC on the proper employment of joint land forces made available for tasking inside the JOA. Develop, integrate, maintain, and share with the JFC an accurate representation of the land COP (objects and events) within the JFLCC's operational area, as an input to the JFC's COP.

(2) Develop the JLOP or other OPLANs/OPORDs in support of the JFC CONOPS and optimize the operations of task-organized land forces in the JOA. (See Appendix C, "Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development Example.") The JFLCC issues planning guidance to all subordinate and supporting elements and analyzes proposed COAs. The intent is to concentrate combat power at critical times and places to achieve operational and tactical objectives.

(3) Direct the execution of land operations in the land AO as specified by the JFC, which includes making timely adjustments to the tasking of forces and capabilities made available.

(4) Coordinate the planning and execution of joint land operations in the land AO with the other components and supporting agencies.

(5) Coordinate and conduct operations in mutual support of other component commanders in the JOA and that cross operational area boundaries and may cross AOR boundaries, as appropriate.

(6) Evaluate the results of land operations, to include the effectiveness of interdiction operations and forward these results to the JFC to support the overall assessment effort.

(7) Synchronize and integrate movement and maneuver, fires, and interdiction in support of land operations.

(8) Designate target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations in the designated land AO.

(9) Provide inputs into the JFC-approved joint operational area air defense plan (AADP) and the airspace control plan (ACP) for the JOA.

3. Designating a Land Area of Operations

a. **AOs** are normally defined by the JFC for surface (land and maritime) forces. A land AO does not typically encompass the entire land operational area of the JFC, but the size, shape, and positioning should be large enough for the JFLCC to accomplish the mission and protect the force or capabilities provided. Within the assigned land AO, the JFLCC establishes an operational framework for the AO that assigns responsibilities to subordinate land commanders and maximizes the operational capabilities of all subordinate elements.

b. The JFC, normally through the airspace control authority, coordinates the use of airspace for all operations throughout the JOA. When any unit is placed under the tactical control (TACON) of the JFLCC, it may have dedicated airspace in which to conduct operations as required.

c. **C2 in Operational Areas.** The JFLCC is the supported commander within the land AO designated by the JFC. Within the designated AO, the JFLCC has the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires to integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction.

(1) Synchronization of efforts within land AO with theater and/or JOA-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the JOA, including within the land force commander's AO. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) is normally the supported commander for the JFC's overall air effort, while land and maritime component commanders are supported commanders for efforts in their AOs.

(2) In coordination with the JFLCC, commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater and/or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations within the land AO. Commanders executing such a mission within a land AO coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects and friendly fire. If those operations would have adverse impacts within the land AO, the commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions adjusts the plan, resolves the issue with the JFLCC, or consults with the JFC for resolution.

d. **The JFLCC may subdivide some or all of the assigned AO.** These subordinate commander AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous depending on the JFLCC's assignments, missions, and objectives. When subordinate commanders are assigned noncontiguous AOs, the tactical units assigned to those designated subordinate

commanders do not share a common boundary. Operation JUST CAUSE, in Panama, and OEF, in Afghanistan, are examples of operations with noncontiguous AOs. The intervening area between land forces within the joint force land component AO remains the responsibility of the JFLCC. If the Army provides the JFLCC, then **Army support areas** may be established at each echelon, from division through theater army, for the conduct of support operations and security of theater-level and lower-echelon troops. An Army support area may also be designated as part of the **joint security area (JSA)**. Figure II-1 depicts an example of an AO for the joint force land component command and subordinate commands with contiguous and noncontiguous AOs.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more discussion on contiguous and noncontiguous operational areas.




Figure II-1. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

4. Organizing

a. The JFC establishing a functional component command has the authority to designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation; force capabilities; and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander. In instances when the theater-level Service component commander is designated the JFLCC, the JFLCC normally delegates as many of the Service component-related duties as practical to a subordinate ARFOR or Marine forces (MARFOR) HQ. These duties typically include Title 10, United States Code (USC), support and administrative control (ADCON) of Service forces.

b. Within the joint force land component command HQ, the commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, and key members of the staff (manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff [J-1] through the communications system directorate of a joint staff [J-6]) should be fully integrated with representation from the forces and capabilities made available to the JFLCC. The commander designated as the JFLCC will normally provide the core elements of the staff (see Figure II-2).

See JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, and CJCSI 1301.01, Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures.

c. **The forces required for the JFLCC to accomplish mission objectives are typically identified during planning and approved by the JFC.** The “Forces For” Assignment Tables, published annually in the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum (odd-numbered years) and Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (even-numbered years), assign forces to the CCDR. During crisis and contingency planning, forces are allocated to CCDRs and may differ from those apportioned during OPLAN preparation.

d. As the JFC develops the CONOPS, the Service and functional components develop their supporting plans. During this process, the JFC tasks the functional and Service components to provide estimates of forces required. **The JFLCC provides the force estimate in terms of capabilities required rather than specific units.** The JFC, working with the functional and Service components, sources the actual forces needed by the JFLCC. **Based upon JFC guidance, Service components designate specific units to report to the JFC, which are assigned a command relationship with the JFLCC.** After the forces are designated, the JFC plans and conducts the strategic deployment of forces. The JFLCC, like other functional component commanders, provides recommended phasing of required forces to the JFC. However, the JFLCC does not control the land force portion of the notional time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) or requests for forces (RFFs)/requests for capabilities (RFCs). Based on the Service and functional component recommendations, the JFC develops the integrated TPFDD or individual RFFs/RFCs and assigns required delivery dates.




Figure II-2. Possible Components in a Joint Force

For more information on TPFDD development, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures).

5. Forming the Staff and Command Element

a. **The JFLCC's staff should, by necessity, be composed of personnel from each Service and various Department of Defense (DOD) organizations and other supporting agencies.** This provides the JFLCC with staff members who represent all available capabilities with the expertise and experience to assist in making informed

decisions for issues that may occur throughout the OE. The JFLCC's staff is organized based upon the mission and forces assigned and attached. Because creating a new staff would be very time-consuming and inefficient, the joint force land component command's staff organization will most likely be derived from an existing Service command structure. The most likely candidate to perform the joint force land component command role within an operational area during large-scale land combat operation with multiple corps-sized formations is a field army. Critical to the formation of the JOA joint force land component command in this case is determining which capabilities are required to be distributed to the commander of the field army (designated the JOA JFLCC) and which are to be retained by the theater army. Candidates for a JOA-JFLCC in major combat operations include commanders of an Army corps or a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) (most likely a MEF). For smaller-scale operations, a contingency command post from a theater Army, an Army division, or a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) could be employed. The JFC should consider availability of an Army corps or MEF if a JFLCC is required. As a result, the initial JFLCC will normally be the theater Army commander. Ideally, the JFLCC and the deputy JFLCC or chief of staff would come from different Services. This construct should be replicated throughout the staff leadership to ensure an understanding of the distinct capabilities of each Service to optimize employment of the forces. Appendix A, "Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Staff Organization," depicts a notional joint force land component command's HQ organization. The SOPs and doctrine for the organization from which the JFLCC is designated normally form the baseline for the joint force land component command's SOP.

b. The leader of each primary staff section provides staff supervision of the activities and capabilities associated with joint warfare at the operational level, while providing expertise in the planning, execution, and assessment processes within their core functional areas. The focused efforts of the primary staff officers in their core areas enable the commander to maintain situational awareness and contribute to sound decision making during the course of the operation or campaign.

c. **Forming and Integrating the Joint Force Land Component Command HQ.** The HQ is organized according to the JFC's implementing directive that establishes the roles and responsibilities of the JFLCC and designates the mission and forces assigned. **Normally, the staff is built around the JFLCC's Service component staff and augmented with members of the other Service components or forces.** The joint force land component command's staff should have key staff billets allocated, such that all Services are appropriately represented and share equitably in staffing tasks. It is significant that these new members are not simply liaisons; they are part of the joint force land component command's staff and ensure the synchronized execution of joint land operations. Forming the staff in advance, to facilitate training and exercising the integrated staff before conducting land operations, is critical to mission accomplishment.

(1) **Split Focus.** If the JFLCC retains Service component responsibilities for AOR-wide, assigned, same-Service forces, dual-hatting of the staff may burdensome staff members with focus and time-management dilemmas. **The JFLCC obtains staff augmentation; splits the Service HQ to establish dual command posts to provide exclusive focus on joint operational and Service administrative matters, respectively;**

or delegates all or many of the Service component-related tasks to a subordinate Service force HQ.

(2) **Staff Organization.** The joint force land component command staff, which will most likely be derived from an existing Service command structure, should be reasonably balanced as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of the Service member concerned. Positions on the staff should be divided so representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force and the character of the contemplated operation; the number of personnel should be kept to the minimum consistent with the task to be performed. The JFLCC is authorized to organize the staff and assign responsibilities to individual Service members assigned to the staff as deemed necessary to accomplish the mission. See Appendix A, “Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Staff Organization.”

(a) **Traditional Arrangement.** A joint staff arrangement is normally adopted, with directorates for manpower and personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communications systems forming the core. Optional directorates for engineering, force structure and resource management, liaison officers (LNOs)/agency representatives, and CMO can be established depending on the nature of the operation, the OE, and the commander’s desires.

(b) **Functional Arrangement.** Alternatively, the staff may be organized into groups that reflect the joint functions of operational movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, C2, information, protection, and sustainment. The focused efforts of the staff in these functionally organized groupings may enable the JFLCC and senior staff to maintain a more logically integrated situational awareness across the operating systems, which contributes to sound decision making.

(3) **Forward Deployment.** At some point, a significant portion of the theater joint force land component command HQ (depending on technological capabilities) may forward deploy to plan, coordinate, and conduct JRSOI and other joint land operations in the AO. The JFLCC will normally forward deploy as soon as the forward-deployed elements of the joint force land component command staff is operational. It is critical for the JFLCC to get forward to conduct a personal assessment and interact with as many military, diplomatic, host nation (HN), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials in the AO as possible. Early arrival of the JFLCC also provides the personal opportunity to begin training a staff composed of many new players that will be conducting operational level tasks.

d. Joint Force Land Component Command Subordinate Elements. The JFLCC controls and coordinates the joint land operations of all subordinate forces (see Figure II-3).

(1) **Multinational forces may be provided to the JFLCC for land operations.** Major concerns are command relationships and authorities, unity of effort, liaison requirements, intelligence and information sharing, integration of forces, interoperability of equipment, doctrine and procedures, language and cultural factors, mission assignment,




Figure II-3. Composition of a Notional Joint Force Land Component Command

AOs, rules of engagement (ROE), logistic readiness and capabilities, and national direction or caveats. When operating as part of a multinational alliance or coalition, military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, policy, regulations, and guidance.

See JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for additional guidance on these concerns.

(2) **Same-Service Forces.** The JFLCC, as a Service component commander, normally exercises operational control (OPCON) of same-Service forces through subordinate Service force commanders.

(3) **Other Service Forces.** The JFLCC will normally be delegated TACON of other Service forces. **The JFLCC and staff must understand the capabilities and limitations of other Service forces.** A MAGTF placed TACON to an Army-provided JFLCC will normally include Marine tactical air assets. The MAGTF commander will retain OPCON of organic air assets. Consequently, **commanders should specifically address the issue of JFLCC employment of Marine tactical aviation (that is, independent functional component air operations) during planning.** The JFLCC should also be prepared to receive and coordinate with Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) forces (e.g., coastal riverine, explosive ordnance disposal [EOD], and naval construction force), the elements of a maritime pre-positioning force (MPF), or the equipment of Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) when attached or provided.

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more detail on joint C2.

(4) **Specialized Land Forces and Capabilities**

(a) **Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC).** The JFLCC may employ an AAMDC to provide integrated AMD, to include missile defense operations conducted by land forces, planned, coordinated, and synchronized with the joint AADP of the AADC. The AAMDC is also normally placed TACON to the AADC to ensure coordination.

(b) **Sustainment.** The authority to direct logistics is not normally resident in the JFLCC's command authority over other Service forces, unless the JFC delegates authority to the JFLCC for a common support capability or capabilities. If so designated, the JFLCC should establish a joint sustainment organization to manage land component common-user logistics (CUL) support. Army theater sustainment commands (TSCs) and expeditionary sustainment commands, as well as Marine logistics groups, may be suitable as a basis for augmentation to provide CUL.

For more information on authority for logistics common support capabilities, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

(c) **Detainee Operations.** While this is an Army executive agent (EA) responsibility, the JFC may designate the JFLCC to supervise joint detainee operations. USA military police (MP) commands or brigades can provide the basis for these organizations.

See Appendix E, "Theater Detainee Operations," for additional guidance on detainee operations.

(d) **Engineering.** If warranted, a USA theater engineer command (TEC) or engineer brigade may be provided to the JFLCC to supervise large-scale engineering efforts in the JFLCC's AO. These units could be supplemented by either naval construction

force units or US Air Force engineering squadrons. The TEC coordinates major construction planning and operations with the engineering staff section of a joint staff (J-7), or logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) when established separately, and receives planning and direction from the joint force land component command.

For additional guidance on engineer doctrine for joint operations, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

(e) **Intelligence.** Specialized intelligence capabilities, such as signals intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), the use of unmanned systems, or joint interrogation and debriefing centers (JIDC), may be provided by the theater Army's military intelligence brigade-theater, reinforced or supported by: Service intelligence offices; Service strategic, operational, and functional intelligence commands; Service multi-component intelligence support; or national agencies.

For additional information on national-level intelligence support, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

(f) **Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC).** US Transportation Command's JECC provides mission-tailored, joint capability packages to CDRs to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force HQs, fulfill global response force execution, and bridge joint operational requirements. JECC is a catalyst to enable C2 at the operational level of warfare by providing alert-postured, expeditionary, short-term, start-up forces in three functional areas: joint planning; joint command, control, communications, and computer systems; and joint public affairs (PA). JECC can provide the JFC with three capabilities: joint planners in five areas—plans, operations, intelligence, logistics, information management and knowledge sharing; joint PA with joint media and communications-capable teams for enhanced, ready PA capability; and joint communications with rapidly deployable, en route, early entry, and scalable communications systems support capabilities.

For a more detailed discussion of the JECC, see JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.

(g) **Joint Task Force-Elimination (JTF-E).** The USA may provide a JTF-E from the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Command for support of CWMD operations. JTF-E provides a rapidly deployable operational HQ that can quickly integrate into an operational-level HQ to provide CWMD expertise in planning, intelligence, and operations. It is a scalable, flexible, and deployable capability to support planning for CWMD operations.

(h) **Other Capabilities.** The joint force land component may be augmented with forces, capabilities, and/or liaisons from the Service and functional components of the joint force, Joint Staff, US Army Material Command, US Transportation Command, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), US Space Command, USCYBERCOM, and Defense Logistics Agency. **These forces and capabilities will either be provided TACON, as supporting forces, or for coordination of specialized tasks and services.** Augmentation may also come from the Reserve Component.

6. Liaison Requirements

a. **The joint force land component command's liaison requirements include, as a minimum, liaison with other components of the joint force, either functional or Service.** The commander may require additional liaison with other organizations such as joint force HQs, major subordinate commands, and multinational land forces not assigned to the command. The liaison teams or individuals represent the sending commander to the gaining commander and staff.

b. Command relationships and mission accomplishment influence LNO requirements. Liaison between the JFLCC and other organizations (i.e., functional/Service components, other United States Government [USG] departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs) is an important consideration when determining manning requirements within the joint force land component command staff. LNOs provide continuous and close liaison to facilitate unity of effort and accomplishment of JFC objectives. Examples include a joint air component coordination element (JACCE), Army digital liaison detachments (DLDs), Marine air-naval gunfire liaison companies, and the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD). The JFACC establishes a JACCE to interface and provide liaison with the JFLCC. The JACCE assists the JFLCC's staff in planning air supporting and support requirements between the JFLCC and the JFACC. The JACCE is not an air support operations center or tactical air control party, nor is it an airspace control element within the theater air control system. Like the BCD, the JACCE provides the necessary interface for exchange of current intelligence and operational data.

c. **BCD.** A BCD is a specialized, regionally focused Army element assigned to CCDRs. The theater army commander provides the BCD as a liaison element to the Service component commander designated as the JFACC or to the Air Force Service component if a JFACC is not designated. A BCD functions in the joint air operations center (JAOC), combined air operations center, or the Air Force air operations center. The BCD is the Army's interface for systems connectivity to the JAOC and for personnel integration with their JAOC counterparts. BCD tasks include facilitating the exchange of current intelligence and operational data, processing air support requests, monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation, coordinating AMD, coordinating airlift, and integrating airspace requirements. When a USA HQ is designated as the joint forces land component command, the BCD may serve as the LCC's liaison to the air component commander when augmented with other unique land force representatives.

See JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters, and JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations, for detailed information on liaison functions. See ATP 3-94.1, Digital Liaison Detachment, for detailed information on that unit.

CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND

1. Functional Component Command Authority

Functional component commanders perform operational missions, which support the JFC's strategic objectives, with authority delegated by the establishing JFC. **Functional components have specific delegated authority over forces or capabilities made available to them, but this does not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC. Normally, these specific authorities are described in an establishing directive or "terms of reference" document prepared by the JFC staff.** Functional component commanders are component commanders of a joint force and do not constitute a "joint force command" with the authorities and responsibilities of a JFC, even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments.

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for additional information on functional component commands.

2. Joint Security Coordinator Responsibilities

a. **The JFLCC may be designated as the JSC by the JFC.** The JSC coordinates the overall protection of the JSA among the component commanders IAW JFC directives and priorities. The JSC ensures the surface area requirements and priorities for the JSA are integrated in the overall security requirements of the joint force and are coordinated with the AADC who is responsible for defending the airspace over the operational area.

b. The JSC will typically establish a **joint security coordination center**, as directed by the JFC. The staff of this center may be part of the JFLCC's HQ or this function may be delegated to a subordinate unit and will normally include representatives from all components operating in the JSA to assist in meeting joint security requirements. USA maneuver enhancement brigades are suitable for this function.

See JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, and Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37, Protection.

3. Command and Support Relationships

Unity of command and effort are primary considerations when designating a JFLCC. Use of the JFLCC is a JFC option for managing the operations of land forces and reducing the requirement for the JFC to oversee every task, thereby enabling the JFC to focus more on the overall joint operation or campaign. The JFLCC must understand the relationship with the JFC, the other components (Service and functional), and the forces and capabilities made available. **The JFLCC may provide support to other components and may similarly receive support from other Service or functional components.**

a. The JFC establishes the command and support relationships and assignment of subordinate forces to achieve mission objectives. The JFC will also specify the command relationships between the functional components and Service components.

b. The JFLCC normally delegates the authority to plan and execute tactical missions to subordinate land commanders. This enables the JFLCC to focus on the operational level and empowers subordinate commanders to employ their forces to support the JFLCC's intent.

c. The JFLCC is responsible for joint land operations as assigned and establishes command relationships for subordinate forces to the limits established by the JFC. The JFLCC plans and executes the land operations portion of the JFC's operation or campaign plan. The JFLCC prepares a supporting plan or order to the JFC's OPLAN that provides JFLCC's intentions, CONOPS, and details. The JFLCC directs current land operations while continuing to plan and prepare for future land operations.

(1) **Command Relationships with the JFC.** The JFLCC reports directly to the JFC and advises the JFC on the proper employment of land forces assigned, attached, or made available. The JFC has the authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations.

(2) **Command Relationships among Components.** The JFC may also establish support relationships among components. There are four defined categories of support that a JFC may direct over assigned or attached forces to ensure the appropriate level of support is provided to accomplish mission objectives. These are **general support, mutual support, direct support, and close support**. The establishing directive will specify the type and extent of support the specified forces are to provide. **The JFC determines not only how to organize the joint force into components but also how each component relates to the others.** Support relationships afford an effective means to ensure unity of effort of various operations, each component typically receiving and providing support at the same time. The effectiveness of these support relationships depends on the establishment of personal trust and confidence between the respective component commanders that ensure mutual support even when not tasked.

(3) **Functional Component Supporting and Supported Relationships.** The JFLCC will be the supported commander for operations conducted within the AO when designated by the JFC and may be the supporting commander for some functions. Similar relationships can be established among all functional and Service component commanders, such as the coordination of operations in depth involving the JFLCC and the JFACC or joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). The JFC's need for unified action dictates these relationships. Close coordination with the JFACC/AADC is necessary when the JFLCC provides joint suppression of enemy air defenses; provides attack operations against missile sites, airfields, C2, and infrastructure; or conducts land operations in the vicinity of a joint special operations area. To this end, the JFLCC will

normally share the land COP with other JTF component commanders to meet the JTF's reporting criteria for a COP of the JOA as outlined in applicable JFC directives and amplifying instructions.

(4) **Command Relationships with Forces Made Available.** The JFLCC will normally be a Service component commander. As Service component commander, the JFLCC normally exercises OPCON over its respective Service forces. As a functional component commander, the JFLCC normally exercises TACON over other forces or capabilities made available for tasking or receives support as determined by the JFC.

(a) Once the JFLCC is designated and forces are available, the operational requirements of subordinate commanders are prioritized and presented to the JFLCC. Requirements supporting operational requirements are approved and prioritized by the JFLCC, to include a joint requirements review board (JRRB) for sourcing. However, Service component commanders remain responsible for their Military Department Title 10, USC, ADCON responsibilities, such as logistic and personnel services support, casualty operations, training, and Service intelligence operations.

(b) The JFLCC collaborates with other components and can receive and integrate component liaison teams to facilitate support and to coordinate the planning and execution of assigned land operations.

(c) Commanders may establish other authorities outside those described above. These authorities enable commanders and subordinates to anticipate and coordinate functions with organizations inside or outside the command to facilitate unity of effort and rapid response. These authorities may include coordinating authority and direct liaison authority.

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more on command and support relationships. For further details on Title 10, USC, responsibilities, refer to Title 10, USC, Service responsibilities, and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.

(5) **MPF Considerations**

(a) An MPF enables operations across the competition continuum. When combined with the forces and their equipment arriving in the fly-in echelon, pre-positioning programs provide forward-deployed equipment and supplies needed to sustain a MEB-sized MAGTF for 30 days of operations, thus reducing total strategic lift requirements. The MAGTF and joint force land component command's staff require close coordination during an MPF operation.

(b) An MPF provides rapid response to regional contingencies and consists of the maritime pre-positioning ship squadron, Navy support element, and MAGTF. **An MPF is an option for the deployment of land forces made available to a JFLCC.** The MPF will be assigned to a functional or Service component commander as appropriate and perhaps based on the phase of the operation. **MPF** organization depends on mission, force

capabilities, tactical situation, and phase of the operations, as well as joint and multinational considerations.

(c) The MAGTF commander's mission becomes the basis for all further MPF operation planning and supports the JFC's overall objectives. The landing force's CONOPS ashore is derived from the assigned mission. The JFLCC prepares to receive and integrate planning and liaison personnel from both the MAGTF commander and the commander, MPF. Without this close coordination between the joint force land component command and MPF staffs, the MAGTF may not be able to effectively influence the land battle upon completion of the arrival and assembly phase of the MPF operation. Once the MAGTF commander reports that all essential elements of the MAGTF are combat ready, the establishing authority terminates the MPF operation and the MAGTF commander executes the assigned mission.

See also Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-02.3M/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 13-10D, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations.

(6) APS Considerations

(a) Army Material Command is responsible for ensuring there are APS positioned strategically around the world, and the Army sustainment command executes APS operations.

(b) APS is the expanded reserve of equipment for Army brigade combat teams (BCTs), theater-opening units, port-opening capabilities, and sustainment stocks forward deployed ashore or aboard ships. APS operations require airlift of an Army BCT with logistic support elements into a theater to link up with its equipment and supplies positioned ashore or aboard afloat pre-positioning force ships. APS operations purposes are listed below:

1. To project an armored BCT that is capable of complementing other early arriving forces to selected forward strategically significant locations early in a crisis.

2. To project an afloat infantry BCT or supporting elements to a port to rapidly reinforce a lodgment established by Army early-entry forces and/or by amphibious assault elements, such as an Army airborne BCT or a MAGTF.

3. To protect key objectives.

4. To commence port operations to support the introduction of follow-on forces.

5. To rapidly provide a BCT or other capabilities to be prepared to conduct subsequent operations across the competition continuum.

(c) During preparation for APS operations, an initiating directive from higher authority will specify the command relationships. The **theater army commander**—the senior Army operational-level commander assigned to a combatant

command—plans APS operations. Thus, a theater army commander and staff plan in detail the task organization and activities for each phase of the operation to ensure minimal disruption of C2 during phase transition. The theater army commander will designate which BCTs participate in the APS program and make recommendations for their employment to the JFC. **Upon completion of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), the BCT will be provided to a JFC, who may assign the BCT to a JFLCC.** As with the MPF, the joint force land component command receives and integrates planners and liaison personnel.

(d) APS employment focuses on expeditious deployment, assembly, and employment of BCTs and other enabling capabilities to meet the supported commander's requirements. It may also include tasks in support of other operations in the objective area. The mission order usually delineates the general AO; the required tasks of the BCT or other Army elements; the general time period for the deployment; required time for operational capability; time constraints on deployment operations—for example, availability of aircraft; and the estimated duration of operations.

See also ATP 3-35.1, Army Pre-Positioned Operations, and JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations.

4. Functional Command Relationships

a. The JFC establishes command relationships between Service and/or functional component commanders with clear areas of operations, delegated authorities, and assigned responsibilities to best integrate the capabilities of the joint force. Elements of the different Services may be placed under TACON or OPCON to functional component commands while retaining an ADCON relationship with their respective Service component commander. However, support relationships may also be used to provide the necessary authority and basis for mutual support in the OE.

b. The Navy component commander normally establishes a subordinate TF comprised of forward NECC elements. These elements may consist of coastal riverine force units, naval construction force units, EOD, intelligence, and Navy expeditionary logistics units operating ashore. This TF interfaces with and provides liaison to the joint force land component command. The NECC LNO assists the JFLCC staff in planning naval supporting and support requirements. The NECC LNO exchanges current intelligence and operational data and coordinates planning requirements, to include airspace coordinating measures (ACMs), fire support coordination measures (FSCMs), and close air support (CAS). An Army DLD may be used to provide Army Service component commander/JFLCC liaison to the Navy component commander/joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) and is responsible for synchronizing joint land operations with maritime operations.

c. Commanders may establish other authorities outside those described above. These authorities enable commanders and subordinates to anticipate and coordinate functions with organizations inside or outside the command to facilitate unity of effort and rapid response. These authorities may include coordinating authority and direct liaison authority.

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more information on functional command relationships.

5. Notional Cross-Functional Staff Organizations

a. The JFLCC may be required to establish a variety of cross-functional staff organizations and send representatives to the JFC's and other component cross-functional staff organizations (see Figure III-1).

For additional guidance on cross-functional staff organization, see JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.

b. How the joint force land component command staff interfaces with other joint force C2 mechanisms is described in Figure III-2. Some considerations by type are:

(1) **Planning.** Provide representation in the JFC's joint planning group (JPG) (or equivalent). Participate in the JFC's time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) development. Provide inputs into the JFC-approved joint AADP and the ACP.

(2) **Intelligence.** Provide appropriate intelligence support, including target intelligence packages, to the other joint force components and the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB). Provide and receive support from the theater joint intelligence operations center. Actively work to satisfy the JFC's priority intelligence requirements. Perform collection management functions and conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Coordinate collection management and ISR operations with other joint force components, theater joint intelligence operations center, and, as directed, combat support agencies, other national agencies, partner nations, and allies.

c. Operations

(1) Provide representation in the JFC's **JTCB and information cell**. These representatives, normally from the BCD when the JFLCC is an Army commander, advocate the JFLCC's desired results/target nominations in the respective board or cell meetings. This should include participation in the JFC's assessment process.

(2) Develop desired effects and information requirements and the associated measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) during the planning process. **These capabilities and processes should address the entire depth of the operation or campaign and are critical to shaping the OE before, during, and after operations.** MOEs required to assess the effects of a range of information-related activities may be resource-intensive (e.g., polling and surveys), and the related resource requirements should be introduced early for JFC validation and force provider planning.




Figure III-1. Notional Joint Cross-Functional Staff Organizations

Joint Force Land Component Command Interface With Other Joint Force Command and Control Mechanisms		
C2 Mechanism	Role/Function	JFLCC Interface
JFC's JTCB	Meets daily to provide broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and refining the JIPTL.	JFLCC's representative attends JTCB meetings to represent land component interests. JFLCC's targeting coordination board provides input.
JFC'S JPG	Meets daily or as required to conduct crisis action planning (to include course of action development and refinement), coordination of joint force operation order development, and planning for future operations (e.g., transition, termination, follow-on).	JFLCC's representative participates in all planning activities.
JFC's Joint Intelligence Operation Center	An interdependent, operational intelligence organization at the combatant command or joint task force (if established) level, that is integrated with national intelligence centers, and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment.	JFLCC's J-2 and staff maintain daily communication to provide, request, and receive intelligence products as needed.
JFC's Information Operations Cell	Meets daily or as required to integrate and synchronize information-related capabilities with other elements of the operation plan.	JFLCC's representative participates and coordinates with the JFLCC's JPG representative and other staff members.
JFC's Joint Transportation Board	Communicates JFC's priorities and adjudicates competing requirements for intratheater lift assets and helps resolve other issues that negatively impact the Defense Transportation System.	JFLCC's representative participates.
JFC's Joint Movement Center	Coordinates the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) daily to support the concept of operations.	JFLCC's representative participates.
JFC's Joint Petroleum Office	Plans and manages wholesale theater bulk petroleum support and develops the petroleum logistic support plan.	JFLCC's J-4 coordinates and provides assistance as needed.
JFC's Civil-Military Operations Center	Meets daily and will coordinate all civil-military operations among other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, coalition, and host nation members and plays an integration and synchronization role with other elements of the operation plan.	JFLCC's representative participates.
JFACC's Targeting Effects Team	Processes all potential targets to balance component priorities with the JFC's objectives. Competing concerns are priorities against available assets to produce the JIPTL, apportionment recommendations, and close air support allocation.	BCD provides input and participates, coordinates with MARLE. MARLE provides input and participates, coordinates with BCD.
JFACC's ATO Development Processes	Produces a tasking document transmitted to components, subordinate units, and C2 agencies on projected sorties, capabilities, and/or forces to targets and specific missions. The ATO normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions.	BCD provides input and participates, coordinates with MARLE. MARLE provides input and participates, coordinates with BCD.

Figure III-2. Joint Force Land Component Command Interface with Other Joint Force Command and Control Mechanisms

Joint Force Land Component Command Interface With Other Joint Force Command and Control Mechanisms (cont.)		
Airspace Control Authority ACO Development Process	Produces an ACO transmitted to components, subordinate units, and C2 agencies on joint use of the airspace. The ACO normally provides specific instructions for airspace deconfliction by time, altitude, or routes as well as general instructions.	BCD provides input and participates. Marine Direct Air Support Center provides input and participates. Army Theater Air Operations Group provides input and participates.
JSCC	Coordinates and oversees overall security operations within the AOR/JOA. Monitors emergency service, force protection, antiterrorism, physical security, and base and base cluster plans.	Joint security coordinator is the designated principal staff officer for the planning of joint security operations throughout the AOR/JOA.
Joint LOC Security Board	Assesses and reports LOC status and security capability shortfalls.	JSCC lead (or operations directorate of a joint staff). Transportation representative. J-2 representative. Provost marshal office representative.
Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center	A combatant command movement control organization designed to synchronize and optimize national and theater multimodal resources for deployment, distribution, and sustainment.	J-4 Trans
JPRC	JPRC is the organization responsible for coordinating, planning, and monitoring PR operations within the assigned operational area. Establishes PR reporting requirements and develops a PR infrastructure. The JPRC is the JFC's primary coordination center for PR assistance to other nations or other civil entities, when such assistance is properly authorized.	Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell
Joint Interagency Coordination Group	Interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, collaborative working relationship between civilian and military with the capability to coordinate with other agencies.	JFLCC's representative participates. USG agencies and departments.
JFC's Joint Cyberspace Center	Combines input from United States Cyber Command and combatant commands to provide a regional /functional cyberspace situation awareness/common operational picture. Facilitates the coordination and deconfliction of combatant commander directed cyberspace operations.	JFLCC's representative participates to provide/request cyberspace operations products.
Legend <div> <div> ACO airspace control order AOR area of responsibility ATO air tasking order BCD battlefield coordination detachment C2 command and control J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff JFACC joint force air component commander JFC joint force commander JFLCC joint force land component commander JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list </div> <div> JOA joint operations area JPG joint planning group JPRC joint personnel recovery center JSCC joint security coordination center JTCB joint targeting coordination board Trans transportation LOC line of communications MARLE Marine liaison element PR personnel recovery USG United States Government </div> </div>		

Figure III-2. Joint Force Land Component Command Interface with Other Joint Force Command and Control Mechanisms

(3) The BCD, naval and amphibious liaison element, and Marine liaison element members will participate in the JFACC's targeting effects team and air tasking order (ATO) development processes.

(4) The joint land component command information planning staff and cyberspace planning staff work with the joint forces land component command staff to determine and prioritize cyberspace assets that should be included in the JFLCC's defended asset list (DAL). Once the DAL has been determined, the information planning staff and cyberspace planning staff will work with the CCDR's CO planning staff to align cyberspace forces to mitigate risk to DAL assets from both physical and virtual threats.

d. **Sustainment.** Participation by the JFLCC's sustainment elements (e.g., logistic, personnel, financial management) in the JFC's pertinent boards or centers is critical. **The key logistics higher-level boards and centers are the theater-joint transportation board (T-JTB), joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC), and joint movement center (JMC).** The JFLCC will conduct appropriate JFC cross functional working groups, such as a JRRB, as needed to support the JFC.

e. **Engineer Boards, Centers, and Cells.** If an engineer staff is formed a joint civil-military engineer board, a joint facilities utilization board, a joint environmental management board, and an explosive hazards coordination cell may be established as part of the joint force land component command engineering staff.

6. Interorganizational Cooperation

a. **General.** Joint force land component commands are likely to operate with other USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector in a variety of circumstances. The nature of interorganizational cooperation requires the JFLCC and staff consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Other agencies may provide the lead effort during some operations, with DOD providing support; however, US military forces will remain under the DOD command structure while supporting other agencies. In some cases, a federal agency with lead responsibility is prescribed by law, regulation, or agreement between the agencies involved.

b. **Civil-Military Integration.** The increasing complexity of peacekeeping and stabilization requires complete civil-military integration within the joint force land component. Presidential directives guide participation by all US civilian and military agencies in such operations. Military leaders work with the other members of the national security team using skill, tact, and persistence to promote unified action; this is made more challenging by the agencies' different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision-making processes. **Integration and coordination among the military force and other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector is distinctly different from military C2.** These differences may present significant challenges to coordination. Military leaders work with other members of the national security team to promote unified action. In the absence of a formal command structure, JFLCCs may be required to build consensus for effective unified action to achieve unity of effort. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment. This function is normally performed by the civil-military operations/interagency cooperation directorate of a joint staff (J-9) or senior civil affairs (CA) representative supporting the JFLCC. The JFC may direct the establishment of a

civil-military operations center (CMOC) to enhance the integration of civil and military efforts.

c. **Formal Agreements.** Formal agreements such as memoranda of understanding or terms of reference are more common among military organizations and other USG departments and agencies or HNs than between military organizations and NGOs. Although formal agreements may be established, commanders should not expect that formal agreements with NGOs exist. Heads of agencies or organizations and specifically authorized military commanders negotiate and cosign these agreements.

d. **Information Sharing.** Unified action requires effective information sharing among DOD, other USG departments and agencies, and state and local agencies. Accordingly, JFLCCs should develop habitual relationships, procedures, and agreements with the individual agencies. For example, DOD support to homeland security requires detailed coordination and information sharing with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Implementation of a collaborative information environment (CIE) that connects commanders and these various organizations, using commonly accessible portals and collaborative tools, provides a proven means for effective coordination and information sharing.

e. **Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).** The JIACG, an element of a CCDR's staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilians and military operational planners at the combatant commands. There is no standardized structure for the JIACG. It should include USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant command. The JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through DOD and the National Security Council System. JIACG members participate in OPLAN development and other types of operational planning. They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of other USG departments and agencies. If required, a JIACG may be formed at JFLCC level.

For additional guidance on the JIACG, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

f. **Joint Force Land Component Command Staff.** There are several other means available at the joint force land component command level to conduct interagency coordination. This coordination can occur cross-functional working groups established within the land component command. The JFLCC and leaders of other USG departments and agencies may also agree to form steering groups to coordinate actions. In the case of a DOD-directed DSCA mission, the JFLCC can establish a defense coordinating element to conduct direct coordination with the federal coordinating officer in the joint field office.

g. **CMOC.** One method to facilitate unified action and conduct on-site interagency coordination for CMO is for the commander to establish a CMOC. The CMOC is an organization established by the JFC, the core of which is normally comprised of CA, to plan or coordinate actions affecting the civil component of the OE and facilitate coordination and collaboration for achievement of regional or stabilization objectives

through unity of effort. Through a structure such as a CMOC, the JFLCC can gain a greater understanding of the roles of international organizations and NGOs and how they influence mission accomplishment.

For additional guidance on CMOCs, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. For additional guidance on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

h. **Other Civil-Military Coordination Mechanisms.** To ensure thorough integration of cooperation between the military and other civilian organizations, the commander may require a number of other centers, including a humanitarian assistance coordination center, humanitarian operations center, and humanitarian assistance survey team. These centers all provide the commander a coordination point between military and various civilian partners.

7. Multinational Operations

a. To achieve the most effective C2 and best use of the capabilities of the multinational land forces, **the multinational force commander normally designates a single LCC for land operations.** Multinational forces may be part of a coalition or an **alliance**. How that structure is organized will be based on the needs, political goals, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. The multinational commander has the option of creating a land component command within either an alliance or coalition.

(1) In alliance operations, such as those conducted by NATO and the United Nations, there are normally existing land commands that can serve as an alliance land component command.

(2) In coalition operations, the multinational commander of the lead nation can establish a land component command from an existing command organization or through establishment of a new command made up of various command staffs and may designate a CFLCC.

b. In multinational operations, the multinational LCC considers many issues, with particular attention to the following:

(1) **Command Authority.** Higher authority and agreements with participating nations will determine the command authority over forces provided to the LCC. Unity of effort is a key consideration with the respective national command elements or the senior element within a multinational command so designated to represent the national command channels from its individual nation. An effective multinational land staff gains the trust of, has rapport with, has respect for, develops knowledge of, and has patience with all its partner nations. Liaison and coordination centers will enhance C2.

(2) **Information Exchange Requirements.** Information sharing, classification, and foreign disclosure issues will require early planning and resolution, especially for any intelligence requirements. Information sharing, cooperation, collaboration, and coordination are enabled by an intelligence and information sharing environment that fully

integrates joint, multinational, and interagency partners in a collaborative enterprise. The JFC participating in multinational operations tailors the policy and procedures for that particular operation based on national and theater guidance.

See JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for additional information on information sharing.

(3) **Communications.** Varying degrees of technological capabilities may constrain activities and cause interoperability challenges. Countries equipped with older communications technologies will require secure communications systems and specially equipped LNO teams, such as Army DLDs, to support them. In other situations, US forces should be capable of interoperability even when the United States is not the lead nation.

(4) **Integration of Forces.** Understanding the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces is essential to assigning missions and reducing friendly fire incidents. In addition, US joint land forces should be culturally prepared, to include obtaining language expertise, for working with multinational partners. Effective employment or integration of foreign area officers, foreign area staff noncommissioned officers, and regional affairs officers as enablers to the joint force and as liaisons to the partnered or allied force early in the planning process can aid in unifying the efforts of multinational forces. Other USG departments and agencies must also work with multinational commands.

(5) **ROE.** Differing national laws and treaties impact ROE. Obtaining concurrence for ROE from national authorities should be addressed early in the planning process and may require early resolution and consensus building. Differences in interpretations need to be reconciled as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies.

(6) **Logistics.** Although logistics is normally a responsibility of each contributing nation, economy of force considerations requires adaptability and planning with centralized control. Funding authorities should be identified early. Each nation should have a designated national support element. This is any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are a part of a multinational force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by that nation. The JFLCC's operational contract support (OCS) integration cell will coordinate with contributing nations to synchronize OCS.

JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, provides further information on multinational C2 and logistics. AJP-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, provides further information on the doctrine for planning, preparing, and executing NATO (alliance or coalition) land component operations.

8. Communications Support Systems

The CCDR, through the J-6-supervised joint network operations control center (JNCC), ensures effective, reliable, and secure communications system to enable the combatant command campaign plan. As driven by the mission, the foundation of the communications system is laid by the C2 organization of forces assigned to the JFC.

a. The JFLCC provides standardized direction and guidance on communications systems matters to the joint land force component command's subordinate commanders and any other communications supporting elements, as these matters affect the operational mission. The JFLCC establishes communications systems and DODIN responsibilities for assigned and attached units and forces made available for tasking. The Service component commands provide communications systems and DODIN capabilities to their own forces unless otherwise directed.

b. The JFLCC utilizes existing theater communications systems that are established and managed by the CCDR. Theater systems may need to be supplemented based on operational need. This provides theater-wide voice, data, and message connectivity between all components and elements. In addition, these systems and nonstandard commercial systems address unique communications connectivity requirements that provide for the appropriate interface between land forces and other components; other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGO partners; and C2 integrated into a partner information sharing environment that permits timely execution of assigned missions. Among the systems the JFLCC should consider are any forms of CIE (including social media) that may have been implemented by the JFC to afford interface of land forces with these traditional partners and which may extend even to nontraditional partners.

c. Communications are established as specified in the OPLAN and/or OPORD (generally found in annex K [Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems]).

d. The J-6 provides functional expertise to the JFLCC concerning communications **systems** matters. The J-6 integrates communications **systems** affecting the JFLCC's joint land operations and ensures their suitability for use by the joint force land component command. Routine communications systems management is the responsibility of the JFC and the subordinate Service component commands. Appendix A, "Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Staff Organization," provides additional information regarding the organization and responsibilities of the J-6 staff.

e. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2), operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), and J-6 may establish a prioritized circuit restoration plan that includes preplanned responses, bandwidth reallocation, prevention of network intrusions, and recovery from data exchange bottlenecks to meet the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

See also JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, and JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

CHAPTER IV PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

“Lack of a Ground Component Commander was a mistake: even absent a combat ground offensive, the planning and staffing capabilities that an ARFOR [Army forces] would have provided were needed...significant ground planning responsibilities were shifted to the JTF [joint task force] staff – that was only marginally prepared to handle myriad issues pertaining to Initial Entry Force for Kosovo and TF [task force] FALCON.”

Admiral James Ellis, Commander, Joint Task Force NOBLE ANVIL during Operation ALLIED FORCE in letter to RAND Corporation, December 2000

SECTION A. PLANNING

1. Strategic Planning Considerations

Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of command. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to attain a specified end state. Joint land force planning links the tactical employment of land forces to operation or campaign objectives through the achievement of operational objectives.

2. Operations Across the Competition Continuum

a. **General.** The use of land force capabilities in **military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence** activities shapes the OE and helps to keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. Many of the missions associated with **crisis response and limited contingencies**, such as foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), may not require land combat. But others, as evidenced by Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and may require land operations planned to protect US and other forces while accomplishing the mission. **Major operations and campaigns** requiring significant land forces often contribute to a larger, long-term effort (e.g., OEF and OIF). The nature of the OE is such that the US land forces will often be conducting several types of joint operations simultaneously. For these operations, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, and stabilization missions and activities to achieve the objective. The commander for a particular operation determines the emphasis to be placed on each type of mission or activity.

b. Joint Land Operations in Major Operations and Campaigns

(1) When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat operations, placing the United States in a wartime state. Campaigns are composed of a series of related operations, where individual operations may be phased. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as

possible, conclude hostilities, and conduct consolidation activities and tasks to establish conditions favorable to the population and the United States and its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions often requires planning and conducting stability activities in support of broader stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction efforts. While the Department of State (DOS) is the lead agent for stabilization and reconstruction efforts, stability activities and tasks is a core US military mission that helps to establish order and protect US interests and values. The immediate objective often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The objective is supporting DOS and the HN to develop indigenous capacity to secure essential services; operate a viable market economy; and maintain rule of law, democratic institutions, and a stable and resilient civil society. This requires a coordinated approach with a chief of mission or other designated individual developing a country (and possible region/province specific) plan in conjunction with all participating agencies and controlling or coordinating all US activities in support of that plan.

(2) Land combat—either offensive with the purpose of securing a vital land area and destroying the enemy defending it or defensive with the objective to deny a vital land area to the adversary—is the most difficult and costly type of joint land operation. Land combat has historically extracted a terrible price on attacker, defender, and civilian alike and this aspect remains present today, multiplied by the increased size and complexity of modern urban areas and increase in the number of inhabitants. However, other types of operations exist in war that may accomplish strategic and operational objectives without ground offensive combat. Aviation assets can destroy and disrupt adversary forces, functions, and the infrastructure on which they depend. SOF can accomplish similar missions such as direct action or counterterrorism. Employment of information-related activities aligned with strategic guidance can lessen popular support for adversary leaders and/or decrease the ability of adversary leaders to effectively direct forces. The use of nonlethal weapons can assist land forces and decrease the likelihood of civilian casualties. If land combat operations are necessary, appropriate shaping of the OE and application of force may prevent full-scale combat. The JFC should consider employing forces and functions in unusual combinations and relations when conducting joint land operations, befitting the nature of the land OE.

c. Joint Land Operations in Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. Crisis response and limited contingency operations planned and conducted by US forces increasingly take place in urban areas. These operations can be conducted in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment. However, in many areas of the world, stability is tenuous at best, making the threat of some types of hostile action real in nearly all operations. As in Somalia in the early 1990s, some crisis response and limited contingency operations began as purely humanitarian operations and ended in urban combat.

d. Joint Land Operations in Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. These ongoing activities are conducted by combatant commands to establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations within their AORs. They encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support other USG departments and agencies and cooperate with international

organizations (e.g., United Nations, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, build partner capacity, and deter conflict. These operations usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities, to include joint land forces, as well as the efforts of other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs in a complementary fashion. DOS is frequently the federal agency with lead responsibility and nearly always is a principal player in these activities. Consequently, CCDRs may employ a JFLCC to plan and conduct these security force operations and direct them to maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area. Land commanders and their staffs should also establish contact and maintain a dialogue with pertinent other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs to share information and facilitate future joint land operations. The USA has established security force assistance (SFA) brigades specifically to provide the necessary senior-trained personnel for SFA with foreign partners. These brigades work for the CCDR through either the theater army commander or the theater JFLCC.

See ATP 3-96.1, Security Force Assistance Brigades, for more information.

e. **Simultaneous Operations.** The nature of joint land operations often requires different types of actions to occur simultaneously or in rapid sequence, sometimes in close proximity. A situation can easily arise where members of the same friendly unit may be feeding and clothing dislocated civilians at one moment; at the next, holding two warring tribes apart; and the next, fighting a highly lethal battle—all within the same area. In a larger context, the joint force may have to initiate a combat-intensive major operation while security cooperation activities or FHA operations are ongoing in the same area or another part of the AO. Such action may not wait for combat to cease but may be an integral part of the overall **land operation**. In addition, joint land **operations usually bring with it requirements normally associated with noncombat crisis response and limited contingency operations; crisis response and limited contingency operations may very well entail joint land operations.**

3. Support to Joint Planning

a. **General.** JFLCC planning tasks are to:

(1) Prepare and coordinate required land component plans or OPORDs in support of assigned JFC campaigns, operations, or missions.

(2) Coordinate land component planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational HQs as required.

(3) Develop land component COAs within the framework of the JFC-assigned objectives or missions, forces available, and the commander's intent.

(4) Determine land component force requirements and coordinate land force planning in support of the selected COAs. The JFLCC conducts planning using the planning processes of the command that forms the core of the HQ. While almost all HQs use the planning cycle described in joint planning publications, the specific steps in the

process may have different names and somewhat different activities. Members of the joint force land component command staff, provided by Services other than the core of the HQ's and integrated into the core staff, must quickly adapt to the planning processes and battle rhythm of the staff they are joining.

b. The joint planning process (JPP) provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem. The JPP may be used by a JFLCC's staff during contingency and crisis planning. The focus of the JPP is the interaction for planning between commanders, staffs, and echelons. The JPP is also linked with the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). JIPOE is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC's decision-making process. The process is used to analyze the physical domains; the information environment; political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems; and all other relevant aspects of the OE and to determine a threat's capabilities to operate within that environment.

See JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on JIPOE.

c. **Commander's Operational Approach.** Joint force land component command planners first frame the strategic and operational problem by developing an understanding of the situation before addressing operational design and ultimately the appropriate level of plan to include OPLANs. Several cognitive models exist to assist JFLCC's and their staffs as they plan and execute joint land operations. The operational approach is the commander's visualization of how the operations should transform current conditions at end state.

(1) The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the OE and the problem facing the JFLCC.

(2) Developing a commander's operational approach provides for **problem framing** as one method for establishing the context of a situation within which a commander and staff acts to achieve the strategic objectives. The essence of problem framing is to examine the problem from multiple perspectives and set conditions for learning about the problem throughout the planning and execution of military operations. Framing can also support the commander's discourse with superiors regarding the nature of the problem the commander has been asked to solve. It also assists in developing a mutual understanding of the OE.

(3) Operational design follows the commander's understanding of the situation and problem framing by applying operational art to the conception and construction of the framework that underpins an operation or campaign. The JFLCC, based upon experience, intuition, instincts, and advice from the staff and other external advisors, employs the creative aspects of operational design elements in a logical process that leads toward COA development.

d. **Operational Art.** **Operational art** is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. **Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces are employed and should influence threat disposition.** It governs the deployment of those forces; their commitment to, or withdrawal from, battle; and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Joint force land component command operational planning addresses some activities required for conducting joint/multinational land operations. These activities are:

(1) Support the CDR's effort in conducting deterrence, shaping operations, security cooperation, and building partner capacity.

(2) Employment planning that describes how to apply force to achieve specified military objectives.

(3) Sustainment planning, which is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity.

(4) Deployment and redeployment planning that includes the development of the TPDFL, monitoring the force flow, and the redeployment of forces from theater at the end of the operation or campaign.

For more information on deployment and redeployment planning, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

(5) Support the CDR's effort in conducting stability activities and tasks in all phases and planning for transitions during the operation or campaign.

(6) Determine and factor environmental considerations tied to risk management and the safety and health of Service members into all phases of joint land operations.

See JP 5-0, Joint Planning; ADP 5-0, The Operations Process; and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process, for more details on planning processes.

e. **JPG.** The JPG is the primary planning element for the JFLCC to support the JFC's planning or to perform component planning. Planners from the JFLCC's core HQ staff element are the nucleus around which the JPG is normally built. It includes personnel from each of the primary coordinating, functional, and special staff elements; LNOs; and, when necessary, planners from the JFLCC's subordinate commands or multinational land forces (see Figure IV-1). The JPG develops and disseminates staff planning guidance and schedules. It confirms the process and products to be developed and delivered to support the JFLCC's planning effort. The JPG is the planning hub and synchronization center for future plans. The JPG develops the CONOPS for each plan. The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint land force and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and

Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Joint Planning Group Representation




Figure IV-1. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Joint Planning Group Representation

sequels. Using **mission-type orders**, the JPG writes (or graphically portrays) it in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting commanders understand the **commander's intent**, purpose, and any specific tasks or requirements and can innovatively develop their supporting plans accordingly. During its development, the JPG determines

the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to create desired effects and accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the operational area, providing the link between joint planning and force planning.

For a more detailed discussion of CONOPS development, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

f. **Plans-Operations Relationship.** The joint force land component command HQ orients on three planning horizons: short, medium, and long. These correspond with current operations, future operations, and future plans. Upon completion of the planning products and orders, the JPG (future plans) organizes to conduct a plans transition. **Once plans are prepared and execution begins, the JPG focus shifts to planning “what’s next” or sequels primarily with higher HQ, while handing off the plan to the current J-3 for execution and preparation of all necessary fragmentary orders directing tactical action.** This requires an organizational procedure to transfer responsibilities and products from the long-range planners to those operators responsible for execution. Key to the success of the plans transition is the requirement that the organization responsible for execution has enough resources, experience, and understanding of the plan to effectively execute it. Experience has shown that the current operations cell is often too immersed in ongoing operations to plan outside the current 24-hour period. This may require the organization of a separate future operations cell (J-35) for focusing on “what if” and branch plans development (see Figure IV-2).

See JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on planning horizons.


g. **Phasing**

(1) **Purpose.** The purpose of phasing is to help the commander organize operations by integrating and synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing is most directly related to the “arranging operations” and “lines of effort” elements of operational design. Phasing helps the JFLCC and staff to visualize and think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. Phasing assists the commander in systematically achieving military objectives that cannot be achieved all at once by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence and relaying that sequence up and down the chain of command. Phasing can be used to gain progressive advantages and assist in achieving objectives as quickly and effectively as possible. Phasing also provides a framework for assessing risk to portions of an operation or campaign, allowing development of plans to mitigate this risk.

(2) **Application.** The JFC’s vision of how an operation should unfold drives subsequent decisions regarding phasing. Phasing, in turn, assists in framing commander’s intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. By arranging operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate and synchronize the land component command’s operations and other subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. Each phase should represent a natural subdivision of the intermediate objectives of the operation or campaign. As such, a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion

Plans-Operations Relationship

Planning Horizons (Vary Based on the Situation)



Legend

COA	course of action	MVT	movement
FRAGORD	fragmentary order	OPLAN	operation plan
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff	OPORD	operation order
J-35	future operations cell	OPS	operations
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff	WARNORD	warning order

Figure IV-2. Plans-Operations Relationship

of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities.

(3) **Number and Sequence.** Working within a phasing construct, the actual phases used will vary with the joint operation and be determined by the JFC. During planning, the JFLCC may establish sub-phases and conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one sub-phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Since operations often require multiple types of activities at the same time, activities from a phase may continue into subsequent phases or actually begin during a previous phase. For example, while the “deployment” phase may be considered complete

and the command transitioned to operations when sufficient forces have arrived in theater, further deployment of forces will likely continue past the “deployment” phase. The JFLCC adjusts the sub-phases to exploit opportunities presented by the threat or operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions.

(3) **Transitions.** Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships. The need to move into another operation or phase is normally identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the approach to the operation. An example is the shift of focus from sustained combat operations to a preponderance of stability activities and tasks. Hostilities gradually lessen as the joint land force begins to reestablish order, commerce, and local government and deters adversaries from resuming hostile actions while the United States and international community takes steps to establish or restore the conditions necessary to achieve their strategic objectives. Planning for the transition from stabilization to enabling civil authorities demands an agile shift in joint land force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks and coordination with a wider range of other organizations—other USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, international organizations, and NGOs—to provide those capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.

For more information on phasing, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations. For more information on intelligence support and planning, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. For more information on logistic planning, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and other JP 4-0-series publications.

4. Operational Planning Considerations

a. **The primary difference between planning for single-Service employment and joint land operations is synchronizing the unique capabilities and limitations of each force to achieve unity of effort.** This requires an understanding of these capabilities and limitations across all staff functions, but it is particularly important in the JPG. The JPG requires knowledgeable members from each Service in all functional areas. With these key personnel and appropriate LNOs from the major subordinate commands in place, the planning process provides sufficient consideration of the capabilities of each Service.

b. **Generally the Service component will perform deployment planning; however, the validating authority for Service component TPFDDs or RFFs/RFCs will be the JFC.** When the JFLCC has been designated in advance of an operation and any associated deployment, the JFLCC will influence the deployment process for those units that will be employed by the JFLCC upon completion of integration. In practical terms, this influence involves analyzing the force generation requirements to determine the required dates for each force or capability made available to the JFLCC. Further, priorities may be established by the JFLCC to aid the JFC in allocating limited lift or port capabilities in a way that best supports the JFLCC’s CONOPS.

c. When conducted, the force deployment planning performed by the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) deployment cell is in concert with the JPG's operational planning. The deployment planners require visibility on the capabilities and sequencing priorities associated with a COA or CONOPS to ensure they are transportable and the deployment requirements are relayed to the JFC. The JFLCC's planning staff should remember that the timing and sequencing priority may be affected by the JFC's overall concept of deployment.

5. Joint Land Operations Plan

a. **General.** JFLCC JLOPs, operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), and OPORDs convey how the land force helps accomplish the JFC's mission. The plans developed by the JFLCC describe the intended conduct of joint land operations that support the achievement of JFC's objectives.

b. The OPORD describes the synchronization of specific tasks that result in an effective employment of joint/multinational land force capabilities for a major operation. The CONOPS, included in paragraph 3 (Execution), also provides the concepts of movement and maneuver, fires, protection, intelligence operations, and information. Sustainment is included in paragraph 4 (Administration and Logistics), while C2 is in paragraph 5 (Command and Control). All are included in the final OPLAN or order.

c. Plans and OPORDs are distributed internally to the land force for action and externally to the JFC for approval and Service and functional component commands for information. If OPLANs, CONPLANs, or OPORDs describe a branch or sequel to the current plan, they are distributed externally to the JFC for approval and to the Service and other functional component commanders for information.

d. Planning products are distributed simultaneously to all joint force land component command subordinate commanders. This allows them to adequately evaluate the impact of future plans and operations from an operational perspective; however, the Service component commands should be concurrently involved to assess and plan for support to the JFLCC.

See Appendix C, "Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development Example," for more information on a joint land OPLAN.

6. Operational Environment

a. **General.** Factors that should be considered when conducting joint land operations that extend beyond the boundaries of the JFLCC's assigned AO. The OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of commanders. It can include all domains and the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint land operation. Understanding the OE helps commanders understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how this impacts attaining the military end state.

b. Physical Areas and Factors

(1) **Physical Areas.** The pertinent physical areas in the OE include the assigned operational area and the associated areas of influence and interest described below. Understanding the relationship between the area of interest (AOI), area of influence, and the assigned AO help commanders and staffs order their thoughts during both planning and execution.

(a) The **AOR** is the geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a CCDR assigned that AOR has authority to plan and conduct operations. The JFLCC will be assigned a portion of the CCDR's AOR, known as an AO.

(b) An **AOI** includes the area of influence and adjacent areas and extends into hostile territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. An AOI focuses intelligence support for monitoring activities pertinent to the operational area that may affect operations. The commander can describe the AOI graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control measure.

(c) An **area of influence** is a geographic area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. The area of influence normally surrounds and includes the assigned operational area. The extent of a subordinate command's area of influence is one factor the higher commander considers when defining the subordinate's operational area. Understanding the command's area of influence helps the commander and staff plan branches to the current operation that could require the force to employ capabilities outside the assigned operational area. The commander can describe the area of influence graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control measure for maneuver or fire support.

(2) **Physical Factors.** The JFLCC and staff should consider numerous physical factors associated with operations in the operational area. These factors include terrain (including urban settings), weather, topography, hydrology, the EMS, and environmental conditions in the operational area; distances associated with the deployment to the operational area and employment of forces and other joint capabilities; the location of bases, ports, and other supporting infrastructure (such as key cyberspace nodes); and both friendly and threat forces and other capabilities. Threat forces may utilize commercial enterprises to act on joint land forces; therefore, the JFLCC must ensure commercial vendors are appropriately vetted to reduce risk to the force. Combinations of these factors greatly affect the operational design and sustainment of joint land operations.

c. **Information Environment.** The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. For analytical purposes, the information environment consists of three interrelated dimensions which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and systems. These dimensions are the physical, informational, and cognitive.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for more information on the OE. See JP 3-13, Information

Operations, *for specific information on the information environment. See JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, for specific information on cyberspace.*

d. **Human and Cultural Factors.** The JFLCC and staff consider numerous human and cultural factors associated with their OE. These factors include all aspects of society, culture, religion, language, economics, and politics as they affect friendly, neutral, and adversary capabilities. Each of these human and cultural factors is essential to understanding the root causes of conflicts, developing appropriate approaches, and anticipating second-order effects, as these can greatly affect the operational design and conduct of joint land operations.

7. Conventional and Special Operations Forces Integration

a. The JFC's C2 organization should consider the unique SOF organizational structures, along with their capabilities and limitations, in the same manner as those of the different Service land forces. The unique attributes of all land forces and their integration are considerations throughout planning and execution. To maximize efficiency, the Services and USSOCOM rely on each other for various functions during operations.

b. Conventional forces and SOF require coordination and liaison at all levels of the joint force to ensure C2 is fully integrated. The focal point for integration of SOF activities and conventional joint land operations is the special operations C2 element, which collocates with the supported or supporting command element of the joint force land component command. In addition, exchange of liaison personnel at various commands, organizations, or lower tactical levels may be required for improved communication.

c. The C2 elements of the joint force land component command operate in concert to execute the JFLCC's assigned missions. This requires organizations, systems, and equipment within conventional forces and SOF to be interoperable to effectively facilitate control of forces. The simplest and most streamlined C2 arrangement can be thwarted by the absence of interoperability among the components' forces and systems.

For additional information on SOF, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. For information on conventional forces and SOF integration, see FM 6-05/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-30.4/NTTP 3-05.19/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.73/USSOCOM Publication 3-33, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence.

SECTION B. ASSESSMENT

8. General

a. **Assessment is a process that measures progress** of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. **Commanders continuously assess** the OE and the progress of operations and compare them to their vision and intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure military objectives are met and the military end state is attained. **The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander's**

decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. **The CCIR process is linked to the assessment process** by the commander's need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions. The assessment process helps staffs identify key aspects of the operation that the commander is closely monitoring and where the commander needs to make decisions. Examples of commander's critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of an operation, what the priority of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships between component commanders.

b. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it **to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective**. During planning and preparation for an operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force's ability to execute the plan based on available resources and changing conditions in the OE. However, **the discussion in this section focuses on assessment for the purpose of determining the progress of the joint force land component toward mission accomplishment**.

c. Commanders and their staffs **determine relevant assessment actions and measures during the JPP**. They consider assessment measures as early as mission analysis and include assessment measures and related guidance in commander and staff estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along lines of operation. During execution, they continually monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and military end state. Normally, the joint force land component command chief of staff, assisted by the J-3 and the J-2, coordinates assessment activities. The chief of staff is normally also assisted by an assessment special staff section which may include personnel to do operations research and systems analysis (ORSA), sociocultural experts, and others. For subordinate commanders' staffs, this may be accomplished by equivalent elements within Service components. The chief of staff normally facilitates the assessment process and determination of CCIRs by incorporating them into the HQ's battle rhythm. Various elements of the JFC's staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning.

d. Friendly, threat, and neutral diplomatic, informational, and economic actions applied in the OE can impact military actions and objectives. When relevant to the mission, the commander also plans for using assessment to evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other USG departments and agencies and multinational partners—preferably within a common, accepted process—in the interest of unified action. Many of these organizations may be outside the JFLCC's authority. Accordingly, the JFLCC should grant some organizations authority for direct coordination with key outside organizations—such as interagency elements from DOS, DHS, and

national intelligence agencies; intelligence sources in other nations; and other components—to the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate assessments.

9. Levels of Operations and Assessment Considerations

a. Assessment occurs at all levels of military operations. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses indicators (MOPs and MOEs) that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Continuous assessment helps the JFLCC determine if the joint land force is doing the right things to achieve its objectives. Tactical-level assessment typically uses MOPs to evaluate task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature but can also reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Combat assessment is an example of a tactical-level assessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and future targeting and reattack recommendations. While there is no single way to conduct assessment, JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, has identified a six-step operations assessment process that can help guide the development of an effective JFLCC assessment plan and provide for an orderly, analytical process. JFLCCs should consider these steps and modify them to fit their needs.

See JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and ATP 5-0.3/MCRP 5-10.1/NTTP 5-01.3/AFTTP 3-2.87, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment, for more information on assessment and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information on combat assessment.

CHAPTER V EXECUTION

“...no plan of operation can extend with any prospect of certainty, beyond the first clash with the hostile main force. Only a layman can pretend to trace throughout the course of a campaign the prosecution of a rigid plan, arranged beforehand in all its details and adhered to the last.”

Helmuth Graf von Moltke (The Elder), 1800-1891

SECTION A. TYPES OF OPERATIONS

1. General

a. JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of military power to address both traditional warfare and irregular warfare (IW) simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. Consequently, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some operations or in specific functions and require economy of force in others. All joint campaigns and major operations feature an appropriate combination and balance between offensive and defensive operations and stability activities in all phases. Planning for stability activities and tasks should begin when joint planning is initiated. Planning for the transition from sustained land combat operations to the termination of joint operations and then a complete handover to civil authority and redeployment happens during plan development and continues during all phases of a major operation or major operations as part of a joint campaign. An isolated focus on planning offensive and defensive operations may threaten full development of basic and supporting plans for stabilization and ultimately joint operation momentum. Even while sustained land operations are ongoing, there will be a need to establish or restore security and provide humanitarian relief, as succeeding areas are occupied or bypassed. While joint land operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements—offense, defense, and stability—joint land operations within the United States primarily focus on HD and DSCA operations.

b. Mission success in large-scale combat operations requires full spectrum superiority: the cumulative effect of achieving superiority in the air, land, maritime, and space domains; EMS; and the information environment (which includes cyberspace) that permits the conduct of joint operations without prohibitive interference. JFCs seek superiority throughout the OE to accomplish the mission as rapidly as possible. JFCs normally strive to achieve air and maritime superiority early to allow freedom of action for the entire joint force and provide mutual support to the JFLCC. The rapid deployment and employment of joint land forces (with the support of other components) enable sustained operations, can quickly contribute to the enemy’s defeat, and help restore stability in the operational area. If, during large-scale land combat operations versus a peer enemy, the OE is prohibitive to initially obtaining air and maritime superiority, the JFLCC may be required to conduct mutual support operations such as long-range fires, raids, and strikes employing joint land forces to reduce enemy anti-access capabilities, secure forward bases,

and favorably shape the OE. JFCs, as well as their JFLCCs, require an early advantage in the information environment, as well as in the physical domains of the OE, and maintain that advantage throughout the operation or campaign. This will degrade the enemy's C2 while enabling the JFC to maximize friendly C2 effectiveness. Achievement of an advantage in the information environment is vital to joint operations and enables the JFLCC to better understand the enemy's intentions, capabilities, and actions, as well as influence foreign attitudes and perceptions.

c. **Protection of Civilians.** DOD members must comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts. IAW the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, and FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare*, attacks against the civilian population are prohibited and noncombatants in general should be protected from unnecessary suffering by taking measures to avoid civilian casualties. Excessive civilian casualties can severely undermine joint land operations and are increasingly transparent to the public. Joint land forces are expected to uphold the highest legal standards. These standards gain extra scrutiny in an environment where the enemy will make false accusations and seek to exploit mistakes. Further, the local population's support is often critical to mission success, and civilian casualties can place such support in jeopardy. Minimizing and addressing civilian casualty incidents frequently supports strategic imperatives and is also at the heart of the profession of arms. Civilian casualty mitigation includes predeployment training and post-incident investigation and response. Leadership is vital for effective civilian casualty mitigation procedures. Commanders should ensure joint land forces routinely incorporate civilian casualty mitigation when planning and conducting land operations ranging from collateral damage estimation during joint targeting, to use of nonlethal weapons, to safety during road movements. Additionally, a commander may establish a civilian casualty tracking cell to systematically monitor a civilian casualty mitigation cycle: prepare, plan, employ, assess, respond, and learn. Commanders should be aware that civilian casualties can be mitigated through efforts that begin long before a particular incident—indeed, long before deployment—and the impacts of civilian casualties continue after the incident has occurred.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations; Department of Defense Law of War Manual; and FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare, for detailed information regarding obligations and measures for protection of civilians.

2. Range and Types of Military Operations

a. The US military employs its capabilities in a variety of military operations at home and abroad in support of its national security goals across the competition continuum against a backdrop of the conflict continuum. Some operations conducted by a JFLCC may involve only military engagement, security cooperation, shaping, and deterrence activities. Operations such as foreign assistance, foreign internal defense, peace operations, FHA, combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, show-of-force operations, and arms control are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives. Other crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as counterinsurgency (COIN), support to insurgency, and combating terrorism, primarily involve IW. Major operations and campaigns may be characterized by large- scale combat

JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDERS DURING OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

In June 2014, as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) overran portions of Iraq, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) commenced military operations against ISIS. On June 24, 2014, Commander, USCENTCOM designated the Army component, the US Army Central Command (ARCENT), as the joint force land component command-Iraq for operations in the joint operations area.

On September 17, 2014, as coalition land forces became available, ARCENT transitioned to become the coalition force land component command-Iraq. USCENTCOM then established Coalition Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) on October 17, 2014, to coordinate coalition conventional and special operations efforts against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria. ARCENT, enabled with joint and coalition partners, initially sourced the headquarters for CJTF-OIR, while also remaining as the Army Service component command for the theater. However, due to personnel cuts within the ARCENT staff, the responsibility for the coalition joint task force headquarters (HQ) would eventually transition to a US Army Corps HQs in September 2015.

In the fall of 2014, as ARCENT became CJTF-OIR, the 1st Infantry Division HQs arrived to serve as the Coalition Joint Force Land Component Command- Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR). This HQ, based on a rotating US Army division HQ, enabled with joint and coalition partners, supports the Iraqi security forces, which include the Iraqi army, the Iraqi air force, the Counter Terrorism Service, the federal police, and the Kurdish Peshmerga in defeating ISIS in Iraq. The coalition joint force land component command's mission also extended beyond just military operations to comprise the full range of the coalition's efforts, including diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.

CJFLCC-OIR's purpose differed greatly from previous operations in Iraq as it focused on an advise and assist mission using a "by, with and through" approach with only limited ground maneuver elements. Instead of serving as a fighting HQ, CJFLCC-OIR served as the integrating node for higher tactical and operational levels as it supported and influenced the Iraqi Security Forces in operations that defeated ISIS.

**Source: Various United States Army Central Command
Briefings and Articles**

operations associated with traditional war. All of these circumstances—each potentially with different root causes and objectives—can exist concurrently within a single operational area and may require consideration by a JFLCC.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more detail on the types of military operations.

b. Recent crisis response and limited contingency operations have been conducted employing significantly fewer joint land forces providing security cooperation to partner nations. This operational approach consists of primarily employing partner maneuver forces with the support of US enabling forces through a coordinated legal and diplomatic framework. This approach finds US land forces, task-organized in small non-standard packages, deployed under division-sized joint force land component command HQ across JOAs typically to austere locations often without habitual and doctrinal sources of support. In some cases, this dispersion exceeds the supporting joint land component command or theater army's capacity to provide C2, or protection, and with increased risk to some categories of sustainment such as medical, maintenance, and distribution.

See FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, for more detail.

3. Offensive Operations

a. Major operations and campaigns are normally conducted to control strategically significant land areas and involve large-scale combat. They will include some level of both **offense and defense**. Although defense may be the stronger force posture, the offense is normally decisive in combat. Further, protection includes certain defensive measures that are required throughout each phase of a joint operation or major operations conducted in a campaign. The relationship between offense and defense, then, is a complementary one.

b. Offensive land control operations are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy land forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. For large-scale combat operations conducted during a campaign, multiple corps-sized formations, potentially including USA corps, MEFs, or multinational forces, may be required, necessitating a joint or multinational force land component command based upon a USA field army HQ (see Figure V-1). Offensive land control operations impose the commander's will on the enemy. Against a capable, adaptive enemy, the offense is the most direct and sure means to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to achieve decisive objectives. Executing offensive land control operations compels the enemy to react, creating or revealing weakness the entire attacking joint force can exploit. Successful land offensive operations place tremendous pressure on defenders, creating a cycle of deterioration that can lead to their disintegration. Long-range, land-based missiles and attack helicopters can also provide cross-AO offensive support to other components.

c. In addition, counterterrorism operations conducted in conjunction with or in support of major operations and campaigns can offensively counter local, regional, or global terrorist threats.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more detail on large-scale land combat and JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism, for more detail on counterterrorism.

d. At the operational and strategic level of warfare, the Armed Forces of the United States are capable of deploying, maneuvering, and fighting to gain access to areas controlled by hostile forces. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military




Figure V-1. Multinational Force Land Component Commander as Part of a Multinational Force

lodgment in the face of armed opposition. Forcible entry operations are normally joint in nature and range in scope from an initial operation planned as part of a campaign or major operation to a coup de main in which the decisive results are accomplished in one swift stroke. The Armed Forces of the United States maintain three primary forcible entry capabilities or options. These are amphibious assault, airborne assault, and air assault. Local air and/or maritime superiority are essential for the duration of the forcible entry operation. JFCs typically seek to achieve more comprehensive control of the potential operating environment, permitting as many such options as possible to frustrate opposing defense planning. JFCs may select one entry capability or a combination based upon

analysis of the situation and the threat. A JFLCC may be tasked by the JFC to perform the detailed planning for a forcible entry operation.

For more specifics, see JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

e. CWMD operations designed to control enemy WMD and to rapidly reduce the threat of use, proliferation, or loss may be a component of forcible entry operations. When an enemy possesses WMD or elements of a WMD program, land operations may be the primary mechanism by which the threat of WMD is reduced or eliminated. A JTF-E is a functional JTF controlled by the JFC and will normally support the JFLCC. The 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Command is a unit that plans and trains for C2 of CWMD operations in support of geographic combatant commands and, on order, deploys to enable an existing HQ or to provide the core of a JTF HQ that executes elimination operations.

f. As sustained, large-scale combat operations conclude, military forces will shift their focus to stability activities as the military instrument's contribution to the more comprehensive stabilization efforts by all instruments of national power. Force protection will continue to be important, and combat operations might continue, although with less frequency and intensity. Of particular importance will be CMO, initially conducted to reestablish or maintain stability. US military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks, especially if conducting a military intervention or occupation, and restore rule of law when indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may support such activities as required/necessary. SFA plays an important part during stability activities by supporting and augmenting the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Likewise, the JFC's communication synchronization will play an important role in providing public information to foreign populations during this period.

For further guidance on SFA, refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

g. Stabilization cannot occur if significant enemy forces directly threaten or attack the local populace. Offensive land control operations destroy or isolate the enemy so stability activities and tasks can proceed by denying enemy forces the opportunity to seize additional terrain, moving them out of population centers of gravity (COGs), and forcing enemy forces to defend their bases.

4. Defensive Operations

a. Defensive operations are combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability activities and tasks. Defense alone is normally not a decisive action. However, defensive land operations enable joint force land component commands to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive or stability activities and tasks. Defensive land control operations retain

terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks and are used to gain time and economize forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere.

b. JFCs position joint land forces to protect vital military and civilian areas in joint operational areas that are important to the overall operational success and provide indirect support to all joint operations. As part of mutual support for the JFC's objectives, joint land forces defend joint lodgments and bases ensuring freedom of action to joint air, maritime, and special operations forces. This defense may consist of land based AMD units and chemical, biological, and radiological warning and decontamination units, as well as land forces physically protecting facilities or terrain using lethal and nonlethal weapons systems.

c. Defense of the local populace, infrastructure, and vital assets supports stability activities and allows joint land forces to receive greater support from the HN. This protection is vital to joint COIN operations where some facilities have significant economic and political value to the local population.

5. Stability

a. US military forces' contributions to stabilization efforts encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Joint land forces assume that role before, during, and after conducting land operations, across the range of operations. In doing so, the efforts of military forces appropriately focus in support of the other instruments of national power. Stability activities will not only include stability tasks but will often have elements of offense and defense. For land forces, these efforts are fundamental to the conduct of joint operations.

b. Joint land forces plan and prepare to consolidate gains to capitalize on operational success and set conditions for a stable environment and eventual transition to legitimate authorities. Subordinate forces may be assigned consolidation areas-designated portions of the JFLCC's AO in which a purposefully task-organized, combined arms unit conducts area security and stability tasks to insure freedom of action for the remainder of the force conducting operations. Planning considerations include considering tactical, operational, and strategic risk; changes to task organization; and new or additional assets required to attain the desired end state. These assets may include engineers, MP, EOD units, CA, and medical units required for stability tasks or additional maneuver forces to conduct area security tasks. Initially, it is likely that joint land forces will be responsible to integrate and orchestrate stability and consolidation of gains in area under military occupation. As the security situation improves, joint land forces may transition to support of other organizations, such as the United Nations.

For additional information on consolidating gains and consolidation areas, see ADP 3-0, Operations.

POST-COMBAT STABILITY IN IRAQ 2003-2004

Following the successful regime change of Iraq by May 2003, coalition land forces under Lieutenant General (LTG) David McKiernan, US Army, as the coalition joint force land component commander, did not completely provide for military occupation of Iraq, thus coalition forces were unable to dominate the operational environment. Civilian factions resorted to violence in order to assert political dominance. As coalition land forces withdrew, LTG Rick Sanchez, Commander of US Army V Corps, replaced LTG McKiernan in June 2003 as the Commander of Combined Task Force 7 as United States Army Central Command Headquarters withdrew to Kuwait. V Corps Headquarters proved to be an inadequate basis for the complex tasks it faced. As a matter of policy, the US was not occupying Iraq,...it was liberating Iraq. In June 2003, US diplomat Paul Bremer assumed his duties as the Presidential Envoy to Iraq and Director for Reconstruction and Humanitarian assistance which the Department of Defense subsequently renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). As Director of the CPA, Mr. Bremer ruled by decree. Amongst his most notable actions was CPA Order #1, which outlawed the Bath party in all its forms, which, in essence, dissolved Iraqi government institutions from national to grassroots level. The inability to enforce local laws allowed sectarian rivals to vie for political and civil control. The rivalry promoted sectarian civil strife between formerly ruling Sunni Baathists and the majority Shiite population. Civil War ensued. The CPA created the Iraqi Interim Governing Council in March 2004 coinciding with the drafting of an interim Constitution and status-of-forces agreement. Sectarian civil war continued as the majority Shiite government gained and assumed the reins of government. The CPA along with the Interim Governing Council transitioned authority to the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004. Although the elected Iraqi government drafted a new constitution, the fractured government failed to adequately remedy the sectarian/political divisions amongst the populace which resulted in a civil war and later the rise of the Sunni-dominated Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) occupying much of western and northern Iraq. The recent success of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE in assisting Iraqi national forces and the Kurdish regional forces has resulted in liberating most of the ISIS occupied areas of Iraq and providing new opportunities to the government of Iraq.

Various Sources

c. Stability activities can be conducted in support of an HN or interim government or as part of an occupation when no government exists. These stability activities maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability. Stability activities cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives and involve both coercive and constructive military actions. Joint land force stability activities are often conducted within the broader context of USG reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Joint land forces support these broader efforts by leveraging the coercive and constructive capabilities of the

force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish or restore political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and help transition responsibility to civil authority operating under the rule of law. This transition is fundamental to the shift in focus toward long-term developmental activities where joint land forces support broader efforts in pursuit of national and international objectives. Success in these endeavors typically requires a long-term commitment by international organizations and NGOs and is ultimately determined by the support and participation of the HN population.

d. Joint land forces establish conditions that enable the efforts of the other instruments of national power through unified action. By providing the requisite security and control to stabilize an operational area, those efforts build a foundation for transitioning to civilian control and eventually to the HN. Stability activities are usually conducted to support an HN government or a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate, functioning HN government exists. Generally, joint land forces establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until a civil authority or the HN is capable of providing these services for the local populace. They perform specific functions as part of a broader response effort, supporting the complementary activities of other agencies, organizations, and the private sector. When the HN or other agency cannot fulfill its role, joint land forces may be called upon to significantly increase their role, including providing the basic civil functions of government.

e. By nature, stabilization is typically a lengthy endeavor. All tasks are performed with a focus toward maintaining the delicate balance between long-term success and short-term gains. Ultimately, stability activities do not necessarily aim to reduce the military presence quickly but to achieve broader national policy objectives that extend beyond the objectives of joint military operations. The more effective those military efforts are at setting conditions that facilitate the efforts of the other instruments of national power, the more likely it is that the long-term commitment of substantial joint land forces will not be required. Nonlethal weapons provide land forces an escalation of force capability to determine intent during operations and assist in reducing civilian casualties, helping to gain the trust of the population.

f. To that end, joint land forces have to operate with other joint forces and the other instruments of national power to forge unity of effort through a whole-of-government approach. This approach accounts for a wider range of considerations beyond those of the military instrument, ensuring that planning accounts for broader national policy goals and interests. For the JFLCC and staff, this may mean planning and executing joint land operations within an environment of political ambiguity. As a result, the potentially slow development process of government reconstruction and stabilization policy may frustrate flexible military plans that adapt to the lethal dynamics of land combat operations. Thus, integrating the planning efforts of all the agencies and organizations involved in stabilization is essential to long-term peace and stability.

g. **Stability Activities and Tasks.** The activities and tasks that make up stability include the following:

(1) Initial response activities, which are tasks executed to stabilize the OE in an area of crisis, for instance, during or immediately following a conflict or a natural disaster. As land control operations clear areas of hostile forces, initial response activities by joint land forces provide a safe, secure environment and attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the indigenous population. They support efforts to reduce the level of violence or human suffering, while creating conditions that enable other organizations to participate safely in ongoing efforts.

(2) Transformational activities, which are a broad range of security, reconstruction, and capacity building efforts. These activities require the absence of major threats to friendly forces and the populace and build HN capacity across multiple sectors. These activities establish conditions that facilitate unified action to rebuild the HN and its supporting institutions.

(3) Activities that foster sustainability, which encompass long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions that enable sustainable development. Properly focused, effectively executed stability tasks by a land component may prevent population centers from degenerating into civil unrest and becoming recruiting areas for opposition movements or insurgencies.

(4) Stability activities can be conducted as part of five joint stability functions, which are linked to the DOS reconstruction and stabilization sectors. The joint stability functions are security, FHA, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. Normally, joint land forces support HN and other civilian agencies. However, when the HN cannot provide basic government functions, joint land forces may be required to do so directly.

h. To attain the national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, JFLCCs integrate and synchronize stability activity and tasks with other joint land operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign phase. Stability activity and tasks support USG plans for stabilization and reconstruction efforts and likely will be conducted in coordination with, and in support of, HN authorities, other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and/or NGOs, and the private sector.

For further details on stability, see JP 3-07, Stability.

i. To achieve success in land operations requires joint forces to consolidate gains and transition an AO to a legitimate authority able to maintain security and public order. Regardless of the scale and scope of combat operations, detailed and continuous planning, task-organizing, and accounting for the effects of combat during all operations is essential to attaining the desired end state. Achieving a sustainable position of relative advantage throughout requires unified action and aggressive leadership.

j. US joint land forces have normally been required to consolidate gains. They have done so with varying degrees of success during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam and more recently in Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Each conflict was unique and

involved a land force role in the governance of an area for periods of time that were not predicted beforehand. As such, planning for joint land forces to consolidate gains and conduct stability activities and tasks is essential to any operation.

For additional information on consolidating gains and consolidation areas, see ADP 3-0, Operations.

6. Defense Support of Civil Authorities

a. Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited by US law in many respects, are conducted to accomplish two missions: HD and DSCA. A theater JFLCC, normally USA North, is a command option used by US Northern Command to provide C2 for Title 10, USC, land operations for DSCA. This option provides for a single Title 10, USC, functional component HQ capable of providing general support to achieve unity of effort between federal and state response forces. In conducting DSCA general support, a theater JFLCC may need to operate with subordinate brigade-level HQs for specialized functions such as aviation, medical, or sustainment.

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY NORTH, AS JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR HURRICANES HARVEY, IRMA, AND MARIA (AUGUST-NOVEMBER 2017)

In response to Hurricane Harvey, Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), designated Commander, United States Army North (USARNORTH), in August 2017, as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) in lieu of being designated a joint task force (JTF) commander. The use of USARNORTH, as a joint force land component command, had previously been utilized during Super Storm Sandy in 2012 and would remain the preferred organization construct for Hurricanes Irma and Maria. As the theater land component command, USARNORTH successfully supported transitions between multiple missions during one of the busiest hurricane seasons on record. With additional authorities authorized by CDRUSNORTHCOM, the utility of USARNORTH, as the land component command, displayed the capabilities of that organization to accomplish its assigned mission within the joint doctrinal framework.

In August 2017, USARNORTH deployed its contingency command post (CP) forward headquarters (HQ), Task Force (TF) 51, to Katy, Texas, in support of Hurricane Harvey response operations while maintaining its main CP at USARNORTH HQ in San Antonio, Texas. Working in conjunction with JTF Texas from the Texas National Guard, USARNORTH coordinated the federal military response in support of the National Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead federal agency. In addition to employment of a large-scale response by United States Army forces, a Marine Corps special purpose Marine air-ground task force was attached under tactical control (TACON) to the JFLCC for employment.

When Hurricane Irma landed in Florida in September 2017, TF 51 repositioned significant liaison elements to Florida in order to support JTF Florida from the Florida National Guard and FEMA disaster response operations.

While simultaneously dealing with recovery from Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, USARNORTH continued to support the United Nations General Assembly Meeting, fight wild fires in the western US, and assist Mexico with earthquake recovery. When Category 5 Hurricane Maria caused catastrophic damage on Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, United States Fleet Forces Command (USFF) was initially designated as the joint force maritime component command to provide a rapid response leveraging naval vessels with embarked Navy and Marine Corps forces.

As understanding of the size and scope of the land devastation in Puerto Rico increased, on September 27, 2017, CDRUSNORTHCOM ordered the transition of responsibility as lead component from USFF joint force maritime component command to the USARNORTH joint force land component command. This included attachment, under TACON, of some remaining Marine Corps capabilities. Because of the devastation and challenges that resulted from Hurricane Maria, Lieutenant General Buchanan, the JFLCC, and his main CP deployed to Puerto Rico. Despite the challenging and austere conditions, the joint force land component command supported JTF Puerto Rico and local and federal organizations to provide lifesaving support and assist in setting Puerto Rico on the path to recovery.

Despite numerous competing events throughout Fall 2017, USARNORTH (as joint force land component command), enabled by authorities from the CDRUSNORTHCOM, provided effective mission command of Title 10, US Code, defense support of civil authorities forces to assist local, state, and federal organizations.

Source: United States Army North Reports

b. DSCA consists of DOD support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, both man-made and natural, and for designated law enforcement and other activities, such as national special security events. This includes DOD forces when directed by the President or SecDef. USG departments and agencies or state governors request DOD capabilities to support their emergency response efforts by using the federal request for assistance (RFA) process. National Guard forces employed under state active duty or Title 32, USC, status are under the C2 of the governor of their state and are not part of federal military response efforts. Dual-status commanders (with both federal and state authorities) provide useful options for command of JTFs established in response to an emergency or major disaster within the United States. For DSCA operations, DOD supports but does not supplant civil authorities. DOD resources are normally used only when state and local resources are overwhelmed and/or non-DOD resources of the USG are insufficient or unable to meet the requirements of local and state civil authorities.

c. Not all DSCA is provided via the RFA process. Counterdrug activities, intelligence or investigative support, or other support to civilian law enforcement may be provided IAW specific DOD policies and US law without using the RFA process.

d. There are advantages associated with employment of the National Guard in either state active duty or Title 32, USC, status. Most notable is the ability to assist law enforcement as the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to Title 32, USC, or state active duty forces. To support operational continuity, most, if not all, National Guard forces supporting a response will remain in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status throughout an event. The military response to events that require DSCA will be a coordinated effort between the NG in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status and Titles 10 and 14, USC, United States Coast Guard forces.

For information on counterdrug activities, refer to JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations; for more information on DSCA, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

SECTION B. JOINT FUNCTIONS

7. General

a. In any joint land operation, the JFLCC and staff plan, direct, and coordinate a number of joint functions that are critical to the successful execution of joint land operations. Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of warfare fall into seven basic groups—information, C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as information, protection, C2, and intelligence, apply to all operations and form the basis for the conduct of other functions. Others, such as fires, apply as required by the mission.

b. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each function. Some tasks, missions, and capabilities could apply to more than one joint function.

c. The JFLCC can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission. The JLOP/OPORD describes the way joint land forces and assets are used together to perform joint functions and tasks. However, forces and assets are not characterized by the functions for which the JFLCC is employing them. A single force or asset can perform multiple functions simultaneously or sequentially while executing a single task. This section discusses the joint functions, related tasks, and key considerations as applicable to joint land operations. The JFLCC and staff also monitor and may coordinate and synchronize the **support functions** (e.g., logistics, personnel support) that impact joint land operations.

For a more detailed discussion of joint functions, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and CJCSM 3500.04, Universal Joint Task Manual.

8. Command and Control

a. **General.** C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The C2 function encompasses a number of tasks that are detailed in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

b. The success of the JFLCC or other commander tasked to conduct land operations is the result of leadership and the ability to control forces and functions in order to execute the intent. C2 is supported by an ISR infrastructure and reliable and secure communications and computer systems. These systems process and integrate data and information and pass it to where it is needed and display it in a useable format in time to be acted upon. This combination of C2 and the tools for its implementation is fundamental to the conduct of modern military operations. The nature of the operational area accentuates the challenges to the JFLCC and may offer significant hindrances to effective C2. The integration of intelligence data and assessments, shared at the collateral level, with sensor and tactical network data available in the joint operations center is a key element in maintaining an accurate picture of land operations.

c. Understanding and shaping the operational area is extremely challenging. The key to understanding the OE at all levels is the ability to rapidly collect and disseminate information. Critical to shaping this OE is the ability to convert information into knowledge that can be used to make and then implement command decisions. Since any joint land operation contains a great deal of uncertainty, and since knowledge is a perishable asset, speed and precision are necessary to convert the right information into knowledge as expediently as possible.

d. C2 Considerations in Land Operations

(1) The complex physical environment of the operational area may restrict the performance of some technologies supporting C2, including line of sight communications and overhead surveillance. Mountains and jungles can present barriers to communication systems. Subterranean and interior spaces also make timely understanding of the urban OE even more difficult.

(2) The presence of civilians in the operational area further complicates land C2. The JFLCC should always consider the effects of operations on civilians, and their presence in large numbers will require great attention in order to achieve US objectives. Commanders conduct CMO to achieve unity of effort with interagency, international, and nongovernmental partners and organizations and with indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). Existing infrastructure such as transportation and communication systems can both facilitate and hinder C2. Service infrastructure such as police, fire, and medical services may offer control and information opportunities, but its absence contributes to joint force responsibilities.

(3) As joint land operations tend to become decentralized, mission command becomes the preferred method of C2. Mission command is the conduct of military

operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Mission command is a philosophy of C2 that empowers individuals to exercise judgment in how they carry out their assigned tasks and it emphasizes the human element in joint operations emphasizing trust, force of will, initiative, judgment, and creativity. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission. Orders are focused on the purpose of the operation rather than the details of how to perform assigned tasks. Essential to mission command is the thorough knowledge and understanding of the commander's intent at every level of command and a command climate of mutual trust and understanding. Under mission command, commanders issue mission-type orders, use implicit communications, delegate most decisions to subordinates wherever possible, and minimize detailed control. When joint land operations are decentralized and rely on mission command, coordination of joint operations is planned with consideration of the procedures, measures, and resources (including time) required to implement those plans. In such conditions, the JFLCC and staff anticipate requirements to identify demands for joint support, prioritize among operations or force elements, and communicate extensively with other affected components. In addition, the JFLCC and staff determine what procedures must remain under centralized control (i.e., ROE, communications, integrated AMD, joint fires) to ensure standardization across the JFLCC's AO.

(4) In joint land operations, the **CCIR** categories of priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements also include pertinent information concerning the land environment. Friendly information may include items such as anticipated political actions by an HN, the ability of the HN to support civilians, or the presence of sufficient precision munitions in the joint force. Although the threat may consist of a traditional armed force, priority intelligence requirements on criminal elements, guerrillas, terrorists, and tribal or political factions may be necessary. Environmental information requirements may include elements of the environment, such as the behavior and needs of civilians or the presence or likelihood of disease or hunger.

(5) In joint land operations, it is imperative an AO be established that includes sufficient area for the JFLCC to achieve the objectives. An area of influence can be established and should include any area from which influence can be exerted on or from the land AO. ACMs, FSCMs, boundaries, and movement control measures should be carefully considered and delineated to allow maximum flexibility on the part of subordinate land commanders and to prevent friendly fire incidents.

(6) Information-sharing relationships and protocols between the JFLCC, local and national authorities, the country team, USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs should be established at the earliest stages of planning.

e. **Communications.** The nature of joint land operations present certain challenges to C2 and particularly to communications. Communications challenges are influenced by decentralization, the three dimensional nature of the operational area, urban terrain, or complex environmental hindrances to radio communications and often the existence of a local communications infrastructure.

(1) Land operations conducted employing mission command are inherently decentralized and the forces involved require the ability to communicate quickly within normal communication patterns. Because of the complexity of the environment, situational awareness, a COP, and visualization is very difficult. The communications system architecture should support the entire land area—vertical and horizontal, surface and subterranean, airspace, and littoral. In addition, the JFLCC may need to provide support to, or liaison with, embassy personnel, partner nations, local government personnel, and other components of the joint force.

(2) DODIN operations are the means by which digital communications are established and maintained throughout joint land forces. USCYBERCOM is the supported commander for global synchronization of CO. Its subordinate HQ, Joint Force Headquarters-DODIN, is responsible for securing, operating, and defending the DODIN in coordination with the CDR's CO planning staff. As the JFLCC's single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint communications network, the JNCC requires knowledge of the communications requirements in the land environment, especially in the specific operational area. Vital to communications management is the need to support planning and execution, to include information exchange requirements, radio frequency spectrum allocation, communications equipment dispersion, and assessment of communications effectiveness.

See JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, for a full discussion of communications considerations. See JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, for a full discussion on defense of the DODIN.

(3) Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO) are those activities consisting of electromagnetic warfare (EW) and joint EMS management operations used to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic environment to achieve the commander's objectives. Frequency allotment and assignment authority is normally delegated to the joint frequency management office.

For additional guidance on JEMSO, refer to CJCSI 3320.01, (U) Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO).

f. Space Capabilities for C2

(1) Space systems may be employed to monitor land areas before friendly forces are established. If specifically designated as the SCA, the JFLCC will normally designate a senior space officer to facilitate coordination, integration, and staffing activities for space operations on a daily basis.

(2) Space systems provide ISR; missile tracking; launch detection; environmental monitoring; satellite communications; position, navigation, and timing; and navigation warfare. Considering the difficulties in communications in and around land areas, space systems offer the JFLCC the ability to exchange information inside the operational area and between elements of the joint force and also facilitates intertheater and intratheater communications. Space systems may form a critical link in the C2 architecture that rapidly

passes data and information. This can enable taskings and warnings to forces, as well as critical situational awareness and location information. Space systems face simultaneous demands from many users and require prioritization.

(3) The space-based **Global Positioning System (GPS)** provides a critical capability during joint land operations. GPS provides position, navigation, and timing information. It can be used for object location, movement direction, velocity, weapon accuracy, clock synchronization, and improved personnel situational awareness. The ability of space systems to provide real-time location information that, enhanced by imagery data, can be used by all components of the joint force is especially crucial to the success of land forces.

See JP 3-14, Space Operations, for a full discussion of space operations.

g. **Risk Management.** Risk management is a function of command and is based on the amount of risk a higher authority is willing to accept. Risk management assists commanders in conserving lives and resources and avoiding or mitigating unnecessary risk, making an informed decision to execute a mission, identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and providing reasonable alternatives for mission accomplishment.

(1) High-tempo land operations may increase the risk of injury and death due to mishaps.

(2) JFLCCs and their staffs develop or institute a risk management process tailored to their particular mission or operational area. Joint land operations in general also tend to produce a significant number of injuries due to the nature of urban and complex terrain—falls from buildings or mountains, vehicular accident injuries, injuries caused by bodies of water or by weather extremes. Cities pose their own safety hazards, even in the absence of an enemy. Urban hazards cause injuries not normally seen in large numbers in other types of terrain. Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation measures, and training lessen those risks. The JFLCC reduces the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel. Safety considerations could include the geospatial and weather data, local road conditions and driving habits, uncharted or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment hazards.

(3) The JFLCCs and their staff also consider risks associated with the use of commercial support. The JFLCC's use of commercial support may mitigate some force structure risks while creating operational vulnerabilities.

9. Intelligence

a. **The JFLCC defines intelligence responsibilities for the land component, prioritizes intelligence requirements of subordinate land forces, and provides representation for the land component and its subordinates.** The staff incorporates and synchronizes intelligence efforts, including human intelligence (HUMINT) and CI efforts with the JFC's staff. The JFLCC is the JFC's focal point for land forces intelligence, target

development, and combat assessment. The JFLCC states operational requirements and provides continuous feedback to ensure optimum intelligence support to operations. The first step for filling JFLCC intelligence gaps should be to request augmentation from theater and/or national assets. Asset support is essential:

- (1) To support the commander.
- (2) To identify, define, and nominate targets.
- (3) To support operational planning and execution.
- (4) To avoid surprise and increase understanding of the operational area.
- (5) To assist friendly deception efforts.
- (6) To evaluate the results of operations.
- (7) To assess opponent's vulnerability.
- (8) To coordinate with the frequency spectrum manager for the use of the EMS to assess intelligence gain or loss for electronic attack and communications.
- (9) To warn of enemy WMD use; collecting information about WMD program and network elements for targeting and control requirements; and to facilitate actions to conduct operations in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environments.

b. Offices, Centers, and Teams. While not all of the offices, centers, or teams available may be required, a JFLCC may request a national intelligence support team, joint interrogation and debriefing center, or joint document exploitation center.

See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; JP 2-01.2, (U) Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations; JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment; JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations; and JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks, for more information.

10. Fires

a. General. The JFLCC plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and employs all joint fires within their AO to create lethal or nonlethal effects to set the conditions for success. Joint fires are delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to create the desired effects in support of a common objective. The JFLCC's focus is on shaping those opponent formations, functions, facilities, and operations that could impact the JFLCC's AO. Through the joint targeting cycle, the JFLCC informs the rest of the JFC's forces of the JFLCC's intent for fires both within and beyond the AO. The JFLCC has four primary objectives associated with these operations.

(1) Facilitating both operational and tactical maneuver by suppressing the enemy's long-range systems, disrupting the enemy's operational maneuver and tempo, and creating exploitable gaps in enemy positions.

(2) Isolating the operational area by interdicting adversary military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

(3) Destroying or disrupting critical enemy C2 capabilities.

(4) Assessing and minimizing collateral damage to realize both the JFLCC's and the JFC's guidance and intent, enabling potential exploitation, or use in continuing or future operations.

b. Fires Synchronization and Coordination. The JFLCC's primary agency—to synchronize and coordinate joint fires and their effects—is either an Army fires cell or a Marine fires and effects coordination center (FECC) or fire support coordination center (FSCC) of the J-3. The fires cell or center reviews the JFC's guidance and intent and makes recommendations for the JFLCC to create the desired effects that support achievement of the objectives. The fires cell or center applies this guidance as it shapes the OE for the land component's current and future fights.

c. USA Joint Fire Support C2. Fire support personnel are assigned at all levels from company to theater level. At company level, a fire support officer (FSO) leads the fire support team. The brigade FSO leads the brigade fires cell. The BCT fires battalion commander is the BCT's fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). Battalion/squadron-level fires cells are led by FSOs. An FSCOORD or chief of fires is authorized from division to theater level and is assisted by FSOs and fire support noncommissioned officers. The chief of fires is the senior fires staff officer at the field or theater army level who advises the commander on the best use of available fires resources.

(1) **The FSCOORD** is the senior field artillery commander designated as a coordinating staff officer at division or corps. The FSCOORD or chief of fires performs all the staff functions associated with fire support. Additionally, as fires cell supervisor, the FSCOORD or chief of fires integrates fire support and electronic attack and related capabilities with each other and assists the operations officer to integrate fires and maneuver into the unit's COP.

(2) **Fires Cell.** The fires cell coordinates and synchronizes the application of joint fires under JFLCC control. Responsibilities include:

(a) Coordinate and synchronize all aspects of operational fires with other component commands, major subordinate commands, and multinational forces.

(b) Coordinate directly with the air support operations center for CAS or through the BCD to the JAOC for air interdiction and other air support. It also participates in the JTF JTCB and other JTF boards. Identify requirements for fires from other components (air interdiction/CAS/naval surface fire support). Influence the JFACC's air apportionment recommendation.

(c) Review and comment on the JFACC's air apportionment recommendation.

(d) Identify assets for JFC allocation (e.g., Army Tactical Missile System/attack helicopters), when available.

(e) Develop JFLCC targeting guidance and priorities.

(f) Integrate and synchronize capabilities that create lethal and nonlethal effects.

d. **USMC Joint Fires C2.** Depending upon the mission, and the decision of the JFC, MARFOR may be employed as the joint force land component command.

(1) Various agencies and elements are established within the MAGTFs when designated to form a joint force land component command to assist in the execution of fires responsibilities. The MEF command element organizes a FECC, to coordinate fires.

(2) At each level below the MEF command element (division, regiment, and battalion), an FSICC is established as an advisory and coordination agency within the ground combat element. The FECC and each FSICC is staffed with representatives of the Marine Corps and other component organizations, dependent on the mission.

e. **Resources.** The JFLCC's primary means to attack targets are operational fires and interdiction. Potential resources available include Army and Marine Corps ground maneuver forces (i.e., regiments, BCTs, divisions), Army and Marine Corps aviation, and Army and Marine Corps tactical missile systems. Additional resources that may be made available in an OPCON, TACON, or support relationship for coastal riverine and surface fire support include Navy, Air Force, or SOF.

See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for more information.

f. **Targeting.** Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. Targeting is executed and applied at all levels within the joint force to incorporate the wide variety of capabilities to create desired effects and to achieve objectives. Effective coordination, deconfliction, prioritization, synchronization, integration, and assessment maximize the potential for achieving objectives. Decisions to modify missions or direct attacks that deviate from the OPORD should be based on the commander's guidance. These decisions are made with the understanding of the perspective and target priorities of other components throughout the campaign. The JFLCC requires effective joint targeting procedures that:

(1) Comply with JFC's objectives, guidance, and intent, as well as with the law of war and established ROE.

(2) Conduct target development.

(3) Nominate targets for inclusion in the joint target list and the restricted target list; nominate targets for inclusion on the JFC's time-sensitive target list and maintain own list of high-priority targets.

(4) Identify and nominate component-critical targets for JFC approval. Typically, these are component nominations not approved as TSTs by the JFC.

(5) Provide tactical and operational assessment to the joint fires element (JFE) for incorporation into the JFC's overall efforts.

(6) Consolidate and nominate deconflicted and prioritized targets for inclusion in the joint integrated prioritized target list.

(7) Provide appropriate representation to the JFE, the joint targeting working group, and JTCB, as well as other associated staff organizations when established.

(8) Provide timely and accurate reporting to the JFE.

(9) Integrate capabilities that create nonlethal effects in the targeting process.

(10) Conduct weaponeering, the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons required to create a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapons characteristics and effects, and delivery parameters.

g. **Joint Targeting Process.** The JFLCC, as a commander at the operational level of warfare, conducts targeting within the joint targeting process. A primary consideration in organizing the framework of the joint targeting cycle is the requirement to coordinate, deconflict, prioritize, integrate, synchronize, and assess joint targeting operations to synchronize targeting efforts among other component and, potentially, other CCDRs' targeting processes. The structure established by the JFLCC facilitates the joint targeting process throughout the entire spectrum of anticipated targeting timelines from long-term to rapidly changing, time-critical situations. Likewise, it should execute all phases of the joint targeting process efficiently and continuously. The joint targeting process cuts across traditional functional and organizational boundaries. Operations, plans, and intelligence are the primary staff participants, but other functional area (e.g., as logistics, weather, legal, and communications) subject matter experts also support the joint targeting cycle. Close coordination, cooperation, and communication are essential for the best use of joint force land component command and other component resources in support of the JFC. **The JFLCC develops guidance that directs and focuses operation planning and targeting to support the JFC's CONOPS; complies with applicable ROE; and submits detailed, operational-level schemes of maneuver for future operations to the JFC for joint targeting support.** In the event of conflict of targeting priorities or ROE, changes may be requested from the JFC.

h. **Targeting Coordination Board.** The JFLCC may organize a targeting coordination board to function as an integrating center to accomplish targeting oversight functions or as a JFLCC-level review mechanism for fires, from lethal and nonlethal

weapons. In either case, it is a joint activity with appropriate representatives from the other components, subordinate units, and the JFLCC's staff. JFLCC targeting responsibilities include:

- (1) To retain authority and responsibility to direct target priorities for land operations and coordinate subordinate units' effort.
- (2) To provide clear guidance and objectives for JFLCC operational planning and targeting.
- (3) To update JFLCC mission planning guidance, intent, and priority intelligence requirements.

OPERATION ICEBERG, THE BATTLE OF OKINAWA

The Battle of Okinawa is an early example of the joint force land component command in operation. During the battle, several innovations, specific to the circumstances of the campaign, were implemented. Among these was Tenth Army's (the LCC [land component commander]) reservation of "the right to assign target and unit priorities, allocating and/or moving assets to where they would have the most beneficial effect on the ground campaign." During the campaign, "Army and Marine artillery were used interchangeably."

Source: Lieutenant Colonel James S. Gavitt, "The Okinawa Campaign: A Case Study," pp. 96-97, Individual Study Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 1991

(4) To direct the formation, composition, and specific responsibilities of a JFLCC's targeting coordination board to support land operations.

(5) To review target selection for unnecessary adverse impacts, such as civilian casualties, collateral or environmental damage and potential intelligence gains or losses.

i. Subordinate unit responsibilities include:

- (1) To identify requirements and nominate targets to the JFLCC.
- (2) To provide representation to the JFLCC's targeting coordination board.
- (3) To recommend priorities for **battle damage assessment** collection requirements to the JFLCC.

See JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information.

j. **Other Component Fire Support Coordination Responsibilities.** The JFLCC and other functional component command commanders (e.g., JFACC, JFMCC, JFSOCC) develop plans to achieve the JFC's objectives. Synchronization, integration, allocation of resources, and matching appropriate weapons to particular targets are essential targeting functions for the component commanders. All component commanders subordinate to the JFC should have a basic understanding of each component's mission and scheme of maneuver to support the JFC's campaign plan. Therefore, the JFLCC provides a description of the support plan through the liaison elements to the Service and functional components and maintains awareness of other component objectives and plans that have the potential to affect the availability of other targeting resources. This basic understanding promotes unity of effort through the coordination and deconfliction of fires and targeting efforts between components, multinational forces, and other agencies. The JACCE located with the JFLCC's staff provides valuable assistance and liaison from the JFACC and can facilitate coordination in planning and synchronizing operational fires and the establishment and control of FSCMs.

k. **FSCMs** are disseminated electronically by message, database update, and/or overlay through both command and joint fire support channels to higher, lower, and adjacent maneuver and supporting units. Typically, they are further disseminated to each level of command, to include the establishing command and all concerned joint fire support agencies. Not all measures may apply to a joint operation. However, knowledge of any component specific FSCMs is necessary for the effective use of joint fire support. FSCMs include permissive measures such as coordinated fire lines, **fire support coordination lines (FSCLs), free fire areas, and kill boxes.** Restrictive measures include **restrictive fire lines, no-fire areas, restrictive fire areas, and zones of fire.**

(1) **Planning and Coordination Considerations.** The establishment or change of an FSCM established by the JFLCC is typically initiated through the J-3 operations cell and ultimately approved by the JFC. FSCMs enhance the expeditious engagement of targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future operations. Commanders position and adjust FSCMs consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The operations cell informs coordination elements of the change and effective time. Conditions which dictate the change of FSCMs are also coordinated with the other agencies and components as appropriate. As conditions are met, the new FSCM effective time can be projected and announced. Following direction to execute the change, the operations cell should confirm with all liaison elements that the FSCM changes have been disseminated. This ensures affected units are aware of new FSCM locations and associated positive control measures are being followed, thus reducing the risk of friendly fire incidents.

(2) **FSCL.** An FSCM established by the land or amphibious force commander to support common objectives within an area of operation, beyond which all fires must be coordinated with affected commanders prior to engagement, and short of the line, all fires must be coordinated with the establishing commander prior to engagement.

11. Movement and Maneuver

a. This function encompasses disposing joint forces to conduct campaigns, major operations, and other contingencies by securing positional advantages before combat operations commence and by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives. This includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area and conducting maneuver to operational depths for offensive or defensive purposes. The JFLCC is responsible for the operational movement and maneuver of land forces necessary to contribute to the success of the JFC's campaign and directs the land force in performance of operational tasks. **The JFLCC plans, controls, and coordinates land movement and maneuver to gain a positional advantage or a positive mobility differential over the threat** to achieve the objectives assigned in the combatant command campaign plan or JFC's OPLAN. The objective for operational maneuver is usually to gain the positional advantage over a threat COG or decisive point.

b. **Key JFLCC movement and maneuver considerations include:**

(1) Appendix A, "Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Staff Organization," provides a framework for the integration of staff officers from each Service into each section of the joint force land component command staff. It is essential that each Service participate in the planning process of all movement and maneuver to ensure consideration of Service-unique capabilities and limitations.

(2) The JFLCC effectively integrates the different capabilities, requirements, and limitations of the forces and capabilities assigned. A key to maximizing capabilities is to understand the maneuver requirements of each assigned force. This requires detailed and continuous coordination with other components and careful consideration of FSCMs and boundaries. This also requires an understanding of the maneuver environment in which each unit will have to conduct operations, to include how the effects of terrain, weather, and possible enemy actions (fires, barriers, mines, improvised explosive devices [IEDs]) could impede maneuver.

(3) The JFLCC normally assumes control of forces from the Service component commander upon completion of their JRSOI in theater. The JFLCC requires effective C2 capability to employ the force.

c. The JFLCC makes recommendations to the JFC on the following:

(1) Land force structure and organization for combat.

(2) Integration and employment of multinational land forces.

(3) Land force scheme of maneuver and fire support to support the JFC's CONOPS.

(4) Priorities of effort for land forces.

(5) Designating the FSCMs and AO boundaries for subordinate commanders.

- (6) Intelligence collection priorities.
- (7) Joint fires to support the land forces.
- (8) Joint fires to support other components.
- (9) Space support to the land force.

(10) Airspace control requests, coordinating altitudes, and other ACMs submitted to the airspace control authority for approval.

For more information, see JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, and ATP 3-52.1/MCWP 3-25.13/NTTP 3-56.4/AFTTP 3-2.78, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control.

- (11) Interdiction targets or objectives within the JFLCC's operational area.
- (12) Special operations support to the land force.

(13) Integration and employment of CBRN support to enhance freedom of maneuver in CBRN environments.

- (14) Land force capabilities to counter CBRN threats and hazards.

See JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Environments, for more information operating in CBRN environments; JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, for more information on managing the response to a CBRN event; and JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, for more information on countering CWMD operations.

(15) Land forces to conduct the site exploitation (SE) of any site with political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, or time sensitivity to the United States.

12. Protection

a. As a responsibility of command, not a separate mission, the JFC considers all elements of force protection. Force protection consists of actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Protection may also extend to friendly forces, however designated. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. **The JFLCC will set appropriate force protection condition (FPCON) for the AO equal to or more restrictive than the JFC's baseline FPCON.** The JFLCC may form a protection cell under the J-3 to

synchronize and coordinate protection. USA divisions, corps, field, and theater army HQ have a protection cell with a chief of protection authorized.

b. The protection function encompasses a number of tasks, including:

- (1) Conducting CBRN defense operations in CBRN environments.
- (2) Providing AMD.
- (3) Conducting antiterrorism (AT) operations.
- (4) Conducting cyberspace security and cyberspace defense actions.
- (5) Providing physical security for forces, means, and civilians.
- (6) Conducting operations security (OPSEC).
- (7) Securing and protecting flanks, bases, base clusters, JSAs, and lines of communications (LOCs).
- (8) Conducting law enforcement measures.
- (9) Conducting PR operations.
- (10) Conducting CBRN response.
- (11) Providing protection to people and equipment from directed energy and laser and radio frequency energy.
- (12) Conducting FPCON training with a focus on AT, intelligence, and security.

c. **CBRN Defense.** The JFLCC may need to establish these defensive measures as part of force protection. During defense operations, detection equipment, intelligence, reporting, reconnaissance, decontamination, and personnel requirements come into play.

(1) The JFLCC should provide subordinate commanders with information from which they can establish appropriate unit defense measures. This system consolidates the most current intelligence estimates regarding the enemy's offensive capabilities, intent, and activities and recommends measures to be employed to combat this threat.

(2) **The JFLCC's J-3 establishes the CBRN threat level in coordination with the J-2 and JFLCC's CBRN officer.** Once established, the **FPCON** is disseminated via J-2 and J-3 channels. Actions associated with each **FPCON** are recommended, not directive in nature. They are based on current CBRN defense doctrine but should be assessed in context of the unit's situation and mission.

(a) CBRN threat level is not synonymous with the mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) levels and/or personal protection equipment levels. Threat is

only one of the factors commanders consider when determining the appropriate MOPP level.

(b) The JFLCC, in coordination with, and with the approval of, the JFC, establishes close relationships with other USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, and international organizations and NGO partners operating within the AO. Networks and other means of information sharing are established with diplomatic missions, country teams, and international organization and NGO partners within the AO. These sources may provide valuable intelligence on the likelihood of adversary intent to introduce CBRN material/WMD and related improvised devices. They may also produce data on the political and psychological implications, as well as military aspects needed to effectively counter WMD beyond that provided by organic or other supporting military intelligence sources. The JFLCC may be required to provide land forces as part of a comprehensive effort to locate and secure residual CBRN hazards or WMD capabilities in support of CWMD operations.

For more information on CBRN defense, see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

d. **SE.** The JFLCC may conduct **SE** consisting of a series of activities to preserve, characterize, exploit, disable or neutralize, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of operations to protect the force and produce an advantage within the operational variables to support tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. SE may be conducted at a **sensitive site**, which is a geographically limited area that contains, but is not limited to, biometric residue (or remains), adversary information systems, war crimes sites, critical government facilities, and areas suspected of containing high-value targets such as WMD or WMD program elements.

See also ATP 3-90.15, Site Exploitation.

e. **Defensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats.** The JFC establishes guidance and objectives to protect against air and missile threats. The JFLCC ensures integrated AMD conducted by land forces are planned, coordinated, and synchronized with the joint AADC. Normally, AAMDC assets will be TACON to the AADC or the AAMDC will be in support of the AADC. The JFLCC may employ the AAMDC to perform those planning and C2 functions. The AAMDC is an Army C2 HQ tailored for joint operations and is capable of planning, coordinating, and synchronizing joint theater missile defense operations. The AAMDC commander also normally commands the subordinate air defense artillery brigades and functions as a special staff officer for the ARFOR commander (or JFLCC, if appointed). For complex, integrated AMD operations, the AADC, with the approval of the JFC, may appoint the AAMDC commander as the assistant or deputy AADC to assist in the integration and synchronization of operations across the joint force to effectively counter air and missile threats.

For additional guidance, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

f. **Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM).** C-RAM is a USA tactical mission that provides detection; warning; C2; interception of rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM) in flight; and engagement of enemy sources of indirect fire. C-RAM capabilities are the combined arms effort to counter the enemy's ability to employ RAM while simultaneously cueing early warning and defensive actions to protect personnel in the vicinity of the projected point of impact. C-RAM is employed to counter RAM threats that will disrupt friendly force decisive actions and attack critical assets. C-RAM is deployed to protect logistic areas, troop concentration areas, and air fields as dictated by the supported commander. When providing support to maneuver forces, commanders should bear in mind that this weapon system is a fixed/semi-fixed site capability unable to provide RAM coverage while on the move. While C-RAM is generally the responsibility of the land commander to plan and execute, integrated AMD addresses aspects of it, which may need to be coordinated with the AADC (e.g., C-RAM protection of airfields).

For additional information on C-RAM, see FM 3-01, US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations.

g. **AT Measures.** A comprehensive JFLCC AT program will seek to identify and reduce the risk of loss or damage of personnel and resources which may be targeted by terrorists and to develop procedures to detect and deter planned terrorist actions before they take place. These measures also encompass the limited response and containment by local and military forces. For assets under the control of the JFLCC, an appropriate division of responsibilities is coordinated with the JFC. **The AT program stresses deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventive measures** common to all combatant commands and Services. The program addresses the following:

- (1) Threat analysis and threat reduction.
- (2) Installation or unit criticality and vulnerability assessments.
- (3) Threat assessment based on the threat analysis and friendly vulnerabilities.
- (4) Information security.
- (5) OPSEC.
- (6) Personnel security.
- (7) Physical security.
- (8) Crisis management planning.
- (9) Employment of tactical measures to contain or resolve terrorist incidents.
- (10) Continuous training and education of personnel.

See also JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism, for more information on AT activities.

h. **Cybersecurity.** Cyberspace security and cyberspace defense actions implement DOD and national cybersecurity policy to secure and defend information systems by ensuring availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.

i. **DODIN Operations and Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO).** DODIN operations are operations to configure, secure, operate, extend, maintain, and sustain DOD cyberspace to create and preserve the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the DODIN, and DCO are missions to preserve the ability to utilize blue cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, cyberspace-enabled devices, and other designated systems by defeating on-going or imminent malicious cyberspace activity.

See JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, and JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, for more detail.

j. **Physical Security Measures.** Physical security measures serve to deter, detect, and defend against threats from terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures include barriers and perimeter standoff space, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

See also JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, and JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism.

k. **OPSEC Measures.** Effective OPSEC measures minimize the signature of the joint force land component command's activities, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when patterns cannot be altered. Although strategic OPSEC measures are important, the most effective methods manifest themselves at the lowest level. This includes monitoring and controlling the use of social media, both by individuals and the command, to prevent the unintentional broadcast of critical information such as unit movements, capabilities, and locations. Terrorist activity is discouraged by varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals, and conducting vehicle and personnel searches and identification checks on a set but unpredictable pattern.

See also JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, for more information.

l. **Law Enforcement Measures.** The JFLCC may be tasked to assist in the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crimes within the assigned overseas AO. Support to law enforcement overseas will be IAW status-of-forces agreements and other legal considerations for the operational area. Security of high-risk personnel and personnel security are other aspects of force protection that will require the JFLCC's attention and use of military law enforcement personnel.

m. **PR Operations.** PR operations serve to return isolated personnel to duty, sustain morale, increase operational performance, and deny adversaries the opportunity to influence our military strategy and national will by exploiting the intelligence and propaganda value of isolated personnel. As a component commander, the JFLCC plans and conducts PR in support of joint land force component command operations and for

other forces operations occurring within the JFLCC assigned operational area or as tasked by the JFC. The JFLCC should establish a personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) to coordinate all component PR activities, including coordination with the joint personnel recovery center (JPRC) and other component PRCCs. The JFLCC should be prepared to establish a JPRC if directed or designated as the joint force supported commander for PR. The JFLCC's PRCC may serve as the nucleus for the JPRC, with other components providing functionally trained PR augmentees to the JPRC as directed by the JFC to represent their component and assist in coordinating and deconflicting their component's PR capabilities at the joint level.

See JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, for more detail.

13. Sustainment

a. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment. Joint personnel services include synchronizing and optimizing personnel service support to the joint force (mail, religious, and legal support, and finance and disbursement services); coordinating morale, welfare, and recreation program; accomplishing manpower management; strength reporting; and managing casualty reporting. Core logistic functions are deployment and distribution, supply, maintenance, logistic services, OCS, engineering, and joint health services.

See JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and other JP 4-series publications for more on sustainment. See JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support; JP 3-80, Resource Management, JP 3-84, Legal Support; and Joint Guide 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, for additional information on joint personnel services.

b. **Authority.** CCDRs exercise **directive authority for logistics (DAFL)** and may delegate authority for a common support capability. The CCDR may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the subordinate JFC's assigned mission. For some commodities or support services common to two or more Services, one Service may be given responsibility for management based on DOD EA designations or inter-Service support agreements. However, the CCDR should formally delineate this delegated directive authority by function and scope to the subordinate JFC or Service component commander. A CCDR's DAFL is not intended to:

- (1) Discontinue Service responsibility for logistics support.
- (2) Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement.
- (3) Disrupt effective procedures, efficient use of facilities, or organization.
- (4) Include the ability to provide contracting authority or make binding contracts for the USG.

For more information on DAFL, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

c. **Staff.** The JFLCC's J-1; J-4; and force structure, resource, and assessment directorate of a joint staff (J-8) provide critical, functional expertise to the commander in the areas of personnel services and logistics. These staffs focus on key personnel services and logistic issues that may have an adverse effect on the land operations portion of the joint campaign. Generally, they manage by exception only. **Routine administrative, personnel services, and logistics management is the responsibility of the JFC and the subordinate Service component commands.**

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and the JP 4-series publications. See Appendix A, "Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Staff Organization," for more information on the J-1 and J-4 staff organization and responsibilities.

d. **Responsibilities.** Each Service is responsible for the logistic and personnel services of its own forces, except when support is by agreement with national agencies; multinational partners; or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing. The supported CCDR determines if common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or designated area. **The JFLCC will make recommendations about personnel and logistics support to the JFC** commensurate with priorities developed for land force operations. While each Service retains authority for logistics and personnel service support of its forces, the JFC will ensure support is coordinated and integrated throughout the operation.

e. **EA.** SecDef or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate a DOD EA and assign associated logistics responsibilities, functions, and authorities within DOD. These policy responsibilities influence logistics planning within the AOR. EA designations are related to, but not the same as, lead Service designations discussed earlier.

For additional information on EAs, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; for supply commodity-related EAs, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

f. **Lead Service.** The CCDR may choose to assign specific CUL functions, to include planning and execution to a lead Service. These assignments can be for single or multiple common logistical functions and may also be based on phases and/or locations within the AOR. Combatant command lead Service assignments are normally aligned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-level EA designations, but this may not always be the case. Service component forces, especially the Army, are often required to provide significant levels of theater/JOA-wide support to other Service components, multinational partners, other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. This support and other support directed by CCDRs are broadly defined by the Army as Army support to other Services. Army theater echelon support units, such as the TSC, normally provide theater/JOA-wide CUL support requirements, but these are carried out by the ARFOR commander and are not a JFLCC responsibility. **In some cases, the JFLCC may coordinate for lead Service CUL support for the land component;**

however, the authority to direct logistics is not resident in the JFLCC's OPCON or TACON, unless the CCDR delegates directive authority for a common support capability to the JFLCC. The JFLCC's J-4 staff ensures JFLCC-directed CUL requirements do not conflict or interfere with CCDR-directed lead Service CUL requirements.

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Force of the United States, and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, for a description of DAFL.

g. **OCS.** OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations, as well CCDR-directed single-Service activities, regardless of designation as a formal contingency or not.

(1) OCS is planned and integrated through cross-functional organizations and associated lead Service or joint theater support contracting-related activities. OCS includes the ability to plan, orchestrate, and synchronize the provision of contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. These three functions are inextricably linked to achieving favorable operational and acquisition objectives.

(2) Contracted support to military operations is administered IAW federal law and acquisition regulations. Contracting authority does not equal command authority. The JFC and planners should identify a requirement for a contracted system or capability at the earliest opportunity, so all contractors and contractor personnel who provide support to the theater requiring transportation can be integrated into the TPFDD. DOD contractor personnel include personnel who are employed as a result of a systems support, external support, or theater support contract. System support contractor personnel and many external support contractor personnel deploy with the force and are referred to as contractors authorized to accompany the force. Integrating contracting and contractor management functions into military planning and operations is a complex and very challenging process.

(3) Multiple joint and Service component organizations are involved in this process, including commanders and the primary and special staffs at the combatant command through major tactical force levels. Military forces should not compete for scarce civilian resources. To avoid competition for similar support and to promote economy of contracting effort, contracts for logistic support must be coordinated through the designated J-4 or lead agent for logistics joint contracting support board or center.

For more information on OCS, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support; Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support; and DODD 4270.5, Military Construction.

h. **Boards and Centers.** The JFLCC is not routinely the lead for JFC-level logistic boards and centers. The JFLCC's J-4 normally participates in selected CCDR/JFC boards and centers that are of critical importance to the successful execution of land operations.

The T-JTB, JDDOC, and/or JMC are transportation-related boards and centers that may have significant impact on land operations and are examples of higher-level joint logistics boards on which the JFLCC may want representation. Other boards and centers of significant importance to the JFC include the joint material priorities and allocation board, OCS working group, JRRB, and the joint petroleum office. To ensure proper focus, the JFLCC participation in these boards needs to be treated as separate and distinct from the Service component participation in these same boards and centers. The JFLCC will not normally convene separate joint logistics boards and centers except when needed to coordinate critical CUL support within the JFLCC's AO.

14. Information

a. The information function encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to influence relevant actor perceptions, behavior, and action or inaction and supports human and automated decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations. This function provides JFLCCs the ability to integrate the generation and preservation of friendly information, while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of all military activities to achieve the commander's objectives and attain the end state.

b. All military activities produce information. Informational aspects are the features and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning to gain understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive human and automated decision making. The continuing expansion of information technology, widespread availability of wireless communication, and the far-reaching impact of social media poses new and complex challenges for military operations in the OE. The JFLCC leverages informational aspects of military activities to achieve an advantage in support of operations, actions, and activities; failing to leverage those aspects will cede this advantage to adversaries and enemies. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities ultimately affects the higher commander's objectives.

c. The information function includes activities that facilitate the JFLCC's understanding of the role of information in the OE, that facilitate the JFLCC's ability to leverage information to affect the behavior of relevant actors, and that support human and automated decision making.

d. In joint staffs, the information section normally serves under the J-3 as the J-39 [information operations cell] (see Appendix A, "Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Staff Organization"). An information staff officer should be designated. This officer or an assistant will interface with the joint force information cell to provide component expertise and act as a liaison for information matters between the joint force and the component. These representatives may also serve as members of one or more of the supporting organizations of information, such as the special technical operations cell. Since CO can be used for physical destruction, the JFLCC designates targets in a manner consistent with target nominations for other weapons systems. The information staff

officer coordinates and synchronizes the information- related activities in an information working group. Typically, the J-9 CMO officer leads coordination with international organization civilian partners and IPI. The public affairs officer (PAO) conducts communication synchronization with the domestic and international media and homeland audiences. The military information support operations (MISO) planner and military deception (MILDEC) officer synchronize communication to indigenous populations and adversary forces. The information staff planner synchronizes the information-related activities of the information function. Service and functional components requesting specific information support from sources internal or external to the JFC should normally request such support through the respective joint force component HQ to the JFC information cell. Service information organizations (e.g., 688th Cyberspace Operations Wing, 1st Information Operations Command [Land], Army theater information operations groups, Navy information operations organizations, and Marine information groups) may also provide support to the information cell through the appropriate Service component commanders.

See also JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more on the information function.

e. With the speed and complexity of today's information environment, the JFLCC develops plans for the conduct of operations in the information environment to shape that environment and seize the initiative to gain an advantage in the OE. Considering the lethality of the modern battlefield and the multiplicity of participating nations, NGOs, media, and private-sector organizations, the management and sharing of information is critical to success. The JFC and subordinate commanders weigh the pros and cons that the release, or withholding, of information from select groups will have upon operations and the local civilian population. As a functional component commander, the JFLCC may have authority over several information activities or operations as delegated by the JFC.

f. **MISO.** The purpose of MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator's objectives. MISO are integrated into all plans at the initial stages of planning to ensure maximum effectiveness during execution of the joint military operation or campaign. Psychological operations support forces assigned to a JFLCC will provide MISO planning and C2 for military information support units that execute MISO in support of the JFLCC's mission. A MISO staff officer is normally assigned to the J-3.

For additional guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations. MISO support to other USG departments and agencies is outlined in DODI O-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

g. **MILDEC.** MILDEC includes actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces' mission. As executed by JFLCCs, MILDEC targets adversary leaders and decision makers through the manipulation of adversary intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems. During the formulation of the commander's concept, particular attention is placed on defining how the JFLCC would like

the adversary to act at critical points in the battle. Those desired adversary actions then become the MILDEC goal. The MILDEC staff officer may be assigned to the J-5.

For additional guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

h. **PA.** The JFLCC plans, conducts, and assesses PA activities. PA is a critical component of the operational planning and risk assessment processes. PA informs key audiences and counters adversary propaganda and disinformation by providing a continuous flow of credible, reliable, timely, and accurate information. The PAO anticipates and advises the JFLCC on the possible impact of military operations and activities within the public information realm and works with the JFLCC and staff to mitigate or address potentially compromising coverage. Because PA and information planning staff conduct public information activities, the JFLCC ensures appropriate coordination is done to maximize coherency and credibility of communication.

For additional information on PA support, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

i. **CMO.** CMO are activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and IPI with the objective to reestablish or maintain stability in a region or HN. During all military operations, CMO can be conducted in support of the overall US objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur across the competition continuum and are the responsibility of the commander. CMO may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. During large-scale land operations, a JFLCC will normally be supported by USA CA such as a civil affairs command (CACOM) or CA brigade. The CACOM or brigade also has the ability to form the nucleus of a joint CMO TF, if directed. JFCs ensure CA and the execution of civil affairs operations (CAO) are integrated into the plans for all military operations and campaigns. CAO are a vital component of CMO and require planning and synchronization within the land component command, HN government, military and security forces, other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and IPI to ensure maximum effectiveness.

For additional guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations.

j. **Combat Camera (COMCAM).** Imagery is one of the most powerful tools available for informing internal and domestic audiences or influencing relevant actors. COMCAM provides operations-focused imagery support to the JFLCC throughout the competition continuum. COMCAM not only supports information activities such as MISO, CMO, key leader engagement (KLE), OPSEC, intelligence, MILDEC, and PA in support of commander's communication synchronization, protection activities that can utilize visual assistance to communicate, inform, influence, disrupt, assure, deter, persuade, acknowledge, or deny friendly or foreign audiences to support a JFLCC, JFC, or USG objective. COMCAM provides critical operational documentation for sensitive SE, legal, and evidential requirements and imagery for battle damage assessment/MOEs analysis, as

well as operational documentation and imagery for narrative development during FHA and noncombatant evacuation operations.

k. **EW.** EW is military action responsible for securing and maintaining freedom of action in the EMS while exploiting it to gain an advantage over adversaries. EW enables the conduct of other information activities that operate within the EMS, such as MISO, PA, or CO.

For additional guidance on JEMSO, refer to CJCSI 3320.01, (U) Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO).

15. Cyberspace Operations

CO include the missions of OCO, DCO, and DODIN operations. CO are conducted across the competition continuum, and CO capabilities should be considered during the JPP, integrated into plans, and synchronized with other operations during execution. Commanders conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace, achieve military operation or campaign objectives, deny freedom of action to our threats, and enable other operational activities. The importance of CO support in all military operations has grown as the joint force increasingly relies on cyberspace for C2 and other critical operations and logistics functions.

See JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, for more detail.

16. Communication Synchronization

Communication synchronization is a process to coordinate and synchronize narratives, themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to ensure their integrity and consistency to the lowest tactical level across all relevant communication activities. The process aligns communication concerning the joint force's mission with the broader national strategic narrative. The commander should determine who will lead the process for the command, but normally it is the PA office. In support of these efforts, commanders and staffs at all levels should identify and understand key audience perceptions and possible reactions when planning and executing operations. This understanding of key audience perceptions and reactions is a vital element of every campaign and contingency plan. Real or perceived differences between actions and words (the "say-do" gap) are addressed and actively mitigated as appropriate, since this divergence can directly contribute to reduced credibility and have a negative impact on the ability to successfully execute current and future missions. Technological advancements and availability of social media around the globe offer opportunities for the commander to close the "say-do" perception gap. Additionally, the use of social media may offer a reference for assessing the general reaction of red cells and green cells actors to joint land operations. Attention paid to the commander's communication guidance during planning and execution improves the alignment of multiple lines of operation and lines of effort over time and space, which aligns the overarching message with our actions and activities. Proactive planning and execution of communication synchronization is a cost-effective application of DOD resources to protect

and promote USG and partner-nation interests in the operational area and to counter competitors and adversaries who threaten them.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-61, Public Affairs; and JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on commander's communication synchronization implementation.

SECTION C. TRANSITIONS

17. General

Transitions are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships. As previously discussed in Chapter IV, "Planning and Assessment," paragraph 3, "Support to Joint Planning," transitions may include moving to another phase of an ongoing operation or a completely new operation. Effective joint land operations planning must contain provisions for any transitions of joint land operations responsibilities between other components or HQs of the joint force, other echelons, and/or to the JFC's staff. Any JFLCC transitions should be identified in the JLOP.

18. Transition Considerations

a. **C2.** Transitions involving JFLCC command relationships normally include a Service HQ being directed by a JFC to assume the responsibilities of a theater or JOA JFLCC. This transition can be based upon either a permanent establishing directive (see Appendix D, "Example Theater- Joint Force Land Component Commander Establishing Directive") or an approved contingency plan. In either case, the Service HQ selected to be a joint land component command prepare to conduct joint land operations for their respective JFC using approved joint doctrine, as well as continue to perform their previous functions as a Service HQ using appropriate Service doctrine and regulations. Conversely, a transition from JFLCC to JFC staff may also be directed when the JFC determines that operational requirements warrant such a change for control of joint land operations. See Figure V-2.

b. **Planned Transition.** The JFLCC should develop a plan for transition of joint force land component command duties to another formation, component, or location. Planned joint force land component command transitions are possible as a function of buildup or scale down of joint force operations. During transition of joint force land component command responsibilities, the component passing responsibilities should continue monitoring joint land operations and planning and tasks and remain ready to reassume joint force land component command responsibilities until the gaining HQ has achieved full operational capability.

c. **Unplanned Transition.** During unplanned shifts of JFLCC responsibility, as a possible result of hostile action or major C2 equipment failure, a smooth transition is unlikely. Therefore, the JFC should predesignate alternates (both inter- and intra-component) and establish preplanned responses/options to the temporary or permanent joint force land component command capability. Frequent backup and exchange of




Figure V-2. United States Central Command Joint Force Land Component Command Transitions During Operation INHERENT RESOLVE

databases is essential to facilitate a rapid resumption of operations should an unplanned transition occur.

d. **Considerations.** Considerations to aid in JFLCC transition planning and decisions include:

(1) Continuous, uninterrupted, and unambiguous guidance and direction for joint land operations is the primary objective of any joint force land component command transition.

(2) Appropriate communications system capabilities to ensure shift of joint force land component command duties is as transparent to the components as possible.

(3) Specific procedures for coordinating and executing planned and unplanned shifts of a joint force land component command should be published in the JLOP.

(4) The relieving HQ requires adequate communications, connectivity, manning, intelligence support, and C2 capability prior to assuming joint force land component command responsibilities.

(5) There is continuous planning to support both the expansion and transition of the communications system to support the JFC's CONOPS for future operations.

(6) The ability to plan, publish, and disseminate fragmentary orders.

UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL COMMAND IN OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE: A THEATER ARMY AS A FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT AND JOINT TASK FORCE

Following the 10 June 2014 seizure of the Northern Iraqi city of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) was directed to develop military options to help the Government of Iraq defeat ISIS and restore its territorial integrity. USCENTCOM commander General Lloyd Austin's initial priorities included to establish a joint operations center (JOC) with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), assess Iraq's ability to defend its capital, and determine the requirements to rebuild Iraq's military capability for a counteroffensive to secure Iraq. On 24 June, General Austin designated the commander of US Army Central Command, Lieutenant General (LTG) James Terry, as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and the supported commander for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR).

Over the next two months, the JFLCC would incorporate staff augmentation and military capabilities to build a coalition of over 60 nations; deploy an additional JOC to Erbil (JOC-North); establish ISF build partner capacity centers at Bessmaya, Taji, Erbil, and Al Asad; establish target engagement authority procedures for the employment of coalition air and long range surface to surface fires; and assist the ISF and Kurdish forces in rescuing thousands of ethnic Yazidis as they fled from ISIS. Additional combat capabilities and enabling forces—sustainment, medical, and attack aviation—deployed to Iraq from formations already in Kuwait in support of Operation SPARTAN SHIELD under the operational control of US Army Central Command as the theater Army.

On 17 September, USCENTCOM designated the JFLCC as the coalition forces land component commander (CFLCC) and directed the development of a joint manning document to transition the CFLCC to a joint task force. Joint augmentation had previously occurred internal to USCENTCOM, as the other Service components provided members of the CFLCC staff and select members of the command group. Additionally, the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command's Joint Planning Support

Element provided plans augmentation in for both the CFLCC future plans and future operations cells.

On 24 September, the headquarters (HQ) of the 1st Infantry Division was ordered to Iraq to replace United States Army Central Command (USARCENT) elements, then employed in Baghdad and Erbil as the US elements of the JOCs. Now a subordinate joint operations area joint force land component command, designated JFLCC-Iraq (later JFLCC-OIR, then CFLCC-OIR), the division HQ arrived and assumed its mission in late October. By 17 October, the original CFLCC, the core provided by the USARCENT HQ, had been re-designated as Combined Joint Task Force, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR).

By mid-2015, OIR had stabilized the situation in Iraq to the point where imminent collapse was averted and newly regenerated Iraqi forces were being employed back on the offensive against ISIS. On 19 September 2015, USARCENT conducted a transfer of authority of the CJTF-OIR mission to III Corps. In the fifteen months since designation as a joint force HQ for OIR, USARCENT had never relinquished any of its theater Army responsibilities.

Various Sources

(7) The JFC's objectives to conduct supporting joint land operations.

(8) Establish timely, reliable, and secure communications links with all appropriate coordination cells to facilitate continuous and dynamic exchange of information.

(9) Complete and current databases to expedite the transition.

e. **Phasing.** In addition, the JFLCC conducts transitions between operations or phases of an operation. An example is the shift of focus from sustained combat operations to a preponderance of stability activities and tasks. Hostilities gradually lessen as the joint land force begins to reestablish order, commerce, and local government and deters enemies from resuming hostile actions while the United States and international community takes steps to establish or restore the conditions necessary to achieve their strategic objectives. Planning for the transition from a stabilization to enabling civil authorities demands an agile shift in joint land force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks and coordination with a wider range of other organizations—other USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, international organizations, and NGOs—to provide those capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.

APPENDIX A

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND STAFF ORGANIZATION

“[W]e will first maintain a safe and secure nuclear deterrent.”

General James N. Mattis, during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 12 January 2017

1. General

The joint force land component staff is organized based upon the JFLCC’s vision, the mission and forces assigned and attached. Because creating a new staff would be very time-consuming and inefficient, the staff organization will most likely be derived from an existing Service command structure. The most likely candidates are a theater army contingency command post, an Army corps, or a MAGTF (most likely a MEF). Augmentees from the other Services are integrated into the core staff to form the joint force land component staff. Ideally, the JFLCC and the deputy JFLCC would come from different Services. This construct should be replicated throughout the staff leadership to ensure an understanding of the distinct capabilities of each Service to optimize force employment. Figure A-1 depicts a notional joint force land component staff organization.

2. Notional Staff

While Figure A-1 depicts a notional staff organization, it is not prescriptive. The practical assumption is that the actual staff organization is based on the staff organization that forms the core of the staff with some staff members being dual-hatted. Therefore, the actual location and specific duties assigned to certain sections (e.g., engineer) and the specific special staff vary according to the organization of the core staff.

3. Manpower and Personnel Staff Section

The J-1 is the principal staff advisor to the JFLCC for personnel management, personnel services, and personnel manpower administration issues. The personnel estimate and the personnel annex of JFLCC’s OPLANs and OPORDs are prepared by the J-1. The J-1 accomplishes personnel accountability and strength reporting for personnel assigned, attached, or OPCON to the joint force land component command to the JFC. The J-1 monitors current and projected unit strengths by daily personnel status, casualty, and critical personnel shortages to determine their impact on land operations. These reports would be routinely provided from the ARFOR and MARFOR component manpower or personnel staff officer to the JFC with copy furnished to the joint force land component command J-1. The majority of personnel services support and administrative actions are accomplished by the Service components through their Title 10, USC, authority (i.e., pay and entitlements; postal operations; morale, welfare, and recreation; casualty operations; personnel performance evaluations; and awards and decorations). The composition of the J-1 will be dictated by the overall organization of the joint force and the operations to be




Figure A-1. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Staff Organization

conducted. Basically, a typical J-1 consists of three divisions: joint manpower, personnel readiness, and personnel services. A notional J-1 organization is provided in Figure A- 2.

4. Intelligence Staff Section

The primary role of the J-2 is to provide intelligence support to the JFLCC. A notional organization of a joint force land component command J-2 staff is detailed in Figure A-3. The J- 2 staff is responsible for the following intelligence-related actions:

- a. Providing threat assessment and warning.
- b. Participating in all decision making and planning.
- c. Synchronizing intelligence with operations and plans.




Figure A-2. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Manpower and Personnel Staff Directorate

- d. Formulating concept of intelligence operations.
- e. Developing detailed intelligence annexes.
- f. Integrating national and theater intelligence support.
- g. Exploiting combat reporting from operational forces.
- h. Organizing for continuous operations.
- i. Ensuring accessibility of intelligence.
- j. Establishing a joint intelligence architecture.

For a detailed discussion of each responsibility, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

5. Operations Staff Section

The J-3 is responsible for the coordination, integration, synchronization, and execution of all operations. The J-3 staff assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibilities for the direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and ending when operations are completed. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unity of effort. The current operations section requires the ability to look out to at least 72 hours for the upcoming commander's decision points. This will allow future operations to conduct planning from 72 hours out to one week from the current point in time and write the fragmentary orders that direct action based on decision criteria as they are modified by an understanding of the COP. Failure to achieve this standard will tend to draw everyone into the close fight. These





Figure A-3. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Intelligence Staff Directorate

sections play an invaluable role during the execution of operations by proposing COAs to address adversary actions or to take advantage of situations. Figure A-4 depicts a notional joint force land component command J-3 staff organization. Its responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the following actions:

- a. Organizing the operational aspects of the HQ.
- b. Recommending land component command organization to the JFLCC.
- c. Recommending ROE.

d. Developing plans and orders and exercising staff supervision or cognizance over the conduct of the following:

Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Operations Staff Directorate



*When assigned the responsibility for Joint Combat Search and Rescue

Legend

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

Figure A-4. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Operations Staff Directorate

(1) Development of an accurate, timely, and complete common land picture for submission to the JFC.

(2) Operational land combat operations.

(3) Coordination of operational maneuver.

(4) Synchronization and integration of fires.

(5) Synchronization and integration of SOF and other USG departments and agencies.

(6) Integration of a JACCE into the joint force land component command staff.

(7) JSA protection and security.

(8) Information integration.

(9) Friendly fire prevention measures.

(10) CMO (if not performed by a J-9, civil-military staff officer).

(11) PR, to include the establishment of the component PRCC and the establishment of the JPRC if directed by the JFC.

(12) Airspace control within a designated AO IAW the guidance provided by the ACP, the airspace control order, the AADP, and the special instructions located in the ATO to ensure deconfliction, minimization of the risk of friendly fire incidents, and optimization of the joint force capabilities in support of the JFC's objectives.

(13) ISR.

(14) Space operations.

(15) Humanitarian assistance.

(16) Mine warfare operations (land).

(17) Disaster relief operations.

(18) Counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations.

(19) CO.

e. Coordinating security of the operations and intelligence center.

f. Coordinating security guards' activities.

g. If established, J-35 (future operations) is responsible for branch plans.

- h. If established, J-7 engineer staff section may be responsible for C-IED operations.

6. Logistics Staff Section

The J-4 formulates and implements logistic plans within the AO for forces assigned or attached to the land force. The J-4 oversees the implementation of logistics plans by monitoring the logistic requirements of the components and performs analysis for logistical impacts on land operations. A notional joint force land component command J-4 staff organization is depicted in Figure A-5. The J-4 is responsible for the following actions:

- a. Monitoring and coordinating logistics functions and requirements.
- b. Advising the JFLCC about logistics matters affecting joint and multinational support to land operations.
- c. Preparing and/or assisting the Service component logistics officer on the concept of logistics support for the AO and the logistics annexes of JFLCC's OPLANs and OPORDs.




Figure A-5. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Logistics Staff Directorate

- d. Recommending to the JFLCC, within the guidelines established by the JFC, priorities for the allocation of logistics resources among assigned forces within the AO.
- e. Participating in joint/multinational logistics boards and centers that directly impact on land operations.
- f. Maintaining liaison with the other component command staffs, agencies, and JFC counterparts to stay current with logistics, operational, and intelligence situations.
- g. Coordinating construction designs and missions for the AO.
- h. Coordination of materiel requirements.
- i. Planning for operational facilities, contingency bases, LOCs, mobility, countermobility, and survivability and environmental management (if an engineering staff directorate is not organized separately).
- j. Depending on theater organization, maintaining liaison with the Army Service component logistics staff officer and/or USMC assistant chief of staff, logistics/logistics staff section, and the Army TSC.

7. Plans Staff Section

The J-5 operational planning section addresses activities required for conducting land force operations. The J-5 future plans section retains its focus on future planning during the course of the campaign—either the next phase of the operation or the future decision points. A notional joint force land component command J-5 staff is depicted at Figure A-6. The following are the J-5 planning responsibilities for the employment and sustainment of land forces:

- a. Employment planning prescribing how to apply force/forces to achieve specified military objectives.
- b. Sustainment planning directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required for the planned levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity.
- c. Deployment/redeployment planning, including TPFDL development, monitoring the force flow, and the redeployment of forces from theater at campaign's end.
- d. Support to the JFC's effort in planning the joint operation from shaping and developing situational awareness through termination.
- e. MILDEC and special technical operations planning.
- f. Support to the JFC's security cooperation planning.




Figure A-6. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Plans Staff Directorate

8. Communications Systems Staff Section

The J-6 staff coordinates voice, video, data, and message connectivity and network operations supporting joint force land component operations and gives needed guidance to ensure synchronization between all components and/or subordinate commands. A notional joint force land component command J-6 staff organization is depicted in Figure A-7. The J-6 staff is responsible for the following actions:

- a. Advising the JFLCC and staff on all communications systems matters.
- b. Maintaining status of communications to obtain an operational profile of the communications systems network to identify problem areas and solutions.
- c. Overseeing the establishment of a JNCC to support top-level network control and management within the operational area and gives direction and mission guidance.
- d. Preparing and reviewing communications systems plans, policies, annexes, and operating instructions, as required, for joint force land component command operations.
- e. Requesting necessary communications support resources through the JFC's J-6.
- f. Identifying communications systems shortfalls to JFC's J-6 for sourcing.
- g. Tasking subordinate components for communications systems support as required.
- h. Planning, coordinating, and activating, when required, communications systems facilities to provide rapid and reliable communications in support of the joint force land component command.




Figure A-7. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Communications System Staff Directorate

- i. Submitting request for intertheater communications security (COMSEC) package use to the JFC and issues COMSEC call-out messages.
- j. Validating, consolidating, prioritizing, and forwarding ultra-high frequency tactical satellite requirements to the JFC for channel allocation.
- k. Establishing, supervising, and revising, as necessary, the communications operating procedures pertaining to the unique JFLCC communications facilities.
- l. Conducting COMSEC management.
- m. Ensuring sound COMSEC principles are adhered to and availability of essential operation codes, authentication systems, and keying materials are in place.
- n. Receiving, reviewing, and advising the JFLCC of COMSEC monitoring reports provided by COMSEC monitoring teams.
- o. Developing unique JFLCC signal operating instruction requirements and providing to JFC for review/coordination prior to dissemination.

p. Consolidating and validating radio frequency requirements from components/warfighting elements and coordinating requests with the JFC.

q. Providing guidance and assistance to supporting and assigned forces on all telecommunications and data systems matters for which JFLCC's J-6 has jurisdiction.

r. Consolidating and validating unique joint force land component command telecommunications service requirements from components and coordinates with the appropriate agencies.

s. Directing and conducting all communications planning.

t. Determining user communications requirements.

u. Developing critical circuit lists.

v. Developing prioritized listing of systems/circuits for initial activation and providing it to the DODIN operations center for activation management.

w. Developing prioritized list of systems/circuits for initial activation and restoration, and providing it to the DODIN operations center for management.

x. Maintaining understanding of future planning direction.

y. Coordinating commercial satellite rights for military systems.

z. Formulating guidance and policy for all communication assets supporting the JFLCC not already addressed by the JFC.

aa. Coordinating and facilitating communication support as required to multinational, other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGO partners operating within the AO.

bb. Performing frequency and spectrum management for the command.

cc. Coordinating matters related to implementation of virtual collaboration capability and of the supporting CIE that are not in the purview of the JFC.

dd. Developing a list of critical cyberspace assets so that they can be properly protected to support JFLCC operations.

ee. Developing a list of critical infrastructure supporting communications and networks to properly defend joint force land component command and theater-level DODIN operations fully supported.

9. Engineering Staff Section (Optional)

a. While the J-7 is optional, the joint force land component commands are constituted for an OE that places engineering as a major support function and not always best aligned

within J-4. If organized separately, the J-7 coordinates engineering effort between all components and/or subordinate commands. A notional joint force land component command J-7 staff organization is depicted in Figure A-8. The J-7 staff is responsible for the following actions:

- b. Planning for and coordinating the conduct of operational mobility, countermobility, survivability, and construction tasks.
- c. Coordinating construction and maintenance of required facilities, and LOCs.
- d. Coordinating for materiel requirements.
- e. Furnishing advice, with legal assistance, on the impact of JFC operations on the environment IAW applicable US law, regulations, and policy; HN law; international agreements; and the appropriate final governing standards or, in countries where no final governing standards exist, DOD 4715.05-G, *Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document*.
- f. Providing geospatial engineering in conjunction with the geospatial information and services officer.




Figure A-8. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Engineering Staff Directorate

- g. Performing real estate acquisition and management.
- h. Providing other specialized engineering support functions.
- i. Providing emergency repair of war damage to facilities and infrastructure.
- j. Preparing the engineer portions of OPLANs and OPORDs.
- k. Reviewing all engineer-related annexes/appendices of OPLANs and OPORDs.
- l. Providing input to the JFC's plan for humanitarian and civic assistance and exercise- related construction programs to support building partner capacity as required.
- m. Providing and coordinating the procurement and distribution of required materiel based on established priorities. Service components are responsible for procurement and distribution of their Class IV requirements.
- n. Coordinating with DOD construction agents and other engineer support agencies.

See JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, for additional information.

10. Resource Management Staff Section

a. The J-8 provides resource management support and coordinates finance operations support. Finance units and resource management capability are staffed separately. Unit placement is within the sustainment community. Each component command establishes their resource management component. Finance operations include disbursing, commercial vendor (contracts) support, and limited pay. Resource management for joint force land component command operations comprises fund control, cost capturing, and cost reporting. Commanders and planners should consider cash and funding authority as commodities needed to support force deployment operations. The supported CCDR will identify the designated lead agent for financial management in the joint OPLAN or order. A notional joint force land component command J-8 organization is depicted in Figure A-9.

See JP 3-80, Resource Management, for additional information.

b. The JFLCC may designate J-8 with the finance and resource management functional responsibilities listed below:

(1) Serving as principal financial management advisor to the JFLCC for finance operations and resource management.

(2) Ensuring the JFLCC exercises appropriate fiscal oversight and control of the joint force land component command's resource management. C2 of finance units resides with the TSC. Acting as focal point within the land component for all issues related to financial management.




Figure A-9. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Resource Management and Financial Support Staff Directorate

(3) Representing the JFLCC in identifying the command's financial management to the JFC, component commands, and Services as appropriate.

(4) Participating in OPLAN/OPORD development for joint force component command operations.

(5) Preparing a resource management appendix to OPLANs and orders.

(6) Establishing AO resource management responsibilities.

(7) When needed, coordinating specific resource management functions or special support requirements.

(8) Providing estimates of resource requirements to the component commands, the Services, and the JFC as appropriate.

(9) Maintaining positive channels of communication with resource management personnel, the financial management center, the JFC, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and other supporting agencies.

(10) Coordinating funding requirements and finance unit support.

(11) Establishing positive controls over funding authority received.

(12) Developing, submits, and validates requirements as necessary in support of resource management requirements.

(13) Developing management internal control processes, controls, and measures applicable to component resource managers as well as relevant to internal staff procedures.

11. Civil-Military Operations/Interagency Cooperation Directorate

The JFLCC may establish a J-9 (see Figure A-10) separate from the J-3 because of the many challenging issues that will arise during operations involving CMO, interagency coordination, FHA, and HN support, as well as coordination with other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, the HN, IPI, and the private sector. The JFLCC may designate a J-9 with the responsibilities listed below:

- a. As required, coordinating CMO activities while serving as a conduit for information sharing, support requirements, synchronizing activities, compiling information of the civil environment, and performing analysis that support the commander's assessment and planning needs.
- b. Assisting and making recommendations relating to CMO.




Figure A-10. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Civil-Military Operations/Interagency Cooperation Staff Directorate

c. Planning provision of HN support and foreign assistance and making recommendations for foreign internal defense. Participates in OPLAN/OPORD development for JFLCC operations and prepares CAO annex.

d. Advising the commander and assists major subordinate commands in interaction within government agencies and populations.

e. Recommending policy for CAO and preparing, implementing, and supervising the execution of CA plans. Preparing estimates and conducting surveys and studies in support of CAO. Determining the requirements for resources to accomplish civil-military activities, to include a CA unit(s), personnel, and equipment.

f. Planning for the conduct of security assistance activities and FHA. In conjunction with the J-4, arranging HN sustainment support for land forces or, when directed, other services.

g. When required, planning for civil administration activities to support the restoration of civil authority.

h. When directed, establishing liaison with other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, the HN, partner nations, the private sector, and IPI that brings these organizations into the realm of planning and information sharing.

i. Supporting domestic operations when required.

12. Special Staff

The special staff consists of representatives of technical or administrative services and may include representatives from other governmental and nongovernmental agencies. The general functions of the special staff include furnishing technical, administrative, and tactical advice and recommendations to the JFLCC and other staff officers; preparing the parts of plans, estimates, and orders in which they have primary interest; and coordinating and supervising the activities for which each staff division is responsible (see Figure A-11).

a. **Red Team.** The red team is an organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide the commander with an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the OE and from the perspective of the threat and others.

b. **ORSA (Assessment).** ORSA assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and military end state.

c. **Command LNOs.** An LNO represents the commander or a staff officer. The task and its complexity determine the required qualifications. At higher echelons, the complexity of operations often requires an increase in the rank required for LNOs.




Figure A-11. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Special and Personal Staff Organization

The Marine Corps public affairs and combat capabilities have merged into a new capability called **Communication Strategy and Operations**. Communication Strategy and Operations Marines advise commanders and staffs on communication matters; develop and integrate communication plans; communicate with internal, domestic, and international audiences; and produce written and visual information products in order to build understanding, credibility, and trust with audiences critical to mission success.

13. Personal Staff Group of the Commander

The JFLCC's personal staff performs duties prescribed by the JFLCC and is responsible directly to the JFLCC. This group, normally composed of aides to the JFLCC and staff officers handling special matters over which the JFLCC wishes to exercise close

personal control, will usually include a staff judge advocate (SJA), PAO, inspector general (IG), chaplain, surgeon, and others as directed (see Figure A-11).

a. **Chaplain.** The chaplain is responsible to the commander for religious affairs within the command. The chaplain coordinates religious support for the command and provides religious advisement to the commander on matters of religion, ethics, morals, and morale as affected by religion and on the impact of indigenous religions on military operations.

b. **IG.** The IG advises the commander on the command's overall welfare and state of discipline. The IG is a confidential advisor to the commander.

c. **PAO.** The PAO is responsible for understanding and fulfilling the information needs of members of the joint force, DOD, and the public.

d. **SJA.** The SJA is the commander's principal legal advisor and provides the full spectrum of legal support through direct and reachback capability to joint operations across the range of military operations.

e. **Safety.** The safety officer coordinates safety activities throughout the command.

f. **Surgeon.** The surgeon coordinates health assets and operations within the command. The surgeon may also serve as a special staff member.

APPENDIX B

THEATER JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Introduction

This appendix provides a set of planning considerations for a theater JFLCC.

2. Set the Conditions in the Theater

The CCDR has ultimate responsibility for the AOR, but the JFLCC plays a significant role in getting it postured to support a wide range of contingencies. The JFLCC typically addresses this mission area through the conduct of the CCDR's combatant command campaign plan as a pre- conflict activity. Each of the Service components leverages military engagement activity to strengthen military-to-military and political-to-military relationships, increase the military capabilities of friendly countries, and obtain and maintain access to key nodes within the AOR. A Service component commander deals with these factors even as the command is transitioning to a joint land force component command or JTF and conducting detailed mission planning and attempting to get key enablers into theater. The JFLCC, however, has additional tasks to address within this mission area. Accomplishing these tasks is key to the entire joint and multinational force should it be committed. When setting the theater, JFLCC considers establishing and growing a robust communication systems architecture, integrating JFC CO efforts, positioning Army and joint logistics materiel forward for quick access, investing in seaports of debarkation (SPODs) and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) infrastructure in coordination with the HN, and establishing Army base camps. This is done to facilitate RSOI and the rapid transition to operations.

a. Shaping the information environment has become an essential element of the CCDR's theater strategy, which includes CCDR's communication synchronization. The JFLCC prioritizes this effort to gain an advantage over competitors and adversaries in the information environment. Leveraging information-related activities should be considered a key effort for the land component prior to combat operations to shape the environment for joint land operations. Information activities integrated with broad military engagement activities that are grounded in an understanding of the people and institutions in the operational area can be significant force multipliers. Use these military engagement activities as collection activities to learn as much as possible about the culture and the traditions of the indigenous people as well, not just the military organizations.

b. As the combatant command and its components transition to a potential conflict stance, theater preparation tasks receive greater priority and resourcing. There is a growing need to support Army Support to other Services tasks that will add complexity and further tax limited resources. The lesson from operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa is to work these preparation tasks as early as possible, in a sustained manner, and in coordination with not just the CCDR but appropriate interagency and multinational actors as well. Resourcing operational tasks for setting the theater is very difficult during non-

LAND COMPONENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Set the Conditions in the Theater (Protection, Logistics, Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Theater “Enablers,” Basing/Access/Over Flight...)

Build the Joint/Coalition Group Campaign

Receive and Prepare the Forces (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration)

Fight the Ground Forces

Ensure “Back End” Campaign Success

**Source: Based on comments by Lieutenant General David McKiernan,
Commander US Army Central Command and Coalition Forces Land
Component
Commander, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM-I**

conflict periods but pays big dividends should conditions change (to include supporting rapid FHA operations).

3. Assess the Theater and the Threat

As with setting the theater, the theater and threat assessment is also a continuous process. Experience from Iraq and Afghanistan operations forced the commands to broaden their collection and assessment activities beyond typical order of battle analysis focused on conventional formations. Infrastructure status, the strength of institutions, tribal and ethnic divisions and hierarchies, and the history and culture of peoples in the AOI become central to JFLCC planning and execution activities. This collective understanding informs a well-integrated, holistic, information effort. This collection and assessment approach includes the entire land component. It is not a J-2 function alone; every military member is a collector and there should be a reporting process in place to reinforce that. This broader understanding of the mission area is particularly important at the operational to strategic level. Accomplish as much of this as possible prior to potential conflict and leverage every resource to do so, interagency capabilities, multinational formations and liaisons, international organizations, and the observations and reports of members of the staff as they move around the theater. Even as the command transitions to combat operations, this broad collection and assessment process continues as it should considerably shape post-conflict operations.

4. Develop the Joint Land Operations Plan

a. The JFLCC’s JLOP requires extensive horizontal and vertical coordination as the land operations will involve a broad range of organizations, both military and nonmilitary. Operations in areas such as Iraq reinforced the importance of conducting planning that

addresses the complete depth of the joint campaign—well past major combat operations. In close collaboration with the CDR, the JFLCC should understand the desired strategic end state and then build the JLOP to either attain the end state or facilitate attainment of the end state. The JLOP should be structured to support a strategic end state, not just a successful military end state. Central to the development of this plan is complete understanding of the higher commander's intent, priorities, and CONOPS. Equally important is an understanding of the other components' intent, their priorities and their CONOPS, and the military limitations of their forces. The JFLCC should ensure the staff is working the JLOP in close coordination with not only the combatant command staff but the other component staffs as well. The information environment should be afforded significant focus as the JFLCC builds the JLOP.

b. Key points for building the JLOP are:

(1) A planning staff that has the right competencies represented, especially logistics planners.

(2) Flexibility. Do not get wedded to any one plan. Things will change, often.

(3) Expect friction with other components fighting for limited theater lift. Make sure the planners understand the priorities.

(4) Get the right interagency and multinational planners and liaison representatives in place early, and use them.

(5) Carefully develop the troop list and balance force capabilities—early and robust presence of protective and sustainment commercial support (contractor) capabilities and Service provided contracting forces contribute to securing early operational gains and paving the way to strategic success.

(6) Plan for tactical exploitation opportunities and how best to translate tactical success to strategic level success—exploitation creates both opportunity and risk.

(7) Establish the respective roles of the future planners (J-5) and the J-35, the latter responsible for orders development during execution, the former building the JLOP that will be turned over to the J-35 planners prior to execution. Timing is important as is task organization between the two planning staffs.

(8) Treat the information environment as key terrain and shape it accordingly. Plan in depth to influence the operations from the tactical to strategic level, fully coordinated across multiple organizations, and applied with consistency and speed. Understanding the commercial support capabilities available in the JFLCC's AO is important given limited organic capabilities and/or to offset lift restraints. Use the media to your advantage. Media engagement is leader business.

5. Receive the Land Force

JRSOI is the CCDR's responsibility in theater. The entire deploy-employ simultaneously construct will likely remain the standard, but it significantly increases risk to mission success and makes it even more important that this mission area be carefully planned and executed. Compounding the problem is the likelihood that the availability of selected APODs and SPODs may not be clear until late in the deployment process. The JFLCC and staff get involved with the HN's military and civilian leadership to work access problems. The "receive the force" mission set is joint in every respect and requires a joint and fully coordinated planning and execution effort. Another complication is the addition of multinational formations, many of which will not be known until late in the planning effort. The J-4 is normally given responsibility for reception, staging, and onward movement and the J-3 for integration. The JFLCC is involved in the entire JRSOI operation, including directing rehearsals. The communication plan for the JRSOI plan should be comprehensive and rehearsed as diligently as the movement of troops and equipment. Importantly, the plan integrates and fully consider the capabilities, and constraints, of the HN(s) and commercial vendor base. This is a mission area that requires considerable leader involvement because the result is combat power.

For more information on JRSOI, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

6. Fight the Land Force

At the JFLCC level, the HQ conducts operations to set conditions for the corps, MEFs, or major tactical formations to succeed. It requires great discipline to stay out of the subordinates' fight and to translate that discipline to the staff. The JFLCC "fights the land force" by ensuring commander's intent is well understood and by shaping the operational area via targeting priorities input into the joint targeting cycle, setting and reinforcing key information-related objectives, and by synchronizing communications between the joint force land component command and other components, as well as the joint force land component and the subordinate commands. Concurrently, the JFLCC is overseeing the sustainment and force flow to allow for an uninterrupted introduction of additional capability. The JFLCC constitutes a reserve and is prepared to commit it to capitalize on exploitation opportunities or prevent or minimize setbacks.

a. The JFLCC retains focus on the strategic end state, enabled by the objectives achieved by the tactical formations. The JFLCC and the staff should establish a single standard for reporting early in the planning process and absorb the host of requests for information that will emanate from higher HQs and elsewhere regarding the conduct of the fight. Reporting is key, essential, and requires practice and continuous discipline. There are clear differences between Marine and Army reporting practices and even more differences between US military and non-US military reporting practices. Establish a single standard early.

b. The commander's presence on the battlefield is still a significant force multiplier and no amount of technical connectivity can compensate for physical presence. This principle is as important at the operational to strategic level as it is at the tactical level plan

to go forward but keep the entourage as small as possible. Fighting the force includes leveraging the capabilities made available from interagency and international organizations that will be present in the operational area. Maximizing the contributions of each to the advantage of the joint land force will be a central task for the commander. Given the significant interaction the JFLCC will have with these other agencies and organizations, it is important that roles and responsibilities between the CCDR and the JFLCC (and their respective staffs) are delineated as each will be coordinating with many of these same organizations. This becomes particularly important as the JFLCC coordinates with interagency and civil authorities that will assume the lead in the post-conflict period.

7. Contribute to Operation or Campaign Success

Strategic success is achieved on the land, through the interaction of military and civilian entities with the people and their institutions. The JFLCC, supported by the other components, identifies both the requirements and the operational approach to setting conditions that will allow the JFLCC to seize the initiative, facilitate control of the operational area, conduct stability and security, help restore essential services, repair critical infrastructure, provide humanitarian relief, and transition authority to civilian authorities. The JFC, supported by the component commanders, plays an integral role in determining operational requirements and a coordinated, and where possible integrated, approach to achieve transition to civil authorities and attain the strategic end state. The JFLCC structures a supporting joint land OPLAN that addresses the complete depth of the operation, well beyond the largely conventional, major combat operations phases. Transition events and stability activities and actions should be fully interwoven into the construct and not considered a secondary or sequential piece. Setting end state conditions begins coincident with crossing the line of departure.

a. Perhaps the greatest challenge for the JFLCC is to fashion a fires and maneuver concept that is at once decisive operationally while equally definitive in setting conditions for achieving strategic objectives. Very early in the planning process, the JFLCC should commit a significant amount of time and energy clarifying, with the JFC, what the end state should look like. There always exists the possibility that, at the policy level, the particulars of the desired end state and the conditions on the land will not have been thought through in any detail. Given this reality, the JFLCC and staff will play a major role in translating broad US strategic objectives into definable, and attainable, end state conditions. Ideally, the JFLCC will be given the latitude, and in some cases the authority, to work with other key interagency and multinational organizations in defining and assigning roles and responsibilities for the latter part of the joint campaign. Transitions should be carefully planned with clear articulation of who assumes responsibility for what, be it military or civilian led. Work hard to eliminate as much ambiguity as possible while retaining a degree of flexibility as conditions will undoubtedly change during execution. But, there are some things the JFLCC can probably count on as lead transitions from the military to the civil authorities: significant military resources will be diverted to support civil operations, there will be a large requirement to provide military staff augmentation to the civilian staff, and it will take time for the civilian entity to gain sufficient situational understanding to be effective. Unity of effort is particularly important in these latter phases of the joint operation or campaign but is very difficult to achieve as more and more organizations get

involved in the transition process. Important to success during transitions is continuity on the military side.

b. The JFLCC should plan to retain responsibility for land operations well past any transition of the lead from military to civil authority—operational experience reinforces the need to absolutely minimize individual and unit rotations in the latter phases of the operation. Additional planning considerations follow:

(1) The JFLCC works to set internal command and support relationships that fully leverage other component capabilities throughout the depth of the joint operation or campaign—ensuring strategic success calls for the support of joint capabilities well beyond major combat operations.

(2) Fully consider the impact of operational fires on the desired objectives, ensure supporting commanders coordinate all fires conducted within land component AO to reduce friendly fire incidents, and ensure no adverse impact on future operations.

(3) Consider the threat of IEDs, their impact on operations, and the need to stand up a C-IED cell or TF to coordinate and conduct IED defeat operations.

(4) Carefully consider force composition and capacity with a view toward the entirety of the campaign—the complete range of tasks to be conducted.

(5) Completely integrate interagency representatives on the staff for planning and execution.

(6) There will generally be multiple transitions in any campaign, many involving other than US military formations. Minimize, to the extent possible, overlapping transitions between different organizations and entities. Executing operational-level military transitions, transfer of authority for example, concurrent with hand-off of civil authority from one entity to another should be avoided. Work to get absolute certainty on who is in charge on the land, what the conditions will be to turn over lead to a civilian authority, and who has the authority to determine when those conditions are met. Transitions, by their very nature, create risk to the force and the mission.

(7) Aggressively pursue a commander's communication approach that is factual, responsive, and holistic. Weave the importance of managing the information environment directly into the commander's intent.

For more information, see US Army War College Guidebook for Joint Force Land Component Commanders.

APPENDIX C

JOINT LAND OPERATION PLAN AND ORDER DEVELOPMENT EXAMPLE

This appendix provides considerations for developing a JLOP or OPORD. SOPs may differ in the degree of detail and emphasis. For general planning procedures, refer to JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*. For formats of actual plans and orders, refer to CJCSM 3130.03, *Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance*.

1. Situation

a. **General.** The general political-military environment of the operation that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan include tactical information for phases of the operation. Refer to command and staff estimates, country studies, or related plans. Designate the trigger event that signals execution.

b. **OE.** A summary of information concerning the AO, which consists of:

(1) A strategic overview of the physical environment, to include climate, geography, and topography. Specific localized information about conditions affecting the early phases of the operation, especially if a forced entry is anticipated. Include weather, key terrain, observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, drop zones, landing zones, and beach and hydrographic data.

(2) Civil considerations focus on evaluating the areas, structures, capabilities (to include the commercial vendor base), organizations, people, and events of the human environment. Other considerations include, but are not limited to, urban areas, infrastructure, resources, production, and other capabilities, that impact combat or post-conflict operations.

c. **Threat.** A description of the threat, which consists of:

(1) Strategic and operational factors such as the political roots and objectives of threat activity, personalities, outside support, sanctuaries, logistic capabilities, enemy linkage to commercial vendors in the JOA, levels of training and combat experience, morale, strategic and operational COGs, and vulnerabilities.

(2) Factors of immediate concern such as locations, strengths, weapons systems, tactical capabilities, reserves, mobility, and probable COAs.

(3) Information about the military strengths of all adversary nations or potential parties to the conflict. Include order of battle information, numbers of major weapons systems, personalities of leaders, levels of training or combat experience, and affiliation with major hostile powers.

d. **Friendly Forces**

(1) Information that may affect the operation. Include mission and applicable higher-level, joint, or multinational commander's intent and desired end state.

(2) The roles of other forces, commands, agencies, or organizations that may affect operations.

(3) The organization of the land forces to support the JFC's CONOPS and the authorities provided by the JFC in respect to forces and capabilities provided to the JFLCC (annex A [Task Organization]).

(4) Tasks of supporting friendly forces, commands, or government agencies.

(5) Status-of-forces agreements, constraints, and ROE for the proposed operation with the HN, in coordination with DOS and appropriate embassies and country teams.

(6) For an operation with several phases, any changes in friendly forces by phase in annex A (Task Organization) or annex V (Interagency Coordination).

(7) Commander's Communication Synchronization. Communication themes and messages applicable to the issuing HQ. (See annex Y [Commanders' Communication Strategy].)

e. **Assumptions.** A summary of the conditions and situations that must exist when the plan becomes an order. Include predictions and presumptions concerning the following:

(1) Conditions within HNs and other nations in the region.

(2) US policy for the region such as the application of the War Powers Resolution.

(3) Involvement by hostile powers, both from outside and within the region, in the internal affairs of nations in the theater.

(4) Impact of US actions in the theater on relations with nations outside the theater.

(5) Adequacy of interagency support.

(6) Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent of common threats, for example, the narcotics trade and required actions.

(7) Availability of resources.

(8) Warning times and times and locations of anticipated hostile actions. The timing of political decisions in friendly nations; the conditions and timing of the release of the use of special weapons.

f. Legal Considerations

(1) Determine applicable US and international laws and legal authorities for the operation and incorporate into planning considerations early in the planning cycle.

(2) For DSCA (e.g., disaster relief), homeland security, and HD missions, determine applicable domestic law and provide legal guidance to commanders and staff. Further, ensure proper coordination with relevant federal, state, and local governmental organizations and authorities.

(3) Determine the existence of any legal constraints or restraints such as provisions of treaties; agreements; status-of-forces agreements; and conventions governing the political, humanitarian, and informational limits on the military effort for the proposed operation with the HN, in coordination with DOS and appropriate embassies and country teams, as appropriate.

(4) Assist in the development, interpretation, and training of ROE and/or rules for the use of force proposed for the operation.

2. Mission

A clear, concise statement of task and purpose that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement describes the mission in terms of the elements of who, what, when, where, and why.

3. Execution

a. **Commander's Intent.** An expression, in clear and concise terms, of the commander's personal visualization of the purpose and end state of the operation overall. This links the mission to the CONOPS and guides all subordinate activities.

b. **CONOPS.** The commander's visualization of how offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA operations will accomplish the mission. At the operational level, the CONOPS is generally broad in nature, with specified tasks to subordinate units addressed in paragraph 3.c. (Tasks to Subordinate Units). The concept may be a single paragraph divided into two or more subparagraphs or, if unusually lengthy, prepared as annex C (Operations).

c. When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and separate phases, the concept is prepared in subparagraphs describing the commander's intent and objectives. Though listed sequentially, phases must be planned concurrently to ensure continuity of the operation. The trigger event for the transition between phases is normally the achievement of an intermediate objective. This knowledge will permit subordinates to plan branches within their own plans. The subordinate commanders are empowered to demonstrate initiative in supporting the attainment of the commander's end state. The commander and subordinates can also execute sequels within and at the conclusion of phases, depending on the outcome of battles and engagements. For each phase of the operation, include the following:

(1) **Movement and Maneuver.** Describe scheme of maneuver, as well as the deployment process, to achieve initial objectives and the employment of maneuver units. Identify the commander's primary task and purpose during decisive, shaping, and

sustaining activities when appropriate. Identify the reserve, main effort, and major regrouping of forces by phase. Ensure stability or DSCA tasks are addressed.

(a) The scheme for forcible entry of combat elements with necessary C2 elements and their accompanying support.

(b) Changes in the form of maneuver or in the nature of the operation.

(c) Mobility and Countermobility. Concept and priorities by phase, unit, or area.

(d) Obscuration. Concept and priorities by phase, unit, or area.

(2) **Fires.** The employment of fires necessary to include phased scheme of fires to show complex arrangements including priorities of fires and targeting.

(a) Targeting priorities and priorities of fire.

(b) Air support, field artillery support, and naval surface fire support.

(c) Joint interfaces such as the JTCB and the BCD.

(d) EW.

(3) **ISR.** Concept for ISR support and objectives, to include priority of effort, by task, unit, or area (appendix 8 [Reconnaissance] to annex C [Operations]).

(4) **Protection.** Describe the concept of protection, to include the priorities of protection by unit and area. Address the concept of area security, to include security for routes, bases, and critical infrastructure. Identify tactical combat forces and other reaction forcers. Use subparagraphs for protection categories such as AMD, EOD, force protection posture, CBRN defense, and provost marshal functions (appendix 14 [Force Protection] to annex C [Operations]).

(a) AMD (includes critical asset list/DAL by phase of operation).

(b) Operational area security, to include security for joint areas, bases, LOCs, and critical infrastructure.

(c) EOD.

(d) Provost marshal/law enforcement activities to include detainee operations.

(e) Survivability measures.

(f) CBRN defensive measures.

(g) Force protection postures and conditions.

(h) SE operations to include sensitive sites.

(5) **Information.** Describe the concept of information integration, to include command themes. Identify key leaders and population groups for information priorities and KLE. Refer to appendix 3 (Information Operations) to annex C (Operations) and cross reference with annex F (Public Affairs) and annex Y (Commanders' Communication Strategy).

(6) Other significant operations conducted by phase, to include annex G (Civil Affairs), annex N (Space Operations), annex P (Host-Nation Support), annex T (Consequence Management) operations with or in support of appendix 4 (Special Operations) to annex C (Operations), appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations), appendix 11 (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations) to annex C (Operations), and appendix 16 (Cyberspace Operations) to annex C (Operations).

d. **Tasks for Major Subordinate Commands.** Tasks that encompass two or more phases of the major operation for each major subordinate command. Include direct tasks for subordinate units not already covered by phases. Include the initial composition, location, and tasks for the reserve.

e. **Coordinating Instructions.** Instructions appropriate to two or more units or two or more phases of the operation.

(1) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between phases.

(2) CCIRs.

(3) Essential elements of friendly information.

(4) ROE (appendix 7 to annex C [Operations]).

(5) FSCMs.

(6) **ACMs.** Management procedures and formation of an airspace element and its relation with the airspace control authority.

(7) **Risk Reduction Control Measures.** Force protection guidance. Include the MOPP levels, operational exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria, friendly fire prevention measures, and integration of active and passive defense warning systems to include any civil defense requirements.

(8) PR coordination measures (appendix 5 to annex C [Operations]).

(9) PA operations and guidance (annex F [Public Affairs]).

4. Sustainment

Operational sustainment instructions are of primary interest to the elements being supported. A JFLCC without an inherent logistics organization will refer to the sustainment plan of the Army Service component command or other Service components for detailed procedures on how subordinate elements may receive support from Service support organizations. The JFLCC describes those support matters necessary to accomplish the combat mission of the force. If a support organization, such as an Army TSC, is placed under command of a JFLCC, include the detailed information normally found in the theater army plan. Even without an integral support organization, the JFLCC may choose to include the following subjects:

a. Logistics (annex D), to include:

(1) Intermediate staging bases in the target region and repositioning of supplies and equipment.

(2) Priorities of supply and maintenance.

(3) Submission of materiel status reports.

(4) Ammunition requirements and expenditure reports

(5) Designations of LOCs.

(6) Mortuary affairs.

(7) Requirements development and prioritization (e.g., HN and commercial support).

b. Personnel (annex E), to include:

(1) Reporting procedures for US military and civilian personnel to include contractor personnel.

(2) Enemy prisoner of war (EPW) or detainee reporting procedures.

(3) Labor policies (use of EPW, civilian labor).

c. Medical services (annex Q), to include:

(1) Medical evacuation policies.

(2) Medical logistics.

(3) Location and capacity of theater hospital facilities.

d. Resource management, to include:

(1) Detailed procedures for making use of labor, transportation, and facilities from HN and friendly third countries.

(2) OCS (annex W).

e. Joint reception, staging, and onward movement of reinforcements.

5. Command and Control

a. Command

(1) Command relationships (annex J). Indicate any major changes by phase and conditions/times for shift. Identify any command arrangement agreements and pertinent memorandums of understanding/agreement.

(2) Command post locations to include location of the commander.

(3) Succession to command.

(4) **Liaison requirements.** Establishing liaison with the HN; with the higher joint forces command; with other component commands (especially those involved in force projection operations); with SOF already in the operational area; and with appropriate other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs.

b. **Communications Systems (annex K).** Communications and cyberspace protection procedures and priorities such as location of key nodes, spectrum management, communications-electronics operating instructions, codes, and interface with joint or multinational forces.

6. Annexes

JLOP annexes should focus on the land audience and contain technical details necessary for C2 of all land organizations and capabilities across the joint force. They should contain any details not considered appropriate for the relevant section of the main plan.

A. Task Organization.

B. Intelligence.

C. Operations.

D. Logistics.

E. Personnel.

F. Public Affairs.

G. Civil-Military Operations.

- H. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.
- I. Command Relationships.
- J. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems.
- K. Environmental Considerations.
- L. Assessments.
- M. Foreign Disclosure Guidance.
- N. Host-Nation Support.
- O. Health Services.
- P. Reports.
- Q. Special Technical Operations.
- R. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.
- S. Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination.
- T. Operational Contract Support.
- U. Execution Checklist.
- V. Commanders' Communication Strategy.
- W. Distribution.

APPENDIX D

EXAMPLE THEATER-JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVE

1. Introduction

A CCDR may establish a theater JFLCC through an implementing or an establishing directive. The following is a notional example of a JFLCC establishing directive. Use of the format is desirable, but not mandatory, and may be abbreviated or elaborated where appropriate. It is often published in message format.

2. Example Theater-Joint Force Land Component Commander Establishing Directive

- a. From: Commander, USXXXXCOM
- b. To all Addressees (as appropriate)
- c. Subject: Theater-Joint Force Land Component Commander Establishing Directive
- d. References (all that apply)

e. Remarks. This message is the establishing directive for the TJFLCC and designates Commander, XXX, Army, as the theater-JFLCC and Commander, MARFORXXX, as the deputy theater JFLCC. This directive outlines the roles, responsibilities, and interactions of the theater JFLCC with Commander, USXXXXCOM.

3. Situation

a. Commander, USXXXXCOM, wants to designate Service components as functional theater commands. To enhance its ability to operate with joint, interagency, and multinational partners across the competition continuum. As a means to establish unity of effort among the land components (XXX Army, MARFORXXX, and SOCXXX), Commander, USXXXXCOM, directs the establishment of a theater JFLCC.

b. Limitations and Resource constraints

(1) Requirements for the day-to-day theater JFLCC coordination will be identified in a separate MOU between Commander, Army XXX, MARFORXXX, and SOCXXX.

(2) The theater JFLCC designation does not override service component responsibilities.

c. Definitions (as appropriate)

4. Mission

Theater JFLCC advises Commander, USXXCOM, on the employment of land forces during military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities for the seamless transition to crisis response, limited contingency, or large-scale combat operations. Directs the operations and activities of designated forces and assists in setting the theater to enable synchronized execution in the OE.

5. Execution

a. **Commander's Intent.** To provide a functional theater JFLCC capable of advising Commander, USXXCOM, on the use of land forces, assisting in setting the theater, and supporting seamless theater C2 transitions for joint operations across the competition continuum enabling Commander, USXXCOM, as the theater commander.

b. **Tasks**

(1) **Theater JFLCC**

(a) Advise Commander, USXXCOM, on land force capabilities and provide advocacy for land domain issues.

(b) Provide coordinated recommendations for land force mission sets, roles, and responsibilities for efficient use of USXXCOM resources.

(c) Provide coordinated recommendations to Commander, USXXCOM, on land force operations, actions, and activities in support of the USXXCOM campaign objectives.

(d) Coordinate with other functional components to assist USXXCOM in campaign planning.

(e) Coordinate land component planning and make recommendations to assist USXXCOM in managing various operations during periods of military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, as well as crisis response and limited contingency operations.

(f) Assist USXXCOM in planning, coordinating, and executing sustained operations for setting the theater during all operations.

(g) Provide coordinated recommendations on the tailoring of land force capability packages in support of specified requirements.

(h) Coordinate KLEs with land force commanders from across the AOR to assist USXXCOM in KLE synchronization.

(i) Compile and maintain an options list of GO/FO commanders, mission command elements, and potential augmentation capabilities for crisis response.

(j) Be prepared to coordinate and support land force operations for one or multiple JFLCCs within the AOR to include coordinating JRSOI and TPFDDs.

(k) ICW USXXXCOM JIOC and JOC, maintain a land COP to coordinate and deconflict the activities of the land components.

(l) Assess gaps, overlaps, and ways to achieve greater effectiveness in the use of land forces requirements for setting the theater, current status and associated risks.

(m) Coordinate with the JIOC, MARFORXXX, and SOCXXX on the intelligence capability to support land operational planning in support of USXXXCOM campaigns, operations, and contingencies.

(2) Commander, USA XXX

(a) Establish the theater joint force land component command coordination center.

(b) Support theater JFLCC efforts as required through provision of administrative support, facilities, and personnel as required.

(c) Provide US Army force and activity information to the theater joint force land component command coordination center for development of the land COP.

(d) Provide lead for the theater joint force land component command security cooperation cell.

(e) Support theater JFLCC efforts by providing LNOs and appropriate staff representation at all theater joint force land component command cross functional working groups when directed.

(f) Provide Army support to other forces as requested by Commander, MARFORXXX, and Commander, SOCXXX, approved by Commander, USXXXCOM, and planned and coordinated by theater JFLCC.

(3) Commander, MARFORXXX

(a) Support theater JFLCC efforts by providing LNOs and appropriate staff representation at all theater joint force land component command cross-functional working groups when directed.

(b) Provide USMC force and activity information to the theater joint force land component command coordination center for development of the land COP.

(c) Identify US ARFOR required to support MARFORXXX operations.

(4) Commander, SOCXXX/TJFSOCC

(a) Support theater JFLCC efforts by providing LNOs and appropriate staff representation at all theater joint force land component command working groups when directed.

(b) Provide SOF force and activity information to the theater joint force land component command coordination center for development of the land COP.

(c) Identify conventional land forces required to support theater JFSOCC operations.

(5) Theater JFMCC

(a) Coordinate with theater JFLCC on issues and operations across the AOR.

(b) Identify conventional land forces required to support theater JFMCC operations.

(6) Theater JFACC

(a) Coordinate with theater JFLCC on issues and operations across the AOR.

(b) Identify conventional land forces required to support theater JFACC operations.

(7) Coordinating Instructions

(a) DIRLAUTH, keep USXXXCOM informed.

(b) Theater Service and functional components, other joint commands, USXXXCOM direct reporting units support theater JFLCC as required.

(c) The theater JFLCC will provide Commander, USXXXCOM, periodic assessments of the operations of the theater JFLCC.

(d) The theater joint force land component command coordination center will coordinate and consolidate land domain information and provide analysis to ensure unified recommendations on TJFLCC issues. The center will serve as the conduit for TJFLCC recommendations.

6. Admin and Logistics

Services are responsible for traditional Title 10, USC, admin and logistical functions; however, for operational support requirements that extend beyond a land force capabilities, the theater JFLCC will coordinate support requirements with USXXXCOM through the theater joint force land component command coordination center.

7. Command and Signal

a. Commander, USXXXCOM, is the supported commander.

b. Commander, USA XXX is the theater JFLCC. Commander, XXX, as theater JFLCC, will exercise coordinating authority between USXXXXCOM components and other JFCs in the performance of the duties outlined in this directive.

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APPENDIX E

THEATER DETAINEE OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

a. **Background.** During the conduct of military operations, US forces must be prepared to plan, execute, and conduct detainee operations. Regardless of the type of military operation, the potential requirement to detain individuals (hereafter referred to as detainees) exists, and US forces must treat all detainees humanely and be prepared to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for detainees IAW applicable US law, the law of war, and applicable US policy. The challenges of today's security environment and the nature of the enemy require clear operational and strategic guidance for detainee operations in a joint environment.

b. **Policy.** DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*, establishes overarching DOD detainee policy. All detainees will be treated humanely and with respect for their dignity, IAW applicable US law and policy and the law of war. The humane treatment requirements in this section apply during all military operations, however characterized, including but not limited to humanitarian assistance, peace operations, or CMO. The standards of treatment set forth in the directive apply to all DOD components and DOD contractors assigned to or supporting the DOD components engaged in, conducting, participating in, or supporting detainee operations. These standards also apply to all non-DOD personnel as a condition of permitting access to detention facilities or to detainees under DOD control.

(1) Because the treatment standard applies from the point of capture throughout detention, DOD personnel and contractor employees must receive training on detainee operations. Inhumane treatment of detainees is prohibited by the *Uniform Code of Military Justice*, domestic and international law, and DOD policy. Accordingly, there is no exception to or deviation from this humane treatment requirement.

(2) All DOD personnel or DOD contractor personnel will immediately report all suspected incidents of inhumane treatment of detainees through their chain of command or supervision for ultimate transmission to appropriate US authorities or other appropriate authorities. Reports also may be made through other channels, such as the MP, a judge advocate, or an IG, who will then forward a report through the appropriate chain of command. On-scene commanders shall ensure that measures are taken to preserve evidence of alleged violations pending investigation by appropriate authorities.

c. Legal Considerations

(1) US detainee operations must comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, no matter how such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations. The law of war regulates the conduct of armed hostilities and occupation and encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law.

(2) The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply as a matter of international law to all military operations that qualify as international armed conflicts, in cases of partial or total occupation, and in certain respects, to conflicts that are not of an international character. These treaties are intended to provide comprehensive humanitarian standards for the treatment of war victims without adverse distinction. Although often referred to collectively as the “Geneva Conventions,” the specific treaties are:

(a) **Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field (GWS).** This convention provides protection for members of the armed forces and other persons on the battlefield who are no longer actively participating in hostilities as the result of becoming wounded or sick. It requires humane treatment for wounded and sick personnel who fall into enemy hands, with an express requirement that such individuals be protected against pillage and ill treatment and provided necessary and adequate care. It also provides for the collection of human remains and the recording of interment locations, and prohibits the abuse of remains.

(b) **Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea.** This convention requires the humane treatment and protection of members of the armed forces and other persons at sea who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked. It also protects hospital ships and provides a procedure for burial at sea.

(c) **The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).** This convention requires the humane treatment and protection of prisoners of war. It also regulates the treatment of prisoners of war (including care, food, clothing, medical care, and housing), discipline and punishment, labor and pay, external relations, representation, the international exchange of information, and the termination of captivity.

(d) **The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC).** This convention deals with the protection of civilians who find themselves under the control of an enemy nation (including during a period of belligerent occupation). It requires the humane treatment and protection of such civilians, including establishing procedures for the deprivation of liberty (arrest, internment, assigned residence), and it provides a legal framework for the relationship between civilians and the enemy authorities controlling them.

(1) DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*, addresses legal issues regarding the reception, treatment, processing, and release of detainees. It includes DOD policy relative to the minimum standards of treatment for all detainees in the control of DOD personnel. IAW US law and DOD policy, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 establishes minimum standards for the humane treatment of all persons detained by the US, allied, and multinational forces during non-international armed conflicts. IAW with USG and DOD policy, the principles set forth in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions establishes minimum standards for the humane treatment of all persons detained by US forces during international armed conflicts. Common Article 3 prohibits at any time and in any place “violence to life and person, in particular murder of

all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”

(2) Multi-Service publication Army Regulation (AR) 190-8/Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3461.6/Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304/Marine Corps Order 3461.1, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees*, addresses legal considerations when conducting detainee operations.

d. **Detainee Categories.** The word “detainee” includes any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of DOD personnel. This does not include DOD personnel or DOD contractor personnel or other persons being held primarily for law enforcement purposes except where the United States is the occupying power. As a matter of policy, all detainees will be treated as EPWs until the appropriate legal status is determined and granted by competent authority IAW the criteria enumerated in the GPW. Detaining officials must ensure all detainees receive humane treatment in all circumstances, during both non-international and international armed conflict IAW international law and DOD policy. Service members will, without regard to a detainee’s legal status, at a minimum apply: Common Article 3 of the 1949 GPW during joint land operations; the principles in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I during international armed conflict and occupation; and the principles in Articles 4-6 of Additional Protocol II during non-international armed conflict IAW guidance in DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*. The inhumane treatment of detainees is prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or deep provocation. There are four categories of detainees (see Figure E-1).

(1) EPW. In general, an EPW is a prisoner of war as described by Articles 4 and 5, GPW, who is under the custody or control of DOD. Individuals are considered to be EPWs if they are:




Figure E-1. Detainee Categories

(a) Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, and members of militias or volunteer corps forming parts of such armed forces.

(b) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied. Such militias or volunteer corps, (including such organized resistance movements) are commanded by a person responsible for their subordinates, have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and conduct their operations according to the laws and customs of war.

(c) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.

(d) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, and members of labor units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces (provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces that they accompany) and are to provide an identity card to annotate that purpose.

(e) Members of crews (including masters, pilots, and apprentices) of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the parties to the conflict who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

(f) Inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

(g) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country (if the occupying power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were ongoing outside the territory it occupies) in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and are engaged in combat, or if the person fails to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.

(h) Persons described in the preceding paragraphs who have been received by neutral or nonbelligerent powers on their territory and whom these powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favorable treatment which these powers may choose to give and with exception to certain issues regarding the costs of prisoner of war detention and the financial resources of prisoners of war and possibly other exceptions based upon the particular circumstances related to the individuals and party to the conflict on which they depend (see AR 190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees*, for more information).

(2) **Retained Personnel (RP).** An individual who is described by Article 28 of the GWS and Article 33 of the GPW and who is in the custody or control of DOD.

Personnel who fall into the following categories are considered RP: official medical personnel of the armed forces of the parties to the conflict who are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport, or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and staff exclusively engaged in the administration of medical units and establishments; chaplains attached to enemy armed forces; staff of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and that of other volunteer aid societies duly recognized and authorized by their governments to assist medical service personnel of their own armed forces, provided they are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of, the wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and provided that the staff of such societies are subject to military laws and regulations.

(3) **Civilian Internee.** Any civilian, including those described by Article 4 of the GC, who is in the custody or control of DOD during an armed conflict or occupation, such as those held for imperative reasons of security or protection. Such individuals, unless they have committed acts for which they are considered unprivileged enemy belligerents, generally qualify for protected status IAW the GC, which also establishes procedures that must be observed when depriving such civilians of their liberty. Civilian internees are to be interned separately from EPWs and persons deprived of liberty for any other reason. The rights, duties, and liabilities of individuals described by Article 4, GC, is considered applicable to civilians who are not described by Article 4, GC.

(4) **Detained Persons.** Individuals under the custody or control of DOD who are not entitled to distinct privileges of combatant status (such as combatant immunity) but who, by engaging in hostilities, have incurred the corresponding liabilities of combatant status, include the following:

(a) Individuals who have forfeited the protections of civilian status by directly participating in, joining or substantially supporting an enemy non-state armed group in the conduct of hostilities.

(b) Combatants, in international armed conflict, who have forfeited the privileges of combatant status by engaging in spying, sabotage, terrorism, or other similar acts behind enemy lines.

2. Roles and Responsibilities

a. **SecDef.** SecDef has overall responsibility for matters relating to detainee program. Within the DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) provides for the overall development, coordination, approval, and implementation of major DOD policies and plans relating to detainee operations, including the final coordination of proposed plans, policies, and new courses of action with DOD components and other federal departments and agencies, as necessary. The specific division responsible for detainee operations policy issues within the office of the Director, Detainee Policy. The DOD general counsel provides legal advice to the SecDef and the DOD on detainee matters.

b. **Secretary of the Army (SECARMY).** SECARMY is designated as the DOD EA for the DOD detainee program (DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*). SECARMY ensures responsibilities and functions of the DOD detainee program are assigned and executed according to DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program* and develops and promulgates program guidance, regulations, and instructions necessary for DOD-wide implementation of DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*. He/she communicates directly with the heads of DOD components, as necessary, to carry out assigned functions and designates a single point of contact (within the Department of the Army) who provides advice and assistance for detainee operations to the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Detainee Affairs and the USD[P]. SECARMY plans for and operates the National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC) and its elements to account for detainees; coordinates with the USD(P) to provide reports on detainee operations to the SecDef and others, as appropriate; recommends DOD-wide detainee affairs-related planning and programming guidance; establishes detainee operations training and certification standards in coordination with the other Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); and develops programs to ensure all DOD detainee operations; doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and regulations or other issuances are subject to periodic review, evaluation, and inspection for effectiveness and compliance with DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*.

c. **Provost Marshal General.** SECARMY has designated the Provost Marshal General as the responsible official for the DOD Detainee Program. The Provost Marshal General develops and executes DOD strategy, policy, plans, and programs; ensures that the execution is consistent with laws, regulations and policies, plans, and programs; and reviews and assesses the execution of DOD policies, plans, and programs. The Provost Marshal General provides staff assistance and technical advice to various agencies, including the OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Departments, combatant commands, DOS and other federal agencies, and NGOs.

d. **CJCS.** The CJCS is responsible for implementing the DOD Detainee Program and for assigning responsibilities to Joint Staff offices and directorates to ensure appropriate oversight of combatant command detainee operations, policies, and procedures, including ensuring operational exercises routinely test the capabilities of DOD components to conduct, participate in, and support detainee operations. Specific CJCS responsibilities related to detainee operations are promulgated in DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*.

e. **CCDRs.** CCDRs are responsible for the DOD Detainee Program. This includes ensuring compliance with applicable law, policy, and joint doctrine related to detainee operations in their AOR. Specific CCDR responsibilities related to planning, execution, and oversight of combatant command detainee operations are promulgated in DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*, and CJCSI 3290.01, *Program for Detainee Operations*.

f. **Subordinate JFCs.** Subordinate JFCs have the overall responsibility for detainee operations in their assigned JOA. JFCs will ensure detainee operations in their JOA comply with international law of war and the applicable policy and doctrine. JFCs will

ensure that persons captured or detained by members of the Armed Forces of the United States are safely handed and processed through a detainee collection point at brigade-level and below, a detainee holding area (DHA) at division and/or corps-level, to the theater detention facility (TDF). JFCs must ensure the proper force structure to conduct detainee operations is included in any joint operational plans. Commanders at all levels will ensure all detainees are accounted for and humanely treated, and that collection, evacuation, detention, transfers, release, and repatriation of detainees are conducted IAW applicable law, policy, and doctrine. Additional specific responsibilities relating to detainee operations may be assigned to the JFC by the applicable CDR. The JFC may assign a commander, detainee operations (CDO), to provide focused attention to detainee operations. A JFC will:

- (1) Issue and review appropriate plans, policies, and directives as necessary.
- (2) Plan, execute, and oversee detainee operations according to DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*; FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*; and AR 190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees*.
- (3) Ensure all members of DOD components, contract employees, and others assigned to or accompanying DOD components are properly trained and certified and are maintaining records of training and certification.
- (4) Provide for the proper treatment, classification, administrative processing, and custody of those persons captured or detained by military services under their command and control.
- (5) Ensure detainee accountability is conducted according to instructions from the Office of the Provost Marshal General NDRC. Presently, the DOD detainee accountability database of records is the Detainee Reporting System (DRS).
- (6) Ensure detainee accountability and detainee identification are based only upon Department of Defense Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War [EPW] Capture Tag) numbers and DRS-generated internment serial numbers (ISNs). Ensure suspected or alleged violations of the law of war are promptly reported to the appropriate authorities and investigated.
- (7) Ensure personnel deployed in operations across the competition continuum are cognizant of their obligations under the law of war.
- (8) Designate a CDO who is responsible for all detainee operations and has command over all detention and interrogation facilities within an AO. The CDO is typically the senior MP commander in a theater and is responsible for all facets of the operation of detention facilities (theater and strategic) and facility-related administrative matters.
- (9) Ensure detention operations comply with the principles of the Geneva Conventions and the intent of the CDR.

(10) Support and improve the intelligence-gathering process with everyone who has contact with detainees.

(11) Preserve detainee records.

g. Component Commanders

(1) In addition to the roles and responsibilities of the subordinate JFC listed above, component commanders identify conflicts between component doctrine and operational plans, policies, and procedures, and seek guidance through component command channels on effective deconfliction procedures.

(2) The Army component commander normally provides the CDO responsible for all detainee operations and all of the units to include MP detention battalions, required to operate a TDF. For planning purposes, one MP detention battalion is required for every 4,000 EPWs or 10,000 detainees.

h. CDO. CCDRs, JFCs, or component commanders normally assign an officer under their operational control as CDO, to be responsible to them for detention operations in the AOR or JOA, as appropriate. If the size and scope of the detainee operation warrants, CCDRs, JFCs, or component commanders may designate a flag or general officer as the CDO. At a lower level, the CDO is normally the senior MP commander or someone else with detainee operations experience. CCDRs, JFCs, or component commanders are responsible to provide the CDO with the adequate resources and authorities to function as an effective subordinate commander. They typically assign the CDO the following responsibilities:

(1) Exercise operational control over all assigned and attached forces, detention facilities, and JIDCs, regardless of location within the JOA. JIDC non-detainee-related activities should remain under the direction of the JFC and/or J-2.

(2) Report directly to the JFC or designated Service or functional component commander on all detainee matters.

(3) Ensure the development of detainee policies, procedures, orders, and directives for the JFC IAW applicable laws, regulations, and policies.

(4) Provide for the humane treatment of detainees. Immediately report all allegations of maltreatment and/or abuse of detainees. Thoroughly investigate and immediately report all substantiated allegations through designated command channels, and implement remedial measures as appropriate.

(5) Coordinate all reporting requirements between MP detention battalions and the theater detainee reporting center (TDRC).

(6) Facilitate coordination between JIDC commander(s) and/or chiefs with the joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element (J-2X).

(7) Ensure all logistical requirements for detention facilities and JIDCs are determined and met. These logistical requirements range from initial setup of detention facilities to sustained operations throughout the life of a facility. Coordinate with J-2X on requirements for the interrogation facility to adequately address operational requirements.

(8) Coordinate with J-2X (when established) to conduct HUMINT and CI collection management efforts, and with the joint security office (when established) to conduct biometric collection management efforts.

(9) Coordinate with appropriate commanders and staffs to disseminate CCDR, JFC, or component commander priorities for detainee operations throughout the AOR/JOA.

(10) Obtain CCDR, JFC, or component commander approval for external visit times and coordinate visits to detention facilities with the TDRC and joint visitor bureau.

(11) Coordinate all International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits, and ensure the command responds to ICRC concerns, as necessary.

(12) Ensure joint strategic exploitation center, JIDC commander, and the detention facility commander (DFC) responsibilities are clearly delineated. Coordinate all procedures in order to accomplish JIDC intelligence activities efficiently and accomplish security requirements effectively at all facilities, while treating all detainees humanely.

(13) Ensure the issuance of ISNs IAW current policies and procedures.

(14) Establish, maintain, and supervise the detainee review process.

(15) Coordinate with the CCDR, JFC, or component commander SJA/legal advisor for guidance in all matters of planning and execution of operations in order to maintain compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

(16) Coordinate with the CCDR, JFC, or component commander surgeon and dental officer for guidance on all detainee medical care, dental care, and other health matters.

(17) Coordinate with CCDR, JFC, or component commander postal staff for guidance relating to postal support for detainees.

(18) Establish a plan to provide postal support to detainees when operationally feasible.

(19) Ensure detainee release agreements to other nations, and the circumstances under which detainees are released to other nations, comply with US law and policy, and international law. For EPWs, if the nation that receives the EPWs fails to carry out the provisions of the GPW in any important respect, effective measures should be taken to correct the situation or the EPWs return shall be requested.

(20) Ensure United States Armed Forces conducting detainee operations comply with the law of war and US laws, regulations, and policies through regular compliance inspections.

For further guidance on the responsibilities of the CDO, see FM 3-63, Detainee Operations.

i. **DFC.** The DFC is the commander responsible for the execution of all detention facility operations. The DFC, when assigned, is responsible to the CDO for all matters relating to detention facility operations, including security, law enforcement, administration, logistics, and other operations support requirements. A DFC is typically assigned the following responsibilities:

(1) Ensure the humane treatment of detainees at all times and under all circumstances.

(2) Establish detention facility SOPs that ensure the detention operations mission is conducted IAW applicable US law and policy.

(3) Ensure the safety, well-being, and training of all personnel operating the facility.

(4) Ensure the effective management and distribution of logistic resources.

(5) Ensure all detainee maltreatment allegations are immediately reported through appropriate command channels and corrective actions are initiated.

(6) Ensure all personnel are properly trained on the rules for the use of force; the law of land warfare, including the Geneva Conventions and all other applicable laws and policies; and that all personnel have an effective knowledge of the detention facility SOP.

(7) Plan for and, when necessary, execute effective perimeter security of the detention facility, including personnel and material aspects and external response force operations and planning.

(8) Assign escort guards for all detainee transportation entering or departing the facility.

(9) Develop, along with the JIDC commander, humane and lawful procedures that include accountability and security of detainees during intelligence interrogation operations.

(10) Coordinate force protection.

(11) Ensure proper reporting of detainee accountability through the TDRC.

(12) Conduct biometric collection and enrollment into the DOD biometric system of record for each detainee.

(13) Coordinate with military criminal investigative organizations and legal agencies regarding evidentiary and other legal matters as required.

(14) Coordinate with the CMOC to facilitate interaction with international organizations, NGOs, multinational forces, and other USG departments and agencies. For further information on CMO, see JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.

(15) Ensure operations security of all detention facilities' activities, security operations, support, and collection operations.

For further guidance on the responsibilities of the DFC, see FM 3-63, Detainee Operations.

j. **JIDC Commander.** The JIDC commander is responsible to the CDO for all matters relating to interrogation, intelligence collection and reporting, and interaction with other agencies involved in the intelligence and/or evidence gathering process.

For further information on the JIDC commander, see JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.

k. **Medical Officer or Surgeon.** The medical officer/surgeon reports directly to the DFC with direct access to the CDO (as needed) and maintains a chain of command independent of the guard forces. Responsibilities include:

(1) Coordinate actions of medically qualified RP (individuals who satisfy the criteria for this status as established in the GWS). Provide first responder capability to the detainee population. Coordinate forward resuscitative care or higher capability.

(2) Advise the commander on medical and health-related issues. Coordinate for medical consultations with appropriate medical specialists and coordinates for transportation and escort of detainees to appointments, if required. Ensure medical information pertaining to the detainee's mental health condition and stability is included in the process for sharing medical information with the interrogation component.

(3) Coordinate with the CA officer to ensure detainee medical concerns are being considered for possible presentation at the CMOC.

(4) Ensure the medical requirements within the detention facility are met consistent with DODI 2310.08E, *Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations*, and its implementing orders and programs. Such requirements include:

(a) Examining and documenting detainees' physical condition upon initiation of detention for the purpose of recording any physical or mental illness, disability, and/or any indication or evidence of mistreatment.

(b) Monthly recording of detainees' weight.

(c) Monitoring of general cleanliness of the facility (latrines, showers, and wash stations).

- (d) Examining detainees for contagious diseases.
- (e) Providing detainees access to medical care, such as sick call.
- (5) Coordinate for preventive medicine inspections of the facility.
- (6) Coordinate preventive medicine inspection of food sources. Advise the DFC of caloric content and dietary suitability of detainee rations.
- (7) Coordinate, upon the death of a detainee, with the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME), who determines if an autopsy is required. The remains are not released from US custody without authorization from the AFME and the responsible commander.
- (8) Clear detainees medically for questioning and interrogation.
- (9) Identify the process for notifying interrogators of detainee medical limitations.

1. **SJA/Legal Advisor.** The **SJA/legal advisor** serves as the JFC's legal advisor for the CDO. Responsibilities include:

- (1) Advise the commander and other personnel responsible for detainee operations on all matters pertaining to compliance with applicable law and policy.
- (2) Provide legal advice to the commander on all matters relating to detainee misconduct.
- (3) Advise the appropriate commander regarding investigation of suspected maltreatment or abuse of detainees, or other violations of applicable law or policy.
- (4) Serve as the CDO's liaison to the ICRC.
- (5) Advise, in coordination with the medical officer/surgeon, the JFC on legal issues pertaining to detainee medical support.
- (6) Review interrogation plans that use the separation approach and any other plan as directed. Interrogation legal advisors require specialized preparation in interrogation operations to provide consistent, informed advice. A JIDC should have a dedicated counsel.
- (7) Advise appropriate commanders on evidentiary collection procedures necessary to prosecute detainees locally for criminal offenses.
- (8) Participate in the review of MISO and other programs regarding the information function, as required.
- (9) Coordinate with other USG departments and agencies on investigations and prosecutions of detainees as directed by the commander.

3. Planning Detainee Operations

a. Introduction

(1) The JFC should consider a plan for detainee operations within the JOA early in the planning cycle of any operation. Planning for detainee operations should be in place prior to the start of operations. The commander should analyze the wide array of logistical and operational requirements to conduct detainee operations. These requirements begin with the correct number and type of personnel are present in the operational area to conduct the operation. Other requirements are the identification, collection, and execution of a logistical plan to support detainee operations throughout the JOA. Plans should adequately account for a potentially very large influx of detainees during the first days of combat operations.

(2) The JFC establishes the C2 relationships among all elements involved in detainee transfers and/or release operations. C2 relationships should be delineated clearly and succinctly (see Figure E-2). C2 guidance, both internal and external to the joint force, should be established as early as possible.

b. Detainee Operations Planning Considerations for Theater or Strategic Detention Facilities. JFCs and their staffs should be aware of special planning considerations that history has proven are essential to successful detainee operations. JFCs should anticipate operational and logistical requirements (notification of engineers, selection and development of facility sites, and procurement of construction materials), well in advance of conducting detainee operations. Comprehensive planning effectively identifies for the DFC and JIDC commander the resources needed to perform all associated garrison support activities that are inherent with facilities of this type. This planning alleviates potential distractions from the primary mission of detainee operations.

(1) **Site Selection.** Site selection for a detainee facility is critical and incorporates a wide range of factors including logistical supportability, security, mitigation of escape attempts, and engineering aspects. Consideration should be given to the garrison support activities that support an operating base where detention facilities are located. MPs coordinate the location with engineers, sustainment units, higher HQ, and the HN. The command should analyze the wide array of logistics and operational requirements necessary to conduct detainee operations. Well in advance of the start of hostilities, the first requirement is to ensure that the correct number and type of personnel and construction material are on the ground to conduct detainee operations. The second requirement is to identify, collect, and execute a logistics plan that supports detainee operations throughout the JOA. The failure to properly consider and correctly evaluate all factors may increase the logistics and personnel efforts required. If a detention facility is improperly located, the entire detainee population may require relocation when resources are scarce. When selecting a site for a facility, considerations include:




Figure E-2. Detainee Operations Command and Control Model

- (a) Locations where detainee labor can most effectively be used.
- (b) Distances from other elements from which additional external security could be drawn upon, if required.
- (c) Potential threats from the detainee population to logistics operations in the proposed location.

- (d) The threat and boldness of guerrilla activity in the area.
- (e) The attitude of the local civilian population.
- (f) Accessibility to support forces and transportation to the site for support elements.
- (g) The proximity to probable target areas (airfields, ammunition storage) and other obligations under the law of war.
- (h) The classification of detainees to be housed at the site.
- (i) The type of terrain surrounding the site and its conduciveness to escape.
- (j) The distance from the main supply route to the source of sustainment support.
- (k) Mission variables.
- (l) Availability of suitable existing facilities (to avoid unnecessary construction).
- (m) The presence of swamps, vectors, and other factors (water drainage) that affect human health.
- (n) The existence of an adequate, satisfactory potable water source. (The supply should meet the demands for consumption, food sanitation, and personal hygiene.)
- (o) Availability of electricity (portable generators can be used as standby and emergency sources of electricity).
- (p) The distance to work if detainees are employed outside the facility.
- (q) Availability of construction material.
- (r) Soil drainage.
- (s) The health protection of detainees and forces manning the site.
- (t) Other environmental considerations as appropriate.

c. TDF

(1) The CCDR specifies the construction standards for a TDF to optimize the effort expended on any given facility, while ensuring that the facilities are adequate for health, safety, and mission accomplishment. The CCDR determines what facilities are needed to satisfy operational requirements.

(2) Facilities are grouped into six broad categories that emphasize the use of existing assets over new construction. To the maximum extent possible, facilities or real estate requirements should be met from these categories in the following order of priority:

- (a) US-owned, -occupied, or -leased facilities (including captured facilities).
- (b) US-owned facility substitutes, pre-positioned in the theater.
- (c) HN, multinational support where an agreement exists for the HN or multinational nations to provide specific types and quantities of facilities at specified times, in designated locations.
- (d) Facilities available from commercial sources.
- (e) US-owned facility substitutes stored in the United States.
- (f) Facilities constructed to fill a shortfall after an assessment of the availability of existing assets.

d. Strategic Detention Facility (SDF)

e. An SDF is a facility, designated by SecDef or a designee, with the capability to further detain and exploit detainees who hold strategic intelligence or who pose a continuing threat to the United States or its interests. Detainees are normally noncompliant and may pose a high security risk to the United States. An SDF usually resembles a TDF with respect to the operating procedures implemented and stated in the section above, but it is task-organized for specific detainees. The SDF is a long-term or semi-permanent facility with the capability of holding detainees for an extended period of time. The location of the SDF depends on the orders and directives published from the highest levels of the national government. An SDF is normally not located in uncertain or hostile environments. SDFs fall under the command and control of the CCDR in whose AOR the facility is located.

(1) **SDF Planning Considerations.** SDF requirements may be filled through multiple Services vice a single Service, which is the typical sourcing strategy for a TDF. For example, the Navy may provide all medical personnel, the Army may provide the detainee guard force, the Marine Corps may provide facility security, and the Services may provide individuals to fill joint manning document billets. Key organizational elements within an SDF may include:

- (a) Joint security group.
- (b) Joint interrogation group.
- (c) Detainee hospital.
- (d) Joint logistics group.

(e) Joint interrogation operations group.

(f) Special staff may include:

1. A joint visitor's bureau.
2. Chaplain.
3. IG.
4. SJA/legal advisor.
5. PAO.
6. Surgeon.

(g) Additional considerations at the SDF may also include:

1. Agriculture. Some detainees, depending on their category, may be allowed to raise vegetables for their own use. Subsequently, commanders must be aware of resources, procedures, and HN guidelines applicable to this program. See AR 190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees*, for more specific restrictions on agriculture and gardening.

2. Religion. Detainees are allowed the freedom of worship, including attendance at services of their respective faith held within the detention facility. Detainees are not entitled to direct religious support from US chaplains and the right of privileged communication that comes with such support. Military chaplains do not generally provide direct religious support to detainees. Should the CCDR determine a requirement to provide direct military chaplain support to detainees, communication between the chaplains and the detainees is privileged to the extent provided by Military Rule of Evidence 503 and appropriate military department policies. Retained chaplains and clergymen are permitted to devote their full time to ministering members of their faith within the detention facility. The MP commander may permit other ordained clergymen, theological students, or chaplains to conduct services within the compound. US military personnel (such as guards and staff) do not attend services with detainees. However, guards should be present to ensure security and to maintain custody and control of detainees.

3. Recreation. The active participation of detainees in recreational activities, in addition to promoting general health and welfare, serves to alleviate the tensions and boredom of extended detention. In addition to athletic contests, group entertainment may be provided in the forms of concerts, plays, recorded music, and selected motion pictures.

4. Safety. A safety program for detainees is set up and administered in each detention facility. ARs, circulars, and Department of the Army pamphlets are used as guides for establishing the safety program. Records and reports used to support the detainee safety program are maintained separately from those that support the Army Safety

Program. The Army Safety Program should include, at a minimum, the hazardous material control; hazardous communication program; and emergency planning and response; fire prevention, control, and evacuation programs.

5. Article 5 tribunals and enemy combatant review boards are normally conducted at the SDF. These formal processes assist DOD commanders and personnel with determining the actual status of a detainee.

(h) **HUMINT Support.** A joint interrogation group, which may include uniformed DOD personnel and other government agencies that may be involved in the collection of intelligence, is normally located at the SDF. The intelligence efforts at the SDF focus primarily on intelligence at the highest national security levels.

For additional information on debriefing, interrogation, and HUMINT support to detainee operations, see DODD 3115.09, DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning; JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters; and FM 3-63, Detainee Operations.

(i) **Medical Operations.** A detainee hospital with the capability to perform all roles of medical care is normally found at an SDF. The detainee hospital may also include personnel who can provide basic medical care to psychological and psychiatric experts. The theater army surgeon for the Army Service component command designates a detainee operations medical director to oversee the aspects of medical care provided to detainees.

For additional information on the medical director responsibilities, see FM 3-63, Detainee Operations.

(j) **Security Considerations.** Security measures will closely resemble those at a TDF, but they may vary in certain aspects. These differences include:

1. Higher security levels.
2. Enhanced access/entry control.
3. Higher risk levels.
4. Geographic locations.
5. Intertheater transportation considerations.
6. Increased media attention.
7. Interagency and international visitation policies.
8. Strategic levels of interrogation.

f. **Other Considerations.** As with any operation, proper planning will set the conditions for the successful conduct of detainee operations. To this end, commanders should establish planning mechanisms that ensure effective consideration of potential detainee-related issues and the development of plans and procedures to respond to these issues as early in the planning process as is feasible. Because detainee operations may impact operations, intelligence, logistics, personnel services (human resources support, religious ministry support, financial management, manpower, and legal support), and information aspects of the mission, the detention operations plan requires coordination with all members of the staff. Underestimating the potential number of detainees, especially during initial military operations, has been a planning error in recent conflicts.

(1) **Force Protection.** To the maximum extent possible, detainees and places of detention will be protected from the hazards of the battlefield. Detainees should derive the same benefit from force protection measures as do members of the detaining force.

(2) **Logistics.** Logistics considerations should be reflected in the TPFDD. The following issues are a few examples of some of the unique logistic obligations and considerations associated with detention operations:

(a) **Temperature and Lighting.** To the extent feasible, the facilities will be protected from dampness, adequately heated and cooled, and appropriately illuminated.

(b) **Food and Water.** When feasible, detainees will be fed three meals a day. At a minimum, basic daily food rations will be sufficient in quantity, quality, and variety to keep detainees in good health and to prevent significant weight loss or development of nutritional deficiencies. The justification for any deviation from the three meals per day standard will be documented by the commander of the detention facility and should be reviewed by both medical and legal support personnel. The habitual diet and religious/cultural requirements of the detainees will be taken into account. The detaining power will supply detainees who work with such additional rations as are necessary for the labor in which they are employed. Sufficient water for drinking and hygiene will be supplied to detainees.

(c) **Clothing.** Adequate clothing for the climate will be provided, and a clothing replacement program will be instituted at each facility. Issued clothing should be uniform in color for identification purposes. If replacement clothing is not available, commanders will attempt to provide for the cleaning of detainee clothing in order to protect the health and well-being of detainees until a clothing exchange program can be instituted.

(d) **Financial Management.** The JFC is responsible for providing EPW and civilian internee pay. The JTF comptroller may designate a component to provide currency and other required support. The designated component will also ensure that controls are established to process deposits to and payments from designated accounts properly. Refer to Defense Finance and Accounting Service–Indianapolis Regulation 37-1, *Finance and Accounting Policy Implementation*, Chapter 26, for specific information pertaining to detainee pay.

(e) **Medical Care, Dental Care, and Sanitation.** The detaining power will take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of facilities, and to prevent epidemics. Detainees will have access to sanitary facilities that conform to preventive medicine sanitation standards. In facilities where women detainees are accommodated, feminine hygiene supplies will be provided. Detainees will receive a full medical and dental examination during in processing. Detainee medical and dental history will be created and recorded, and a narrative summary of that record will be forwarded to the detainee's new facility location. If the detainee is released, he/she should be given a narrative clinical summary detailing past and present medical status and recommendation of medical follow-up, if any. All treatment provider names will be redacted. No records will be released directly to the detainee or a foreign country. Patient services should include first responder, forward resuscitative, and theater hospitalization capabilities, as operational circumstances permit. DFCs should also provide mental health services (mental health treatment, assessment, and therapy) to detainees when necessary.

(f) **Work Program.** The JFC establishes appropriate policy and guidelines for the detainee work programs, to include validation of the funding requirement through the appropriate resourcing channels within theater.

(3) **Property Safekeeping and Confiscation Accountability.** DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*, states, "Detainees and their property shall be accounted for and records maintained according to applicable law, regulation, policy or other issuances."

(a) All personal effects and articles of personal use (except arms, military equipment, personal documents with intelligence value, and military documents) will remain in the possession of detainees, including effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding, unless the detaining force considers continued possession to cause a risk for the detaining force or other detainees, or the item is of intelligence or law enforcement value.

(b) Detainees will be permitted to retain individual protective gear and like articles issued for personal protection. This is especially important during initial detention and transportation to a more established detention facility when there is a risk that the detainees will be exposed to CBRN threats. This rule does not prohibit the centralized management of such protective equipment by the DFC if such management is intended to enhance the overall protection of detainees. Badges of rank and nationality, decorations, and articles having, above all, a personal or sentimental value, may not be taken from detainees.

(c) Sums of money carried by detainees may not be taken away from them except by order of a commanding officer, after the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a special register, and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank, and unit of the person issuing the said receipt. Sums in the currency of the detaining power, or those changed into such currency at the detainee's request, will be placed to the credit of the detainee's account. The detaining power may temporarily confiscate articles of value or necessity, including medications, from detainees when such action is determined to be necessary for reasons of security (including

intelligence evaluations for the purpose of the security of the force). Procedures for such confiscation should be established by SOP and should follow the rules applicable for the impoundment of money noted above.

(d) All personal property taken from detainees shall be kept in the custody of the detaining power and, if feasible, shall be returned in its initial condition to the detainees at the end of their detention. Always use a chain of custody receipt for inventoried numbers. Administrative detainee property practices may not be adequate to preserve evidence. If detainee property is needed as evidence in criminal proceedings, military law rules of evidence should be followed.

(4) **Administrative Processing and Accountability.** According to DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*, DOD components shall maintain full accountability for all detainees under DOD control. Detainee records and reports shall be maintained, safeguarded, and provided to the USD(P) and other DOD components, as appropriate. Information and biometric samples and associated data will be collected and recorded on each detainee captured and detained by the Armed Forces of the United States and referenced to the ISN. Detainees should provide name, rank, serial number (if applicable), and date of birth for tracking purposes and appropriate country notification. However, failure to do so does not result in any treatment not otherwise consistent with this publication. Upon transfer to a theater-level facility, detainee information (including information related to personal property taken from the detainee) will be provided to the NDRC through the TDRC. The NDRC will maintain all information concerning detainees and their property.

(5) **Religious, Intellectual, and Physical Activities**

(a) **Religion.** Respect for the religious preferences of detainees is an essential aspect of detainee operations. Accordingly, the organization and administration of the detention facility must not be such as to hinder unjustifiably the observance of religious rites, and commanders should plan for the reasonable accommodation of the religious needs of detainees. Certain limitations may be necessary due to security concerns. However, a good faith balance should be struck between the detainee's obligation to comply with disciplinary rules and procedures and the detaining power's obligation to afford detainees the ability to meet their religious obligations and exercise their religious practices. The detaining power is also prohibited from imposing any adverse distinctions within the detainee population based on religion. In this regard, it should be noted that in some situations, segregating the detainee population based on religious affiliation may be beneficial and therefore not prohibited, particularly when conflict has been based in part on religious affiliation. Detainees have no right to person-to-person support by military chaplains. Therefore, a JFC is under no obligation to provide such support. Accordingly, military chaplains do not typically provide direct religious support to detainees. Should the JFC determine a requirement to provide direct military chaplain support to detainees, communications between the chaplains and the detainees is privileged to the extent provided by Military Rule of Evidence 503 and appropriate Military Department policies.

(b) **Physical and Intellectual Activities.** Physical and intellectual activities for detainees are necessary for their physical and mental well-being and contribute to the maintenance of good order and discipline within the detainee population. While certain physical and intellectual activities may be subject to mission requirements, regular access to the outdoors is mandated for all detainees. Detainees shall be afforded, at minimum, one hour per day in the open air, and more if feasible. The extent to which accommodation is considered and/or implemented will be determined by the needs of the facility population and will take into account both security limitations and available resources. Authorized activities and programs include, but are not limited to, participation in physical exercise, access to outdoor areas, and the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits. Other programs that may be considered, where feasible and consistent with security limitations and/or mission accomplishment, include establishment of a family visitation program.

(c) Detainees should have voluntary access to a wide array of programs. These programs help protect moderate detainees from extremist influence, prepare detainees for release, and encourage them to not engage in belligerent activities when released. While the programs must be tailored for each area and conflict, they can include vocational, educational (especially reading and writing), and religious programs.

(6) **HN Coordination.** The JFC's staff should plan for cooperation between the US, multinational forces, and HN security forces, police and judicial or local prosecution elements. In many situations the USG and HN form security and legal agreements that determine how detainees within the HN are handled and locally prosecuted. Lessons learned demonstrate the value of this coordination in pursuit of high-value targets that yield intelligence value to the JFC but also support HN prosecution of detainees. This can result in prosecutorial judges interviewing intelligence assets and US force personnel being present at the point of capture. This process challenges protecting DOD intelligence capabilities and requires the JFC to modify actions at the point of capture to support evidence collection and potential prosecution. As the JFC's staff plans for cooperation their considerations can include:

(a) Confirmation of HN adherence to internationally recognized standards and humane treatment for detainees.

(b) Access procedures for both JTF and HN personnel to detainees based on which element has the detainee control.

(c) Agreements on exchange of evidence, detainees, and information (the detainee has both intelligence and evidentiary value to both the USG and HN).

(d) Established sharing procedures to both protect JTF intelligence sources and provide a method to share detainee information that supports HN prosecution.

(7) **Interaction with ICRC, NGOs and Other Similar Organizations**

(a) During detainee operations, commanders may encounter representatives of organizations attempting to protect detainee interests. Such representatives often seek

access to detainees and/or offer their services to assist in the care and maintenance of detainees. Effective detainee operations planning requires establishing a mechanism for command interaction with such organizations in order to maximize the benefit of potential contributions to the US effort. Commanders should anticipate that, upon initiation of detainee operations, these organizations will request access to and/or information about detainees, and they will continue to do so throughout the operation. Commanders should seek guidance through operational command channels for responding to such requests prior to the initiation of detainee operations, or as soon thereafter as possible. In the absence of mission-specific guidance, all such requests for access or information should flow via the established chain of command to the OSD.

(b) The ICRC is an independent, neutral organization ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war and armed violence. The ICRC has a permanent mandate under international law to take impartial action for prisoners, the wounded and sick, and civilians affected by conflict. The Geneva Conventions give it a unique status. Commanders should be cognizant of the special status of the ICRC. The services of the ICRC will be accepted and used to perform humanitarian functions related to detainees during, and in relation to, any armed conflict, however characterized, to which the United States is a party. IAW DOD policy, the ICRC is given access to all DOD detention facilities and the detainees housed therein, subject to reasons of imperative military necessity. Consistent with the Geneva Conventions the ICRC has access to both EPW and civilian internees. ICRC visits are not prohibited except for reasons of imperative military necessity and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure. As a general rule, commanders should coordinate with a legal and PA advisor before ordering a suspension of ICRC access to a detainee.

(8) **Media.** Detainees will be protected from public curiosity at all times. Strict compliance with this requirement is essential. There is no distinction between international and domestic media with regard to this obligation. Commanders and staffs should anticipate substantial media attention of detainees and supporting PA personnel should develop procedures, in advance, for dealing with media requests for visits and information. Unless delegated to subordinate commanders, OSD is the sole release authority for photographs or video of detainees. Commanders will prepare and coordinate, in advance, PA plans for events such as detainee movements, transfers, or releases, with both the transferring and receiving commanders.

(a) Requests for interviews or filming of detainees must be coordinated through the SJA/legal advisor to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations including the law of war.

(b) Photographing, filming, or other videotaping of detainees for other than internal detention facility management and intelligence purposes is prohibited.

For additional considerations for detainee operations, refer to FM 3-63, Detainee Operations, and for commander's communication synchronization, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and Joint Doctrine Note 2-13, Commander's Communication Synchronization.

g. **ISN.** IAW DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*, individuals who are detained by DOD personnel shall be vetted and assigned an ISN as soon as possible. The ISN is the DOD identification number used to maintain accountability of detainees. (See Figure E-3.) All detainees under DOD control are registered promptly, normally within 14 days of capture. Once an ISN is assigned, all further documentation, including medical records, uses only this number. The ISN is generated by the DRS, the detainee accountability database required for use by all DOD agencies. When required by law and/or policy, the NDRC provides detainee information to the ICRC to satisfy Geneva Convention obligations. The ICRC uses this information to provide notice of the status of the detained individual to his or her government. The United States must be vigilant in executing all obligations to account for detainees and must issue detainees an ISN when required by law and/or policy.

h. **Detainee Control and Discipline.** Maintaining control and discipline within a detention facility is essential to detainee operations. JFCs ensure DFCs establish procedures for detainee control and discipline.

For further information on detainee control and discipline see FM 3-63, Detainee Operations.

i. **Training Standards and Documentation for Detainee Operations**

(1) The Office of the Provost Marshal General has primary Headquarters, Department of the Army, responsibility for the DOD Detainee Programs. When US forces conduct detainee operations, they must possess the text of the applicable Geneva Conventions and be instructed as to their provisions.




Figure E-3. Internment Serial Numbers

(2) CCDRs, or their designated subordinate JFCs have the overall responsibility to develop, implement, monitor, and, when necessary, refine standards, policies, and SOPs for detainee operations that are consistent with obligations imposed by law and applicable policy. Pursuant to this obligation, these commanders are responsible to ensure the effective routine review of detainee operations and related training to enhance compliance with applicable law and policy.

(3) Foremost among command responsibilities during detainee operations is to maintain good order and discipline through leadership, guidance, and effective, continuous training. All guard force commands and respective attachments will establish a continuous training program, training regularly on emergency plans, to include disturbance control formations, use of force, first aid, interpersonal communication skill training, and nonlethal munitions usage. DFCs will maintain records of all relevant documents regarding the conduct of detainee operations. These records will be available for review during all inspections and assessments of the detainee operation.

For further information on training and standards, see FM 3-63, Detainee Operations.

4. Executing Detainee Transfer Operations

a. “Transfers” refers to the movement of detainees between DOD locations. Typically, a transfer also changes the officer responsible for the detainee’s accountability and wellbeing.

b. During the course of their detention, detainees may be transferred between relatively local TDFs, across international borders, or to other suitable locations outside the combat zone. Orders directing detainee transfers usually include detailed coordinating instructions regarding the method of transportation. Movement may involve multiple modes of transportation and coordination between the Services to effect the transfer.

c. Security and safety are principal concerns when planning a transfer. Security must include safeguards for US and multinational force personnel, government property, and the detainees. Further considerations include contingency plans for and prevention of escape attempts, attacks upon the detainee movement, delays en route due to enemy actions, weather, and mechanical failures.

d. Plans must include provisions for adequate food, water, and shelter. The movement should not expose the detainees to undue hazards. Consideration for individual detainee needs (e.g., adequate supplies of prescription medication, medical support en route, and sanitary and hygienic needs) must also be addressed.

e. Extended trips may require guard force rotation and rest plans.

5. Detainee Movement Planning

The primary considerations for detainee escort missions are the security of the conveyance, the safety of all US resources, and the protection of the detainees. Ideally, the issues related to detainee transport should be addressed in orders or directives issued by

the JFC. The coordination for the transportation of detainees is the responsibility of the detaining power and is a task performed solely by military personnel. The foremost planning consideration is assessing the appropriate amount of land, maritime, and air transportation assets to accomplish the mission. Considerations are also made for the logistical, medical, and linguistic needs of detainees while in transit. Given the array of transportation methods and variety of arrangements, no single instruction can feasibly outline all TTP to be used throughout all detainee escort missions. Therefore, it is necessary for commanders, security elements, and other personnel to use their best judgment when selecting a COA to accomplish this task.

6. Movement Procedures

a. Movement and transfer of detainees occurs from the point of capture to the detainee collection point, through the detention holding area, to the TDF. For movement of detainees at division/corps-level and below, *see FM 3-63, Detainee Operations*.

b. DFCs forward copies of detainee records (including at a minimum: capture tag, disciplinary actions, medical narrative summaries, property, and record of any injuries sustained since capture) along with a complete manifest for each detainee transferred. Prior to transport from the DHA to a TDF, all detainees receive a thorough medical exam, are deloused, bathed, and if necessary, shaved. Detainees are thoroughly searched for weapons and contraband immediately before boarding the conveyance. Detainees are briefed in a language that they understand about the departure and restrictions while on board the conveyance, as well as safety and emergency procedures. Detainee records and property accompany them during transport.

c. Another aspect of transfer missions is the transportation of detainees to medical treatment facilities or to judicial proceedings. These transfer missions are likely to involve many security assets—therefore, commanders should conduct a thorough mission analysis and determine appropriate requirements for such transport missions. Therefore, they should be considered when planning detainee operations.

7. Detainee Movement by Land Transportation

JFCs should plan for and assign the mission of detainee evacuation to a properly resourced transportation element. The transportation of detainees is a separate mission from the escort and guarding of detainees in transit. Capturing units and initial transfers primarily use land transportation to move detainees. Further movement of detainees by land transportation should be minimized to limit exposure to hazards, public curiosity, and the media.

8. Detainee Movement by Maritime Transportation

Detainee movement by maritime transportation can be used, but normally is not considered as a location for detention (in rare circumstances, temporary maritime detention may provide the best COA to protect detainees from operational and environmental hazards). If considered, the use of maritime detention must be authorized by SecDef. When maritime movement is used, appropriate resources and areas aboard maritime

vessels will be sequestered for detainee use and must meet the requirements of the Geneva Conventions.

For further information on detainee operations at sea, see JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations.

9. Detainee Movement by Air Transportation

Detainee movement by air should be the primary means of transporting detainees outside the JOA. Aircrews that are responsible for the transportation of detainees are briefed on the proper handling and interacting procedures. Security escort teams are trained for the mission and perform all detainee handling procedures on board the aircraft. The security escort team leader adopts TTP to meet mission requirements, including feeding, latrine escort, medical aid, and any emergency actions aboard the conveyance. A copy of the detainee manifest remains with the losing organization until the detainees are accounted for at the gaining unit.

10. Detainee Disposition

A detainee disposition describes the intended status of a detainee's liberty, confinement, or fate upon release from DOD control. A disposition is indicated on release or repatriation orders generated by the DRS. As a matter of policy, the United States does not conduct disposition of detainees who have life threatening medical conditions, to locations where adequate medical care is not available to address their conditions. In addition, the United States will not conduct disposition of detainees to a location where they would likely suffer unjust persecution. This does not prevent or deter the transfer/repatriation/return of detainees to face justice, under reasonable standards of due process, for crimes they are alleged to have committed.

a. Repatriation

(1) Is a term applied only to EPW/RP when leaving DOD control for return to their country.

(2) Repatriation or accommodation of sick or wounded EPWs/RP in a neutral country may occur during hostilities.

(3) Sick and wounded prisoners will not be repatriated against their will during hostilities.

(4) EPW/RP who are not repatriated under the above circumstances will be repatriated at the cessation of hostilities as directed by OSD.

(5) EPW/RP otherwise eligible for repatriation, who are pending judicial proceedings in criminal court for offenses not exclusively subject to disciplinary punishment, will be detained until the close of the proceedings.

b. Release

(1) A term applied to all types of detainees, other than EPW/RP, when leaving DOD control. Note that in certain cases, “release” means that the detainee will be transferred to the control of another government or USG department or agency.

(2) Detainees may be released during or after a period of conflict.

(3) Release orders may further specify the reason for a detainee release or declare their intended post-release disposition. The DRS contains a menu of release options. Common options are:

(a) Detainee Review Board—a detainee has gone through the standard review for release and is approved for a general release from custody, usually on the detainee’s own recognizance.

(b) Higher HQ Order—theater commander orders the release of a detainee, omitting the requirement for a detainee review board.

(c) Released to Alternate Authority—detainee is released to a partner nation’s military.

(d) Released to Country of Origin—detainee is released to the government of the detainee’s origin. This selection is used to release third-country nationals to their home nations.

(e) Released to HN—detainee is released to the local equivalent of law enforcement or corrections officers.

(f) Released to Local Civil Authority—a detainee is released to the local equivalent of law enforcement or corrections officers.

(g) Released to NGOs—detainee is released to an organization that has no affiliation to any government, for the purpose of returning the detainees to their home nations. This would include organizations such as the ICRC.

(h) Released to other USG departments or agencies—detainee is released to another US non-DOD entity.

(i) Detainees will not be released or transferred to the custody of another country when a competent authority has assessed it more likely than not the detainee would be subjected to torture.

c. **Escape.** Self-explanatory.

b. **Death.** Self-explanatory.

c. **Disposition Responsibilities**

(1) **JFC**

(a) Provide all personnel conducting detainee operations training and logistical support necessary to conduct transfer or release operations and international law.

(b) Develop and conduct all transfer and/or release operations IAW applicable US law and policy.

(c) Determine air, land, or maritime transportation requirements for transfer and/or release operations to the point of capture, through the unit responsible for that JOA.

(d) Establish the C2 relationship between all elements involved in transfer and/or release operations.

(e) Provide notification of the transfer and/or release of a detainee to the NDRC.

(f) Coordinate with appropriate staff elements to conduct transfer or release operations.

(g) Coordinate with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure that transfer or release operations directives are disseminated throughout the JOA.

(2) Medical Officer/Surgeon

(a) Ensure policies established regarding medical requirements for the transfer or release of detainees are IAW applicable US law and policy.

(b) Ensure coordination of subordinate medical elements to support transfer or release operations.

(3) SJA/Legal Advisor

(a) Provide the JFC with legal guidance regarding applicable US law and regulations.

(b) Serve as the command liaison to the ICRC and advise the command concerning ICRC activities related to the transfer/release of detainees.

(c) Provide technical expertise in support of required instruction and training related to the law of war.

(4) PAO

(a) Develop media policies regarding detainee operations for the JFC IAW applicable US law and policy.

(b) Coordinate all media coverage regarding detainee transfer or release operations through the chain of command.

11. Detainee Classification

The initial classification of a detainee may be based on unsupported statements or documentation accompanying the detainee. After a detainee is assigned to a facility, expect a continuing need for further classification. If the identity of the detainee may have been based on unsupported statements or documentation, it may be necessary to reclassify the detainee as more information is obtained. If the detainee's classification remains in doubt, a tribunal may be convened to determine the detainee's status. Reclassification may result in release of detainees, or reassignment of detainees within the facility or to other facilities.

For additional information on tribunals, see FM 3-63, Detainee Operations.

12. Review and Approval Process

a. For transfer or release authority of US-captured detainees, SecDef, or SecDef's designee, will establish criteria for the transfer or release of detainees and communicate those criteria to all commanders operating within the theater.

b. The designated CCDRs periodically assesses the detainees at the TDF for release or transfer per applicable regulations. The JIDC commander, with the advice of the assigned HUMINT and CI personnel, should provide recommendations to ensure detainees are not transferred to another detention facility while they are still being exploited for intelligence. Recommendations for transfer or release are coordinated with other USG departments and agencies as appropriate and forwarded to SecDef, or SecDef's designee, for decision.

13. Release to Established Recognized National Authority, Allied Facilities, or Inter-Service Agencies

a. The permanent or temporary release of detainees from the custody of US forces to the HN, other multinational forces, or any non-DOD USG entity, requires the approval of SecDef or SecDef's designee. The permanent or temporary release of a detainee to a foreign nation may be governed by bilateral agreements, or may be based on ad hoc arrangements. However, detainees may only be released IAW the requirements of the applicable US law, the law of war, and US policy.

b. The DFC, IAW applicable procedures, makes the transfer of a detainee from a collection point or a detention facility. All proposed transfers should be reviewed by the legal adviser to ensure compliance with applicable law and policy. Unless prohibited by command policies, immediate release of detainees may be made at the point of capture based on the decision of the most senior official on the ground. The decision should be based on criteria established by higher HQ.

c. The temporary transfer of detainees from one facility to another is authorized to accommodate surges in the detainee population beyond capacity. Transfers will also occur to ensure detainee treatment and conditions are IAW applicable law and policy. As a general rule, detainees should not be transferred closer to military operations.

d. A detainee who is captured or detained by the US military or other agencies will be turned over to the US detention facility designated by the JFC at the earliest opportunity. Inter-Service or intratheater transfers will be executed following initial classification and administrative processing.

14. Transfer Between Department of Defense Facilities

a. Reclassification or other situations may result in a detainee's transfer. The transferring unit will determine appropriate security measures based on the type of detainee being transferred, the mode of transportation used, and other relevant conditions.

b. The DFC:

- (1) Publishes a transfer order and inform the TDRC/NDRC of the movement.
- (2) Verifies the accuracy and completeness of the detainee's personal records and provide copies of the records (in a sealed envelope) to the guards accompanying the movement.
- (3) Verifies that the detainees possess their authorized clothing and equipment.
- (4) Accounts for and prepares impounded personal property for shipment with the escorting unit or separate shipment as appropriate.
- (5) Briefs escort personnel on their duties and responsibilities, including procedures for an escape, a death, or other emergencies.
- (6) Provides rations and basic needs to the detainees during the movement.
- (7) Ensures the detainees are manifested by name, ISN, nationality, and physical condition (including a statement of "communicable diseases," if applicable).
- (8) Prepares paperwork in English and other languages (if required) before transferring the detainees.
- (9) Ensures detainees are given a full physical by a health care provider and a supply of required medications with instructions for their use.
- (10) Ensures all appropriate health and disciplinary records accompany the detainee.
- (11) Coordinates prior to transfer with JFC subordinate commanders regarding transfer of detainees.

15. Transfer or Release Mission

a. For transfer or release from within the JOA to either other detention facilities or direct release of the detainee back into the community, the following requirements should be met:

(1) Publish the transfer/release order informing the detainees of their impending transfer or release when required by the applicable Geneva Convention so that they may notify their next-of-kin of their new location. Caution should be exercised to ensure sensitive detainee information is not released to the general public or local officials.

(2) Verify the accuracy of the detainees' personnel records and provide copies (in a sealed envelope) to the transporting unit.

(3) Verify detainees possess their authorized clothing and equipment. Account for and prepare impounded personal property for shipment with the escorting unit.

(4) Ensure logistic resources are adequate (food and water).

(5) Ensure the detainees are manifested by name, rank/status, ISN, power served, nationality, and physical condition. Attach the manifest to the original receipt and provide a copy to the NDRC.

(6) Prepare paperwork in English and other languages (if required) before transferring/releasing the detainees.

(7) Coordinate, prior to transfer, with JFC subordinate commanders regarding transfer of detainees.

(8) Verify collected biometric data.

b. For release from a long-term detention facility, the following requirements should be considered. SecDef, or SecDef's designee, sends official notification of release from long-term detention. Applicable execute orders approved by appropriate authority will delineate the responsibilities and procedures to undertake. Figure E-4 outlines the release process, from long-term detention, for detainees. The DFC may tailor stations to meet the current situation and conditions. Some steps normally taken to execute the order include:

(1) The releasing unit prepares, maintains, and reports the chain of custody and transfer/release documentation IAW current transfer and release procedures as directed by SecDef or SecDef's designee.

(2) Individual detainee preparation including, at a minimum, segregation and outbriefing, medical screening, and execution of conditional release statement for those detainees being released.

(3) Determination of receipt/transfer location.

(4) Movement routes to transfer location. Coordinate all routes through the appropriate CCDRs.

(5) Due to operational security concerns, only make public notification of a release and/or transfer in consultation and coordination with OSD.

Transfer Accountability Measures

	Actions
Control and accountability	<p>Maintain control and accountability until releases or transfers are received by the appropriate authorities.</p> <p>Maintain a manifest that contains:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">NameRank/statusInternment serial numberPower served/nationalityPhysical condition <p>Note: A manifest is used as an official receipt of transfer and becomes a permanent record to ensure accountability of each detainee until release.</p>
Records	<p>Ensure that copies of appropriate personnel, finance, and medical record narrative summaries accompany released detainees. Signed release agreements will be maintained within the Department of Defense.</p> <p>Transfer the records to the designated receiving authority.</p>
Personal property	<p>Ensure that confiscated personal property (that can be released) accompanies released detainees.</p> <p>Conduct an inventory and identify discrepancies.</p> <p>Ensure that detainees sign property receipts.</p> <p>Ensure released detainee is provided with appropriate food, clothing, and equipment for safe transition and movement upon release.</p>

Figure E-4. Transfer Accountability Measures

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- d. DODD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*.
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- g. DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*.
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APPENDIX G

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the Department of the Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Dr. John Bonin, Joint Staff J-3; Mr. Alan Armitstead, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Branch; and Lt Col Lewis Vaughn, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Branch.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, 24 February 2014.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness

of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at <https://www.jllis.mil> (NIPRNET) or <http://www.jllis.smil.mil> (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (NIPRNET) and <https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/generic.jsp> (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at <http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

AADC	area air defense commander
AADP	area air defense plan
AAMDC	Army air and missile defense command
ACM	airspace coordinating measure
ACP	airspace control plan
ADCON	administrative control
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AFME	Armed Forces Medical Examiner
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AJP	Allied joint publication
AMD	air and missile defense
AO	area of operations
AOI	area of interest
AOR	area of responsibility
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APS	Army pre-positioned stocks
AR	Army regulation
ARFOR	Army forces
AT	antiterrorism
ATO	air tasking order
ATP	Army techniques publication
BCD	battlefield coordination detachment (USA)
BCT	brigade combat team
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CACOM	civil affairs command
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAS	close air support
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CDO	commander, detainee operations
CFLCC	coalition forces land component commander
CI	counterintelligence
CIE	collaborative information environment
C-IED	counter-improvised explosive device
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center

CO	cyberspace operations
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
COIN	counterinsurgency
COMCAM	combat camera
COMSEC	communications security
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
COP	common operational picture
C-RAM	counter-rocket, artillery, mortar
CUL	common-user logistics
CWMD	countering weapons of mass destruction
DAFL	directive authority for logistics
DAL	defended asset list
DCO	defensive cyberspace operations
DFC	detention facility commander
DHA	detainee holding area
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DLD	digital liaison detachment
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DODIN	Department of Defense information network
DOS	Department of State
DRS	detainee reporting system
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
EA	executive agent
EMS	electromagnetic spectrum
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPW	Enemy prisoner of war
EW	electromagnetic warfare
FECC	fires and effects coordination center (USMC)
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FM	field manual (USA)
FPCON	force protection condition
FSCC	fire support coordination center (USMC)
FSCL	fire support coordination line
FSCM	fire support coordination measure
FSCOORD	fire support coordinator (USA)
FSO	fire support officer
GC	Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

GPS	Global Positioning System
GPW	Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
GWS	Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field
HD	homeland defense
HN	host nation
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAW	in accordance with
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	improvised explosive device
IG	inspector general
IPI	indigenous populations and institutions
ISN	internment serial number
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW	irregular warfare
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-2X	joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-35	future operations cell
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff
J-7	engineering staff section of a joint staff
J-8	force structure, resource, and assessment directorate of a joint staff
J-9	civil-military operations/interagency cooperation directorate of a joint staff
JACCE	joint air component coordination element
JAOC	joint air operations center
JDDOC	joint deployment and distribution operations center
JECC	Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (USTRANSCOM)
JEMSO	joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFE	joint fires element
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander

JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIDC	joint interrogation and debriefing center
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JLOP	joint land operations plan
JMC	joint movement center
JNCC	joint network operations control center
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JPG	joint planning group
JPP	joint planning process
JPRC	joint personnel recovery center
JRRB	joint requirements review board
JRSOI	joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
JSA	joint security area
JSC	joint security coordinator
JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
JTF	joint task force
JTF-E	joint task force-elimination
KLE	key leader engagement
LCC	land component commander
LNO	liaison officer
LOC	line of communications
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MARFOR	Marine forces
MCDP	Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP	Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEB	Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
MILDEC	military deception
MISO	military information support operations
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
MOPP	mission-oriented protective posture
MP	military police (USA and USMC)
MPF	maritime pre-positioning force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRC	National Detainee Reporting Center
NECC	Navy Expeditionary Combat Command

NGO	nongovernmental organization
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OCO	offensive cyberspace operations
OCS	operational contract support
OE	operational environment
OEF	Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
OIF	Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
ORSA	operations research and systems analysis
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PR	personnel recovery
PRCC	personnel recovery coordination cell
RAM	rockets, artillery, and mortars
RFA	request for assistance
RFC	request for capabilities
RFF	request for forces
ROE	rules of engagement
RP	retained personnel
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SCA	space coordinating authority
SDF	strategic detention facility
SE	site exploitation
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SFA	security force assistance
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOF	special operations forces
SOP	standard operating procedure
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
TACON	tactical control
TDF	theater detention facility
TDRC	theater detention reporting center
TEC	theater engineer command
TF	task force
T-JTB	theater-joint transportation board
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data

TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
TSC	theater sustainment command (USA)
TST	time-sensitive target
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
USA	United States Army
USC	United States Code
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCYBERCOM	United States Cyber Command
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Army corps. An echelon of command and tactical formations that employs divisions, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

Army division. An echelon of command and tactical formation that employs brigade combat teams, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

Army Service component command. Command responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatant command. Also called **ASCC**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

Army support area. At all echelons, an area designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of sustainment assets and where the majority of sustaining operations occur. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

brigade combat team. A combined arms team that forms the basic building block of the Army's tactical formations. Also called **BCT**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

civilian internee. A civilian, including ones described by Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, in the custody or control of Armed Forces of the United States during an armed conflict or occupation, including those held for imperative reasons of security or protection, who generally qualifies for protected status under the Geneva Conventions. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this term and its definition will be included in the DOD Dictionary.).

close support. The action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

onsolidation area. The portion of the land commander's operational area that may be designated to facilitate freedom of action, consolidate gains, and set conditions to transition to follow on forces or other legitimate authorities. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

custody. 1. The responsibility for the control, transfer and movement, and maintenance of accountability for weapons and components. 2. Temporary restraint of a person. 3. The detention of a person by lawful authority or process. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this publication will assume proponentcy for this term and its definition and this publication number will replace the existing proponent number in the DOD Dictionary.).

detainee. Any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of Department of Defense personnel. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this publication will

assume proponency for this term and its definition and this publication number will replace the existing proponent number in the DOD Dictionary.).

detainee collection point. A facility or other location where detainees are assembled for subsequent movement to a detainee holding area. Also called **DCP**. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this publication will assume proponency for this term and its definition and this publication number will replace the existing proponent number in the DOD Dictionary.).

detainee holding area. A facility or other location where detainees are administratively processed and provided custodial care pending disposition and subsequent release, transfer, or movement to a theater detention facility. Also called **DHA**. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this publication will assume proponency for this term and its definition and this publication number will replace the existing proponent number in the DOD Dictionary.).

detainee operations. A broad term that encompasses the capture, initial detention and screening, transportation, treatment and protection, housing, transfer, and release of the wide range of persons who could be categorized as detainees. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this publication will assume proponency for this term and its definition and this publication number will replace the existing proponent number in the DOD Dictionary.).

field army. An echelon of command that employs multiple corps, divisions, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. Also called **JFLCC**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

joint land operations. Land operations performed across the competition continuum with land forces made available by Service components in support of the joint force commander's operation or campaign objectives or in support of other components of the joint force. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this definition will modify the existing definition and be incorporated into the DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

joint land operations plan. A joint force land component commander's plan for a connected series of joint land operations to achieve objectives within a given time and operational area. Also called **JLOP**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

land control operations. The employment of land forces, supported by maritime and air forces (as appropriate) to control vital land areas. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

land domain. The area of the Earth's surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

land forces. Personnel, weapon systems, vehicles, and support elements operating on land to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

line of departure. 1. In land warfare, a line designated to coordinate the departure of attack elements. Also called **LD**. (JP 3-31) 2. In amphibious operations, a suitably marked offshore coordinating line, which is located at the seaward end of a boat lane, to assist in the landing of landing craft and amphibious vehicles on designated beaches at the scheduled times. Also called **LOD**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)

military occupation. A condition in which territory is under the effective control of a foreign armed force. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31.)

mission command. The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

National Detainee Reporting Center. The national-level center that accounts for all persons who pass through the care, custody, and control of the Department of Defense and that obtains and stores information concerning detainees and their confiscated personal property. Also called **NDRC**. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this publication will assume proponenty for this term and its definition and this publication number will replace the existing proponent number in the DOD Dictionary.).

operations research. The analytical study of military problems undertaken to provide responsible commanders and staff agencies with a scientific basis for decision on action to improve military operations. Also called **operational research; operations analysis**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

reportable incident. None. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this term and its definition will be removed from the DOD Dictionary.)

retained personnel. Detainees who fall into one of the following categories: a. Designated enemy medical personnel and medical staff administrators who are exclusively engaged in either the search for, collection, transport, or treatment of the wounded or sick, or the prevention of disease; b. Staff of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and that of other volunteer aid societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments to assist medical service personnel of their own armed forces, provided they are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and provided that the staff of such societies are subject to military laws and regulations; chaplains attached

to enemy armed forces. Also called **RP**. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this publication will assume proponenty for this term and its definition and this publication number will replace the existing proponent number in the DOD Dictionary.).

segregation. In detainee operations, the removal of a detainee from other detainees and their environment for legitimate purposes unrelated to interrogation, such as when necessary for the movement, health, safety, and/or security of the detainee, the detention facility, or its personnel. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this publication will assume proponenty for this term and its definition and this publication number will replace the existing proponent number in the DOD Dictionary.)

ensitive site. A geographically limited area that contains, but is not limited to, adversary information systems, war crimes sites, critical government facilities, and areas suspected of containing high-value targets. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

site exploitation. A series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of operations. Also called **SE**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

standard operating procedure. A set of instructions applicable to those features of operations that lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. Also called **SOP**; **standing operating procedure**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

tactical questioning. The field-expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value of a captured or detained person at or near the point of capture and before the individual is placed in a detention facility. Also called **TQ**. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this publication will assume proponenty for this term and its definition and this publication number will replace the existing proponent number in the DOD Dictionary.).

theater Army. An echelon of command designated as the Army Service component command responsible for recommendations of allocation and employment of Army forces to the geographic combatant commander. Also called **TA**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-31)

theater detainee reporting center. The field operating agency of the National Detainee Reporting Center responsible for maintaining information on all detainees and their personal property within a theater of operations or assigned area of operations. Also called **TDRC**. (Upon approval of this revised publication, this publication will assume proponenty for this term and its definition and this publication number will replace the existing proponent number in the DOD Dictionary.).